Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Emission Reduction Decision-Making Behavior of Public Building Owners Based on Carbon Trading

ICCREM 2016 ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui Yan ◽  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Xin Yang ◽  
Terry Hongyang Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Public Building ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Decision Making Behavior

scholarly journals The Stimulation and Coordination Mechanisms of the Carbon Emission Trading Market of Public Buildings in China

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingyan Li ◽  
Mimi Duan ◽  
Xiaotong Guo ◽  
Yao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Public Buildings ◽  
Public Building ◽  
Trading Mechanism ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading ◽  
Decision Making Behavior ◽  
The Impact

The most important issue related to the establishment of carbon emission trading in China is how to motivate the owners of public buildings to participate. However, Existing research few considered the characteristics of public building owners and the influence of various uncertain factors in carbon emission trading investments. To fill this gap, this study constructs a carbon emission trading investment decision model of public building owners to study the mechanism that encourages them to participate, incorporating these characteristics and uncertain factors. The findings are as follows. First, carbon price is important in adjusting the emission reductions of different owners to minimize the total social cost of emission-reduction measures. Second, the price of carbon-emission permits has a significant impact on the investment threshold and decision-making behavior of public building owners. Finally, reducing the cost of energy-conservation and emission-reduction technologies in public buildings and appropriately subsidizing owners for their emission-reduction investment were effective methods to motivate them to participate in carbon emission trading. The results were used to quantitatively analyze the impact of a carbon emission trading mechanism on the decision-making behavior of public building owners and to construct the carbon emission trading mechanism used in China’s public building industry.

scholarly journals Analysis of Fallow Farming Decision-Making Behavior of Farmers Based on Hawk-Dove Game Theory: The Case of Guizhou Province

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (14) ◽  
pp. 3821
Author(s):  
Hualin Xie ◽  
Qing Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Guizhou Province ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Cultivated Land ◽  
Successful Development ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
The Government ◽  
Decision Making Behavior

Implementing a land fallow policy is of great significance for ensuring China’s food security and promoting the improvement of the ecological environment. The implementation of a fallow project involves different stakeholders. Farmers are the main participants in the fallow project. The decision of farmers to practice fallow is the key factor for the successful development of the fallow project. Therefore, this study theoretically reveals the decision-making mechanism of farmers’ participation in cultivated land fallow by utilizing the hawk-dove evolutionary game theory among farmers and explains some challenges in the implementation of fallow in Guizhou Province. We drew the following conclusions: (1) The behavior of farmers will be affected by other farmers in the same situation, and the effects of mutual incentives and imitations between the groups of farmers are affected by their interests; (2) in the fallow project, the rate of choosing either fallow or unfallow depends on the ratio of fallow income to planting income. If the income of participating in fallow is higher, the demonstration effect of farmers participating in fallow is stronger, and the strategy of continued cultivation is adopted. The fewer unfallow farmers there are, the more consolidated the results of fallow will be; and (3) the government should protect the income of farmers after fallow as much as possible, implement flexible subsidy policies, and formulate corresponding policies to successfully consolidate the fallow results.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11421
Author(s):  
Xueping Wu ◽  
Liping Zhang ◽  
Jianhua Huang ◽  
Wei Li ◽  
Yanhua Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Household Waste ◽  
Separation Mechanism ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Recycling Economy ◽  
Decision Making Behavior

Municipal household waste (MHW) separation is a fundamental way to achieve waste reduction and a recycling economy. This study takes the positions of government and residents in MHW separation as the research object, and aims to explore the change process and influencing factors of their decision-making behavior, which is of great significance to attract residents to participate in MHW separation and establish an effective MHW separation mechanism to solve MHW pollution. This paper firstly establishes an evolutionary game model between government and residents in MHW separation; secondly, the payoff matrix of the system is determined, and the replication dynamic equations under different constraints are calculated to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of the system, and the stability conditions are analyzed; Finally, through numerical simulation, the decision-making behavior of MHW separation and its influencing factors are studied, and the rationality of the model is verified. The results show that: (1) In the process of MHW separation, residents often choose not to separate without government regulation; (2) Environmental fee rates and government effort have great impacts on residents’ decision-making behavior; (3) The increase of penalty intensity can significantly drive residents to separate MHW; (4) The sensitivity of residents’ behavior decision to subsidy coefficient is the lowest among all the variables, and the incentive effect of increasing subsidy coefficient is not obvious. The research results can not only provide theoretical guidance for policy makers to develop waste management policies, but also provide valuable insights for local communities to guide residents’ MHW separation behavior.

scholarly journals Analysis on Decision-Making Changes of Multilevel Governments and Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuansheng Wang ◽  
Xiaojing Wu ◽  
Juqin Shen ◽  
Chen Chi ◽  
Xin Gao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Critical Value ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Transboundary Water ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Decision Making Behavior ◽  
Protection Cost ◽  
The Impact

Watershed ecological compensation has been widely accepted as a system to promote the cooperation of various stakeholders to solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, but the existing research does not fully consider the impact of compensation fee paid by different governments on stakeholders’ decision-making. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite game model between upstream governments, downstream governments, and the central government by using evolutionary game theory and determines the influence of different factors on the decision-making process of each player through simulation. The results show the following: (1) the initial probability significantly affects the decision-making behavior of each player; (2) daily supervision of the central government and the reduction of the environmental protection cost can promote the implementation of watershed ecological compensation; (3) the fine to downstream governments makes the decisions of the central government and downstream governments change periodically; and (4) the increase of ecological compensation fee urges downstream governments to choose noncompensation, and compensation fee paid by the central government has a critical value.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis on Strategies in “Main Manufacturer–Supplier” Mode Considering Technology Docking and Price Concluding under Competition Condition

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
pp. 1184
Author(s):  
Ming Zhang ◽  
Jianjun Zhu ◽  
Hehua Wang ◽  
Pei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Complex Products ◽  
Competition Condition ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Cost ◽  
First Mover

This paper analyses the strategies of the substitutable suppliers competing to collaborate with a main manufacturer in “main manufacturer–supplier” (M-S) mode. In the research and development (R&D) of complex products, only one supplier can be chosen for one kind of part as a long-term collaboration partner with the manufacturer. The competition between substitutable suppliers focuses on the technology docking and price-concluding strategies. In this paper, one original supplier as the first-mover and one new supplier as the second-mover chose between the two strategies sequentially to compete for the collaborative preference of the manufacturer. We also took the delay cost brought by strategy changing into the consideration of the risks, which the suppliers and the manufacturer should prepare to share. With evolutionary game theory applied, we can conclude that the initial costs have little impact on suppliers’ making decisions, while the initial prices are correlated with both suppliers’ decision making. Results also show that hesitation and fluctuation periods exist in suppliers’ decision making, which have a relationship with existing strategy conditions, initial prices, and the cost caused by modifying the part. These results provide practical and reasonable managerial implications for M-S collaboration.

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