Attorney General for New South Wales v Trethowan [1932] AC 526, before the Privy Council

Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Attorney General for New South Wales v Trethowan [1932] AC 526, before the Privy Council. This case concerned whether provisions enacted by an earlier legislature could bind the legislative choices of future legislatures. It should be noted that this case relates to a dominion legislature. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.

Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Attorney General for New South Wales v Trethowan [1932] AC 526, before the Privy Council. This case concerned whether provisions enacted by an earlier legislature could bind the legislative choices of future legislatures. It should be noted that this case relates to a dominion legislature. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Attorney General for New South Wales v Trethowan [1932] AC 526, before the Privy Council. This case concerned whether provisions enacted by an earlier legislature could bind the legislative choices of future legislatures. It should be noted that this case relates to a dominion legislature. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-242
Author(s):  
Ian Holloway

There is, among many students of Australian law, a tendency to regard the establishment of constitutional government in Australia in positivistic terms: as a result of the passage of the New South Wales Act in 1823, or of the Australian Courts Act in 1828, or of the Australian Constitution Acts of 1842 and 1850, or even of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act in 1900. This is understandable, for, as Sir Victor Windeyer once put it, there was in the foundation of European society on these islands no element whatever of a social contract. Rather, the move to populate the Australian territories was a consequence entirely of a prospectively looking determination made by the government in London. And, as Windeyer went on to note, the formal establishment of local government was effected by ceremonies that were by their very essence positivistic in nature. On 26 January 1788, there was first a formal ceremony in which the Union flag was raised and a salute fired. Then, on 7 February, the whole population of the colony was assembled and the royal letters patent were read, which formally instructed Captain Phillip to go about the duty of creating a penal establishment.


1978 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-456
Author(s):  
Robert S. Geddes

During 1978, the High Court of Australia and the New South Wales Court of Appeal handed down decisions which announce a departure from the longstanding rule that decisions of the Privy Council bind all Australian Courts. In this article, Mr Geddes analyses these decisions and considers their future impact on the authority of Privy Council decisions in the various courts which make up the Australian judicial hierarchy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-68
Author(s):  
Brendan Lim

‘State courts’ can be understood in at least two ways. Their ‘attributes’ are the characteristics that define them as ‘courts’. Their ‘attribution’ is the extent to which they are regarded as emanations of a ‘state’ in its constitutional conception as a constituent unit of the federation. The principle first articulated in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 ensures the institutional integrity of state courts by protecting from legislative impairment their defining characteristics as ‘courts’. It therefore understands state courts almost exclusively by their ‘attributes’. This article examines the significance to the Kable principle of also understanding state courts by their ‘attribution‘. There are different conceptions of the proper attribution of state courts, coincident with different visions of how to accommodate simultaneous constitutional commitments to autonomous states and integrated courts. Those conceptions influence the content and application of the Kable principle in ways that are insufficiently appreciated. This insight permits a new perspective on the Kable principle as a doctrine of federalism, and its recent applications in International Finance Trust Co Ltd v NSW Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319; Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1; and Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181. It also prompts an analysis of a contemporaneous evolution in the constitutional policy of the Commonwealth, whose Attorney-General typically intervened in Kable cases in support of the states, until recently seeking to extend to them certain Chapter III limitations.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 73-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Quilter ◽  
David Brown

Within just over one month of coming into operation in May 2014, the new Bail Act 2013 (NSW), a product of long-term law reform consideration, was reviewed and then amended after talk-back radio ‘shock jock’ and tabloid newspaper outcry over three cases. This article examines the media triggers, the main arguments of the review conducted by former New South Wales (NSW) Attorney General John Hatzistergos, and the amendments, with our analysis of the judicial interpretation of the Act thus far providing relevant background. We argue that the amendments are premature, unnecessary, create complexity and confusion, and, quite possibly, will have unintended consequences: in short, they are a mess. The whole process of reversal is an example of law and order politics driven by the shock jocks and tabloid media, the views of which, are based on fundamental misconceptions of the purpose of bail and its place in the criminal process, resulting in a conflation of accusation, guilt and punishment. Other consequences of the review and amendments process recognised in this article include the denigration of judicial expertise and lack of concern with evidence and process; the disproportionate influence of the shock jocks, tabloids and Police Association of NSW on policy formation; the practice of using retired politicians to produce ‘quick fix’ reviews; and the political failure to understand and defend fundamental legal principles that benefit us all and are central to the maintenance of a democratic society and the rule of law. The article concludes with some discussion of ways in which media and political debate might be conducted to produce more balanced outcomes.


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