Does debt affect firm value in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis

2011 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng-Li Lin ◽  
Tsangyao Chang
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Threshold Regression ◽  
Panel Threshold Regression

Relation between foreign ownership and firm value – Fixed-effect panel threshold regression analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruchi Kansil
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Fixed Effect ◽  
Threshold Regression ◽  
Firm Characteristics ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Threshold Levels ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Panel Threshold Regression

PurposeThe paper examines the differential impact of various firm characteristics on firm value across various threshold levels of foreign ownership.Design/methodology/approachUsing a panel of 408 Indian publicly listed companies for the period during 2010–2018, a fixed-effect panel threshold regression model is adapted to study the threshold effects between foreign ownership and firm value. Tobin's Q is used as a proxy for firm value.FindingsThe study identifies three threshold levels, that is, four threshold regions in which foreign ownership changes its slope considerably. Various firm characteristics impact firm value differently in these four regions.Research limitations/implicationsThe study employs observations of the past nine years on variables identified as firm characteristics impacting firm value. Some variables are dropped due to the problem of multicollinearity. The employed variables may not be exhaustive in nature.Practical implicationsThe present study implies that there exists no impact of foreign ownership on the value of the firm. Foreign investors invest for financial considerations and not with the objective of governing the firms. The governance effect of foreign investments is negligible, so their activism in the firms needs to be encouraged.Originality/valueThe study employs a novel approach to study the impact of foreign ownership on firm value applying fixed effect panel data threshold regression, considering foreign ownership as a proxy of corporate governance.

scholarly journals Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 119-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng-Li Lin ◽  
Tsangyao Chang
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Regression Model ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Utilization Efficiency ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Threshold Regression ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Threshold Regression Model ◽  
Panel Threshold Regression

Two agency theories have dominated the corporate ownership debate, the convergence of interest and the entrenchment hypothesis. Following the work of Ang et al. (2000) and Sing and Davidson (2003) to a panel of 266 Taiwanese listed companies for the 1996-2006 period, we adopt an advanced panel threshold regression model to determine whether managerial ownership reduces agency costs. We find when managerial ownership is less than 36.55% or greater than 59.06%, consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership decreases asset utilization efficiency by 0.32% and 0.5%, respectively. However, managerial ownership is between 51.35% and 59.06%, consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership increases asset utilization efficiency by 0.21%

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