The shape of Athenian laws

1998 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Carey

The title is unashamedly plagiarized from Stephen Todd's excellent book, The Shape of Athenian Law. The plagiarism is slightly misleading, however, since my interest is in law as enactment (Gesetz) while Todd's title expresses his interest in law as system (Recht). The issue I wish to address is the formulation of written laws in Athens during the late archaic and classical period, specifically the balance between procedural and substantive law. Substantive law deals with rights, obligations, offences, etc. Its role is to define behaviour which is required, allowed, or prohibited. These are what Hart terms ‘primary rules’. Procedural law, on the other hand, deals, as the name suggests, with the administration of justice, that is with jurisdiction, process, etc. Hart's term for these is ‘secondary rules’. The two cannot be separated quite as neatly as I have suggested, of course. A procedural law can scarcely avoid mentioning the offences or rights whose punishment or protection it regulates, while a substantive law may need to address issues such as jurisdiction. This is therefore an issue of orientation, not a simple binary division. However, as a broad basis for classification it is of value.

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 237-250
Author(s):  
Bernadette M Waluyo

The Indonesian Supreme Court, in response to the information era, modernizes the civil procedural rules at the district court level.  This is done by issuing Supreme Court Regulation no. 1 of 2019 re. Administration of Justice at Civil Law Courts and Electronic-Court Proceedings. Undoubtedly, modernization of existing rules on the administration of justice is much needed.  On the other hand, these changes may violate a number of procedural civil law principles.  The author argues, from a civil procedural law perspective, that the above Supreme Court regulation violates the basic principle of transparency of court proceedings and physical attendance at court proceedings. 


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsi-Ping Chen

The German Law on public procurement remedies, implementing the EU Remedies Directives into national law, has to engage in a balancing act between effective legal protection of bidders and the necessary acceleration of the award procedure. The book develops solutions for conflicts between the abovementioned opposing interests, which are consistent with the pluralistic paradigm of the European legal area, and the standards of assessment of the EU primary substantive law on public procurement. The Europeanisation of the German Law on public procurement remedies is analysed in detail. The work deals with the establishment and improvement of effective legal protection of bidders on the one hand and, on the other hand, shows that the acceleration of the award procedure within the framework of the procedural system is bounded by the rule of law. The book carves out strengths and deficits of the German Law on public procurement remedies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-324
Author(s):  
Haidar Adam

Abstract: This article discusses about dissenting opinion and concurring opinion in the decision of the Constitutional Court. Law enforcement can be done through the Constitutional Court in the form of law judicial review. The issue of dissenting opinion is regulated through Law No. 24 Year 2003 and Constitutional Court Regulation No. 6 of PMK Year 2005 concerning Procedural Law of Tests of Act. The phrase used in the Constitutional Court Law is “the different opinion of the judiciary members". The different opinion, according to Jimly, is divided into two namely dissenting opinion and concurrent opinion. A verdict is considered concurring if there is an argument by a member of the panel of judges that is different from that of the other members of the judiciary but it does not affect the difference of the decision. On the other hand, a decision is said to be dissenting if the opinion of a member of the panel of judges is different from that of the majority of the other members of the panel of judges and the difference is not merely in the case of reasoning but to touching on the verdict. Keywords: Dissenting opinion, concurring opinion, the court constitution’s decision. Abstrak: Penegakan hukum dapat dilakukan melalui pengadilan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam bentuk pengujian terhadap undang-undang. Masalah dissenting opinion diatur melalui Undang-Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2003 dan Peraturan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 6 PMK Tahun 2005 tentang Hukum Acara Pengujian Undang Undang. Frase yang dipakai dalam UUMK adalah “pendapat anggota majelis hakim yang berbeda”. Pendapat yang berbeda menurut Jimly, dibedakan menjadi dua yaitu dissenting opinion dan concurrent opinion. Suatu putusan dianggap sebagai concurring apabila terdapat argumentasi anggota majelis hakim yang berbeda dengan mayoritas anggota majelis hakim yang lain, namun tidak berimbas pada perbedaan amar putusan. Di sisi lain, suatu putusan dikatakan dissenting, jika pendapat suatu anggota majelis hakim berbeda dengan pendapat mayoritas anggota majelis hakim yang lain dan sampai menyentuh pada amar putusan. Kata Kunci: Dissenting opinion, concurring opinion, putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 220
Author(s):  
Lisiane Beatriz Fröhlich ◽  
Jonathan Iovane De Lemos

