11. Intentional torts

2021 ◽  
pp. 128-139
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Per Se ◽  
False Imprisonment

This chapter discusses both common law and statute in relation to the torts of trespass to the person: battery, assault, and false imprisonment. These torts have three common characteristics: they are the result of intentional actions, take the form of direct harm, and are actionable per se, that is, without proof of damage. An additional intentional tort is derived from Wilkinson v Downton (1897), the wilful infliction of physical harm upon the claimant by indirect means. This category of intentional harm is also augmented by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Defences to the intentional torts are also discussed.

11. Intentional torts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Per Se ◽  
False Imprisonment

This chapter discusses both common law and statute in relation to the torts of trespass to the person: battery, assault, and false imprisonment. These torts have three common characteristics: they are the result of intentional actions, take the form of direct harm, and are actionable per se, that is, without proof of damage. An additional intentional tort is derived from Wilkinson v Downton (1897), the wilful infliction of physical harm upon the claimant by indirect means. This category of intentional harm is also augmented by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Defences to the intentional torts are also discussed.

11. Intentional torts

2019 ◽  
pp. 125-136
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Per Se ◽  
False Imprisonment

This chapter discusses both common law and statute in relation to the torts of trespass to the person: battery, assault, and false imprisonment. These torts have three common characteristics: they are the result of intentional actions, take the form of direct harm, and are actionable per se, that is, without proof of damage. An additional intentional tort is derived from Wilkinson v Downton (1897), the wilful infliction of physical harm upon the claimant by indirect means. This category of intentional harm is also augmented by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Defences to the intentional torts are also discussed.

Dangerous things and the Non-Natural User of Land

1929 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 376-397
Author(s):  
W. T. S. Stallybrass
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
True Nature ◽  
Moral Qualities ◽  
The Common ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Law

It is perhaps true that one of the most important moral qualities of a man, especially an undergraduate, is a knowledge of where to ‘draw the line’; it is certainly true that one of the most essential parts of a lawyer's equipment is the capacity for drawing distinctions correctly. The whole framework of the law is based upon distinctions, and the drawing of false distinctions is as disastrous as is the failure to draw those that are based upon sound reasoning. It is the object of this article to consider, very tentatively, two distinctions which have been introduced into the common law relating to injury done to others by the property of the defendant: in the first place, the distinction between those things which are dangerous per se and those things which are dangerous sub modo, and in the second place, the distinction between the natural and the non-natural user of land. I shall then endeavour to consider the relation of these two problems to each other. But there will be no attempt to state the nature or extent of the liability that arises; for example, I shall not consider the true nature of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher or the extent of the duty owed by him who deals with dangerous chattels, though some light may incidentally be thrown upon such matters.

15. Intentional interferences with the person

Tort Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 410-445
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Bodily Integrity ◽  
False Statement ◽  
Freedom Of Movement ◽  
Per Se ◽  
False Imprisonment

This chapter examines intentional interferences with the person, including the torts comprising trespass to the person—battery, assault and false imprisonment—the tort in Wilkinson v Downton [1897], and the statutory tort of harassment. The trespass to the person torts seek to protect an individual against an infringement of their personal or bodily integrity, that is, against the infliction, or fearing the infliction, of unlawful force (battery and assault) and the unlawful restriction of a person’s freedom of movement (false imprisonment). The three trespass to the person torts have the same characteristics: the defendant must have intended both the conduct itself and consequences of their action; the defendant’s action must cause direct and immediate harm; and they are actionable per se, that is, without proof of loss. The chapter also considers the tort in Wilkinson v Downton, which provides a remedy for physical and psychiatric harm deliberately caused by a false statement, and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which imposes both civil and criminal liability for harassing conduct.

A new chapter in the law of sexual harassment in Malaysia: The emergence of the torts of harassment and sexual harassment

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 191-207
Author(s):  
Abdul Majid ◽  
Sri Yogamalar ◽  
Audrey Kim Lan Siah ◽  
Jane L Y Terpstra-Tong ◽  
Luc Borrowman
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Harassment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Law ◽  
First Time

In a landmark case in 2016, Malaysia’s apex court, the Federal Court, explicitly recognised for the first time, the common law tort of sexual harassment. Actually, the Federal Court did more than that; its recognition of the common law tort of sexual harassment is built on its recognising the common law tort of harassment. The recognition of the tort of harassment has escaped notice because attention has been concentrated on the tort of sexual harassment. This article analyses the Federal Court’s exposition of the tort of sexual harassment to reveal that the exegesis itself acknowledges the existence of the tort of harassment per se. The tort of harassment that the Federal Court sent out into the world is largely a creature of its English common law ancestry.

scholarly journals Preventing lawful and decent burial: resurrecting dead offences

Legal Studies ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 354-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imogen Jones ◽  
Muireann Quigley
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Per Se

