Cannibalism and the Common Law: The Story of the Tragic Last Voyage of the "Mignonette" and the Strange Legal Proceedings to Which It Gave Rise. A. W. Brian Simpson

Ethics ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 745-747
Author(s):  
David Braybrooke ◽  
Judith Fingard
1938 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-420
Author(s):  
E. Wyndham White

In what are generally known as ‘running-down’ cases, that is to say, actions of negligence by pedestrians against motorists who have caused them injuries, the pedestrian, like every other plaintiff, has to discharge the burden of showing that the accident was due to the negligence of the motorist. This burden is made heavier by the fact that in most cases the pedestrian will have been disabled at the time of the accident from observing accurately the exact circumstances of the case and from enlisting the support of eye-witnesses. This latter disadvantage is a very real one if one takes into consideration the extraordinary reluctance of the average citizen to come forward and testify voluntarily in legal proceedings. The appalling wastage of human life and the suffering caused by road accidents in recent years is reflected in the anxiety of legislators to devise regulations for the protection and safeguarding of all road-users, and pedestrians in particular. The time is apt, therefore, to consider once again the desirability of altering in this class of cases the common law burden of proof of negligence.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Geercken ◽  
Kelly Holden ◽  
Michael Rath ◽  
Mark Surguy ◽  
Tracey Stretton

AbstractIn the context of internal or regulatory investigations or other legal proceedings, companies located in Europe may be forced to disclose electronically stored information such as e-mails on short notice in order to comply with any such internal or regulatory request or applicable procedural electronic discovery regulations. These disclosure requirements may have considerable breadth, and non-compliance can lead to severe sanctions.Part I of this article describes the American procedure of e-discovery. Part II provides a brief description of the British concept of e-disclosure and considers how it differs from the American concepts of e-discovery. Part III shows - as one prominent example for civil code jurisdictions in the European Union (for an overview of other jurisdictions see The Sedona Conference, International Overview of Discovery, Data Privacy and Disclosure Requirements, September 2009) - the German regime for e-discovery requests and highlights some data protection issues to be observed. Part IV examines how the conflict existing between the common law concept of e-evidence and the civil law principles could be harmonized. Finally, part V gives some examples of how technology can be used to support e-discovery and to establish processes in compliance with applicable data privacy laws.


Author(s):  
J.-G. Castel

I Persons against whom the jurisdiction cannot be enforcedThe first part of this note deals with the persons who claim immunity from the compulsory jurisdiction of Canadian courts.(1) The Foreign State, Sovereign or Head of Foreign State as a DefendantThe law relating to the immunity of foreign states and sovereigns or heads of foreign states from Canadian jurisdiction is to be found in the common law and has been stated and re-stated in leading cases such as The Parlement Belge, The Porto Alexandre, The Cristina, Dessaulles v. The Republic of Poland and Mehr v. The Republic of China et al. Lord Atkin reduced this law to two propositions:The first is that the courts of a country will not implead a foreign sovereign, that is, they will not by their process make him against his will a party to legal proceedings whether the proceedings involve process against his person or seek to recover from him specific property or damages.The second is that they will not by their process, whether the sovereign is a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property which is his or of which he is in possession or control.


Author(s):  
John Jackson ◽  
Paul Roberts

This chapter offers a critique of the “common law model” of the Law of Evidence and calls for a new organizing principle that “reimagines” evidence law as forensic science, particularly in the context of criminal adjudication. It first provides an overview of the orthodox common law model of Evidence Law before deconstructing it, arguing that it adopts a very narrow doctrinal focus, thus undermining the dynamic processes through which evidence is collected, organized, presented, tested, and evaluated in legal proceedings. It also suggests that the model is difficult to defend in terms of robust disciplinary boundaries differentiating that which is specifically evidentiary from broader aspects of substantive and procedural law. Finally, it considers the so-called “New Evidence Scholarship” on evidence law, the impact of the new cosmopolitanism on common law evidence, and the rationale for reconceptualizing evidence law as part of an interdisciplinary “forensic science” that goes “beyond common law.”


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