RESUMOO presente estudo tem como objetivo geral compreender em qual dos planos dos atos processuais – existência, validade ou eficácia – reside o defeito que acomete a sentença de mérito prolatada com a preterição do(s) litisconsorte(s) necessário(s) unitário(s). A partir dos resultados obtidos com a pesquisa, constatou-se que, para o alcance de uma conclusão satisfatória a seu respeito, é imprescindível a verificação do momento em que é alegada a preterição do(s) litisconsorte(s) necessário(s) unitário(s). Assim, concluiu-se que, na eventualidade de a alegação ocorrer anteriormente ao trânsito em julgado, o defeito estará situado no plano da validade, tratando-se de uma nulidade absoluta. Por outro lado, após o trânsito em julgado, o que remanesce é o vício no plano da eficácia. Dessa forma, observa-se que a atual legislação processual civil não é incorreta, mas incompleta e carente de precisão. Isso porque, apesar da superlativa importância da definição do momento em que se está analisando o vício, o Código de Processo Civil de 2015 é omisso com relação a esse aspecto, potencializando as dúvidas a respeito do tema. Por fim, verificou-se que, devido à gravidade do defeito que acomete essa sentença – oriunda, sobretudo, da ofensa aos princípios constitucionais –, é possível que qualquer interessado o alegue. Além disso, pelos mesmos motivos, as vias processuais admissíveis para combater esse vício são variadas, podendo ser manejada a ação rescisória, a impugnação ao cumprimento de sentença, a querela nullitatis insanabilis ou, ainda, qualquer outro meio idôneo e compatível com a situação concreta.Palavras-chave: Litisconsórcio necessário unitário. Sentença de mérito. Inexistência. Invalidade. Ineficácia. ABSTRACTThe purpose of the present study is to understand in which of the plans of procedural acts – existence, validity or efficacy – is situated the defect that affects the judgment of merit prolated with the pretermission of the necessary unitary collegitimate. From the results obtained with the research, it was verified that, in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion about it, it is essential to verify the moment when is alleged the omission of the necessary unitary collegitimate. Thus, it was concluded that, if the claim occurs before it is formed the res judicata, the defect is situated in the validity plan, being an absolute nullity. On the other hand, after the res judicata is formed, what remains is the inefficacy. Therefore, it was verified that the current civil procedural law is not incorrect, but incomplete and lacking precision. This is because, in spite of the superlative importance of defining which moment the defect is being analyzed, the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code of 2015 do not consider this aspect, potentializing doubts about the issue. Finally, it was discovered that, because of the severity of the defect that affects this veredict – originated, principally, from the offense to the constitutional principles – it is possible that any interested subject of the process can claim it. Besides that, for the same reasons, it is admitted the use of several procedural means to combat this decision, like the rescissory action, the enforcement’s impugnment of the judgment, the querela nullitatis insanabilis or any other suitable procedural means and compatible with the specific situation.Keywords: Necessary unitary joinder of parties. Judgment of merit. Inexistence. Invalidity. Inefficacy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 64-69
Author(s):  
A. R. Sharipova

The negative impact of the existing legislative approach to reforming the criminal process on the possibility of its convergence with other procedural branches is considered. The unjustified separation of bills on reforming the CPC within the framework of unified procedural transformations is noted. Separate legislative work on the criminal process, on the one hand, and arbitration, civil and administrative, on the other hand, leads to the emergence of additional unjustified differences in the normative consolidation of universal institutions. Specific examples of undesirable divergence of lawsuits caused by uncoordinated lawmaking are given. The absence of convergence of procedural law among the goals of both sectoral, in particular, criminal procedure policy, and judicial policy is noted. The necessity of developing the concept and directions of judicial procedural policy is substantiated.


