An evolutionary game theory analysis linking manufacturing, logistics, and the government in low-carbon development

Author(s):  
Haojun Wang ◽  
Lianghua Chen ◽  
Jun Liu
Author(s):  
Yan Liu ◽  
Chenyao Lv ◽  
Hong Xian Li ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Zhen Lei ◽  
...  

Managing quality risks of prefabricated components is one of the challenges for prefabricated construction. The Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components (QLIPC) is an effective approach to transfer such risks; however, limited research has been conducted regarding the development of QLIPC. This study introduces an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-based approach incorporating decisions from both the government and insurance companies. In the EGT model, a payoff matrix under disparate strategies is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are deduced. The simulation calculation is then carried out by MATLAB using sample virtual data to demonstrate the analysis. The results show that the government should act as the game promoter because the QLIPC can reduce governance cost and has significant social benefits. This research contributes a theoretical framework to analyze the QLIPC development using the EGT theory, and it could help the government to make long-term strategies for developing the QLIPC market.


IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 18514-18521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijuan Yang ◽  
Yu Zhang ◽  
Raymond Chiong ◽  
Sandeep Dhakal ◽  
Qiangqiang Qi

Author(s):  
Arij Michel

The article uses evolutionary game theory analysis as the research object, which is the most commonly used research method of institutional change, and summarizes some methods in the research of institutional change, and points out the advantages and disadvantages of evolutionary game analysis in the research of institutional change and through the comparison of cutting-edge methods and evolutionary games to see the development direction of future research institutional changes.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tongyao Feng ◽  
Shuangliang Tai ◽  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Qingpeng Man

Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 218 ◽  
pp. 104-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristof Coninx ◽  
Geert Deconinck ◽  
Tom Holvoet

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