Recent high-profile convictions have called attention to the common law offence of preventing a lawful and decent burial. This offence, which can only be found in its modern incarnation since 1974, is being used with increasing frequency. We argue that there is, however, little justification (or need) for criminalising the prevention of burial per se. The historical context of the need to regulate the disposal of corpses is no longer relevant. Moreover, the ambit of the offence is such that it cannot be argued to be targeting acts of intentional disrespect to deceased bodies. We suggest that acts which intentionally impede the administration of justice are rightly criminal, but other offences already deal more appropriately with these. We conclude that the contemporary use of the offence of preventing a lawful and decent burial contributes to an unnecessary proliferation of overlapping offences, providing prosecutors and juries with a way to assign liability to a person whom they suspect, but cannot prove, is guilty of more serious charges.

Exemplary damages in the English law of tort

Legal Studies ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-200
Author(s):  
P. R. Ghandhi
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Personal Injury ◽  
Monetary Value ◽  
Actual Harm ◽  
Subjective Element ◽  
English Law ◽  
False Imprisonment

At common law, the primary remedy for a successful plaintiff in an action in tort is an award of damages. The plaintiff must be put in the position in which he was before the tort was committed so far as money can do this. In many actions the principle of restitutio in integrum is a sufficient guide to the quantum of damages. But, in other cases, for example, actions for damages for personal injuries or defamation, a highly subjective element is involved. Neither personal injury nor loss of reputation is easily convertible by the use of any yardstick into an exact monetary figure.In some cases, the damages are said to be ‘at large’. This signifies that the award is not limited to the pecuniary loss that can be precisely proved. Where damages are ‘at large’, as they are, for example, in assault, false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, trespass and defamation, they may be conveniently divided into three separate elements. First, there is the compensation for the actual harm caused to the plaintiff by the defendant; in addition to any pecuniary loss specifically proved, the assessment will involve putting a monetary value on the physical hurt in assault, on curtailment of liberty in false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, on injury to reputation in defamation and on inconvenience and disturbance in trespass.

Negligence Per Se and Unaccounted Risks

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert D. Cooter ◽  
Ariel Porat
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Background Risks

This chapter considers cases of “negligence per se” and the problem of unaccounted risks. In general, breaching the statute constitutes “negligence per se.” When the injurer's breach of the statute harms people, courts systematically compensate the victims explicitly targeted by the legislation and not other victims, creating a misalignment. The chapter first examines the doctrine of negligence per se before discussing the problem of unaccounted risks. It then describes an approach that it argues is wrong in common law negligence: the tendency of courts to treat foreground risks created by the injurer as wrongful and impose liability accordingly, while ignoring background risks. It also explores a condition for establishing liability, known as the “causal link,” and asks why courts account for the foreground risks while disregarding the background risks.

Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] WLR 660 House of Lords: A detective constable, exercising his powers under s2(4) of the CLA 1967, arrested the plaintiff on suspicion that she had stolen jewellery and took her to a police station where she was questioned. She was not charged with an offence and was released from detention within six hours of her arrest. The plaintiff bought an action in the county court against the Chief Constable for damages for wrongful arrest. The judge found that the detective constable had had reasonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff of having committed an arrestable offence and that the period of detention was not excessive but, because the constable had decided not to interview her under caution but to subject her to the greater pressure of arrest and detention so as to induce a confession, there had been a wrongful exercise of the power of arrest. The plaintiff was awarded £1,000 damages. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the Chief Constable. On the plaintiffs appeal: Held that the Wednesbury principles were to be applied in determining, for the purpose of founding an action at common law for false imprisonment, whether the discretion conferred upon a constable by s2(4) of the CLA 1967 to arrest a person without a warrant had been exercised lawfully, namely whether the discretion had been exercised in good faith and whether irrelevant matters had been excluded

2012 ◽  
pp. 366-370
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Police Station ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
False Imprisonment ◽  
Court Of Appeal

15. Intentional interferences with the person

Tort Law ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Bodily Integrity ◽  
False Statement ◽  
Freedom Of Movement ◽  
Per Se ◽  
False Imprisonment

This chapter examines intentional interferences with the person, including the torts comprising trespass to the person—battery, assault and false imprisonment—the tort in Wilkinson v Downton, and the statutory tort of harassment. The trespass to the person torts seek to protect an individual against an infringement of their personal or bodily integrity, that is, against the infliction, or fearing the infliction, of unlawful force (battery and assault) and the unlawful restriction of a person’s freedom of movement (false imprisonment). The three trespass to the person torts have the same characteristics: the defendant must have intended both the conduct itself and consequences of their action; the defendant’s action must cause direct and immediate harm; and they are actionable per se, that is, without proof of loss. The chapter also considers the tort in Wilkinson v Downton, which provides a remedy for physical and psychiatric harm deliberately caused by a false statement, and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which imposes both civil and criminal liability for harassing conduct.

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