Human dignity's false start in the Supreme Court of Canada: equality rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M.J. Bateman
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
Tatyana A. Vasilyeva ◽  

The Canadian system of human rights protection is an original one. The Supreme Court of Canada is one of the most influential constitutional review bodies in the field of human rights. At the time of its adoption, the Canadian Charter of rights and freedoms had the broadest catalog of equality rights in Western countries, formed on the basis of the Bill of rights and provincial human rights codes case-law, as well as the activities of political movements and groups of equality advocates who played a decisive role in its drafting. In Canada, a distinction is made between the enumerated in Charter and analogous grounds of discrimination established by court. The plaintiffs may claim differences on the basis of the enumerated or analogous grounds, or indicate the necessity to establish new analogous grounds. Article 15 (the right to equality) is recognized as one of the most conceptually complex provisions of the Charter. It is aimed at ensuring equality in the process of law drafting and implementation, as well as protecting human dignity. The Supreme Court of Canada is considering the provisions of the first part 1 of article 15, which enshrines the right to equality, and part 2 of this article, which provides for affirmative actions to assist disadvantaged groups as interrelated, reflecting the understanding of equality according to which affirmative actions are considered not as an exception, but as one of its best manifestations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-96
Author(s):  
Richard Moon

Very early in my academic career I wrote two pieces about section 15.1 The first was written in 1987, before the Supreme Court of Canada had heard any section 15 cases,2 and the second in 1989 was a comment on Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, the first of the Court’s section 15 decisions.3 When I re-read these pieces recently it struck me that with a few minor updates they could be read as comments on the Court’s recent decision in Fraser v Canada(Attorney General). 4 The same issues and tensions that were there at the beginning of section 15 are still there. They are built into the concept of constructive/effects discrimination and are not about to disappear. Shamelessly, I have reconstituted these two earlier pieces into a comment, of sorts, on the Fraser case. Other contributors in this special issue of the Constitutional Forum have set out the facts of the Fraser case and so I have not done so here. 1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Richard Moon, “Discrimination and Its Justification: Coping with Equality Rights under the Charter” (1988) 26:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 673.3 Richard Moon, “A Discrete and Insular Right to Equality: Comment on Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia”(1989) 21:3 Ottawa L Rev 563.4 2020 SCC 28 [Fraser].


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-84
Author(s):  
Joshua Sealy-Harrington

A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.”2 Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics. 1 s 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.


1993 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 523-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter McCormick

AbstractNow that the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has made the fact of judicial power so obvious, it is important to develop the conceptual vocabulary for describing and assessing this power. One such concept that has been applied to the study of United States and British appeal courts is the notion of “party capability theory,” which suggests that different types of litigant will enjoy different levels of success, as both appellant and respondent. Using a data base derived from all reported decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada between 1949 and 1992, this article applies party capability theory to the performance of Canada's highest court, and compares the findings with similar studies of American and British courts.


Refuge ◽  
2002 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Audrey Macklin

In Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Ahani v. MCI, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that removing a refugee accused of terrorism to a country where he or she would face a substantial risk of torture or similar abuse would virtually always violate the individual’s rights under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the Court deserves praise for vindicating fundamental human rights over competing claims of national security, coming so close on the heels of September 11, the victory is in certain respects more apparent than real. Given the strong endorsement of judicial deference to the exercise of Ministerial discretion in national security matters, the Court leaves the state wide scope to circumvent the spirit of the judgment while adhering to its letter.


2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 995-1003
Author(s):  
Louis-Philippe Pigeon

In practice, no question ever arises respecting the effectiveness of judicial decisions in matters of public law. Whether or not a judgment is technically executory is of no importance. There is such a high degree of respect for the decisions of the courts, specially those of the Supreme Court of Canada, that public authorities practically never feel free to seek a way out of compliance with a judicial pronouncement. Remedial powers of the courts are entrenched under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Constitution is declared to be the supreme law of Canada. There is thus very limited scope for governmental action in defiance of court orders. The only specific provision for such action appears to be a section of the Extradition Act authorizing the Minister of Justice to refuse to surrender a fugitive if he determines that the latter's offence is of a political character.


Author(s):  
Lawrence Sonia

This chapter considers the effect of section 1, the “justification” section of the Canadian Charter, on the doctrinal development of section 15, the equality section. It begins by describing the development of the section 15 substantive equality analysis, including the claim of a conceptually complete separation from the section 1 analysis of state justification. The chapter then identifies some features of section 15 which suggest that this separation is less than complete, including the existence of section 15(2), and anxieties over constraining government action. The chapter then turns to three post-2001 cases in which the Supreme Court of Canada found discrimination under the Charter but then held that discrimination was “justified” through section 1, and asks what these cases might reveal about the symbolic significance of a finding of discrimination and the Court’s struggle with institutional competence concerns in equality claims.


2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 663-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Dauvergne

This article reviews the Supreme Court of Canada’s treatment of claims by non-citizens since the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the early decisions in Singh and Andrews were strongly supportive of rights for non-citizens, the subsequent jurisprudence has been strikingly disappointing. This study shows that the decline in rights protections for non-citizens is a predictable consequence of some of the Court’s early interpretative positions about the Charter. This study considers all Supreme Court of Canada decisions in the thirty-year time frame. The analysis is rounded out by a consideration of cases that were not granted leave and cases that engage directly with an issue of non-citizens’ rights even where a non-citizen was not a party. The concluding section shows that non-citizens in Canada now have less access to rights protections than do non-citizens in some key comparator countries.


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