Author(s):  
М.Г. Абрамзон ◽  
А.А. Завойкин ◽  
В.Д. Кузнецов ◽  
И.А. Сапрыкина

В статье впервые публикуются серебряные монеты конца 6 середины 5 в. до н.э. из раскопок Фанагории. Этот нумизматический материал имеет важное значение для уточнения датировки слоев поздней архаики ранней классики на акрополе Фанагории и открытого в них целого ряда объектов жилищ, общественных зданий, фортификационных сооружений. С другой стороны, археологический контекст находок монет позволяет корректировать хронологию некоторых типов самих монет. Для этих целей особенно важны находки монет, которые происходят из разных уровней жизни общественного здания (294), построенного во второй половине 6 в. до н.э. и с перестройками дожившего до середины 5 в. до н.э. Кроме того, большое значение имеют находки монет в слое разрушения древнейших оборонительных сооружений Фанагории (679), которые погибли ок. 480 г. до н.э. К этому же времени относится клад боспорских серебряных монет, спрятанный под стеной дома (205). В целом хронология ранних серебряных монет, найденных на раскопе Верхний город , согласуется с характеристиками этого района города в период поздней архаики ранней классики (примерно до середины 5 в. до н.э.), что позволяет, опираясь на фанагорийские материалы, четко определить рубеж, отделяющий датировки более поздних монетных типов. Публикуемая коллекция представляет собой ценный источник информации о денежном обращении ранней Фанагории, а исследование химического состава металла монет дает возможность подойти к решению вопросов об источниках серебра для ранней боспорской чеканки и атрибуции ряда выпусков. The article is the first publication of the 6th first half of the 5th century B.C. silver coins from excavations at Phanagoria. These numismatic finds are most important for the verification of the date of the Late Archaic and Early Classical layers at the acropolis of Phanagoria and a number of structures discovered there dwellings, public buildings, fortifications. On the other hand, the archaeological context of numismatic finds allows us to verify the chronology of certain types of coins. Most important in this connection are coin finds from different levels of a public building (294) erected in the second half of the 6th century B.C., which existed, after a number of reconstructions, till the middle of the 5th century B.C. There are also important coin finds from the ruined fortifications of Phanagoria (679) destroyed circa 480 B.C. A hoard of Bosporan silver coins concealed under the wall of a dwelling (205) belongs to the same period. In general, the chronology of early silver coins found in the excavation site the Upper City agrees with the features of this area in the Late Archaic and Early Classic times (approximately before 450 B.C.), which allows us to define the border dating later coin types. The collection presented here is a valuable evidence for the currency in early Phanagoria, and the study of the chemical composition of the coin alloy allows us to find out the sources of silver for the Early Bosporos coins and the attribution for a number of issues.


Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel CABELLOS ESPIÉRREZ

LABURPENA: Konstituzioak, 149.1.6 artikuluan, ez zion atea itxi nahi izan autonomia- erkidegoen parte-hartzeari araudi prozesalaren erregulazioan, eta, berez, Estatuari legegintza prozesalaren gainean eman zion eskumen esklusiboa mugatua da; izan ere, beren zuzenbide substantiboaren berezitasunetatik eratorritako espezialitate prozesalen gaineko eskumena aitortu baitzien, aldi berean, autonomia-erkidegoei. Eskumen hori batez ere zuzenbide zibil propioa duten erkidegoetan erabiltzekoa zen, baina ez haietan bakarrik, ez eta soilik gai honi dagokionean ere. Konstituzio Auzitegiak, baina, hain modu murriztailean jokatu du konstituzio-arau hori interpretatu eta aplikatu behar izan duenean (47/2004 epaia da salbuespen bakarra), non autonomia-erkidegoen espezialitate prozesalen gaineko eskumena ezerezean geratu baita. Artikulu honen asmoa honako hau da: alde batetik, egoera honetara nola heldu garen aztertzea; bestetik, 21/2012 epaia analizatzea, zeinak Konstituzio Auzitegiaren ildo murriztailea berresten duen; eta, azkenik, gaurko egoeran beste hautabide batzuk eskaintzea, autonomia-erkidegoek espezialitate prozesalen gainean daukaten eskumena (haietako batzuk erabiltzen ari direna) desagertzeko zorian dago-eta Konstituzio Auzitegiaren jurisprudentzian. RESUMEN: La Constitución, en su art. 149.1.6, no quiso cerrar la puerta a la intervención de las CCAA en la regulación de la normativa procesal y otorgó al Estado una competencia exclusiva sobre legislación procesal cuya exclusividad es, en realidad, limitada, dada la simultánea atribución a las CCAA de la competencia para dictar las necesarias especialidades procesales derivadas de las particularidades de su derecho sustantivo. Ello debía ser especialmente útil en aquellas comunidades con Derecho civil propio, aunque no solo en estas ni únicamente respecto de este ámbito material. Ocurre sin embargo que el Tribunal Constitucional, en las ocasiones en que ha debido interpretar y aplicar el mencionado precepto constitucional, lo ha hecho de modo tan restrictivo que, con la única y aislada excepción de la STC 47/2004, la competencia autonómica relativa a las especialidades procesales ha quedado reducida a la nada. El propósito de este artículo es, por un lado, el de examinar cómo se ha llegado a este punto; por otro, estudiar el último de los casos relevantes, la STC 21/2012, que confirma la citada línea restrictiva seguida por el Tribunal; y finalmente apuntar algunas alternativas a la situación a la que se ha llegado, en que la competencia de las CCAA en materia de especialidades procesales (que por otra parte algunas están ejerciendo) se halla condenada a la práctica desaparición en la jurisprudencia constitucional. ABSTRACT: The Constitution in section 149.1.16 has not closed the door to the Autonomous Communities intervention in the regulation of the procedural provisions and conferred the State the exclusive power over the procedural legislation albeit its exclusivity is limited by the simultaneous allocation to the Au tonomous Communities of the power to enact the necessary procedural specifities that come from the special features of its substantive law. That should be extremely useful in those Communities with their own Civil law, even though not only in those and not solely regarding this material field. But what happens is that when the Constitutional Court had to interpret and apply the aforementioned constitutional provision, it has done it so narrowly that with the only and sole exception of the Constitutional judgment 47/2004 the power is almost reduced to nothing. The purpose of this article is on the one hand to examine how this is been reached; and on the other hand, to study the last relevant ruling, judgment 21/2012, which confirms the aforementioned narrow line of interpretation followed by the Court; and finally to point at some alternatives to the situation that has been created in which the power of the Autonomous Communities regarding the procedural specificities (and which they are exercising anyway) is doomed to the practical disappearance according to the constitutional caselaw.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Lever

It has been suggested1 that those reading this article are likely to fall into two groups: those who regard my proposition as obvious but feel that if I go on, as I evidently intend to, they will be driven to the opposite conclusion; and, on the other hand, those who take the view that my thesis can scarcely be taken seriously, but that they had better pay careful attention, just in case there is something in it.


Author(s):  
Peter Oestmann

Abstract Argument about legal fees in the early modern period. Part 2: jurisdiction and types of procedure. Part II of this investigation, following ZRG GA 132 (2015), pp. 152-218, describes the practice of the courts. What were the possibilities for procurators to sue for their fees if the parties did not pay them? Most aspects of procedural law were quite unknown until now: The Rescripts of the Aulic Council and the Mandata de solvendo of the Wismar Tribunal were complete different ways for the procurators to get their fees. Not surprisingly, the Wismar procedures seem the more powerful and effective ones, enabling the administrative and jurisdictional organization of the Swedish territory to sue in a promising way. On the other hand, the procedures at the Imperial courts show, up to the end of the Old Empire in the summer of 1806, the typical weakness, even if some effective bureaucracy can be observed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-42
Author(s):  
Folker Bittmann

The aim of German criminal procedural law is not to convict the accused at any cost. Even a guilty party can only be convicted if the criminal procedure is held in accordance with the law. If this is not possible, the German legal system accepts the risk of possibly acquitting a guilty party; it finds this more tolerable than the irregular conviction of the culprit. A criminal procedure seeks the truth. Only on the basis of a judicial conviction of the crime and its culprit may a sentence be imposed. This, though, can only be based on the so-calledprocedural truth.On the one hand, the past can never be reconstructed precisely; on the other hand, clarification can only be found through legal means and by following designated paths allowed by procedural law. Therefore, further investigation must cease if it is only possible to proceed by violating procedural law.


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