10. The rule against hearsay I

Author(s):  
Richard Glover

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the rule against hearsay, covering the definition of hearsay; the dangers of hearsay evidence; the development of exceptions and reform of rule. The second part explains how the hearsay rule operates by distinguishing hearsay and non-hearsay statements and, therefore, discusses: a statement having legal effect or significance; a statement admissible to prove that it was made or was made on a particular occasion or in a certain way; a statement as circumstantial evidence of state of mind; a statement as circumstantial evidence of other relevant facts; three classic hearsay problems; and the use of avoidance and evasion.

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 418-439
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

In Uganda legislation requires witnesses to adduce direct evidence in court. However, this may not be possible in all cases and the law provides for circumstances in which hearsay may be admissible. The Evidence Act is the main piece of legislation which governs the issue evidence. In this article, the author relied on 539 cases in which the Ugandan High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have dealt with hearsay evidence to establish the principles which these courts have developed on this issue. This case law shows, inter alia, that there are three major issues that Ugandan courts are still grappling with when it comes to hearsay evidence: the definition of hearsay; the admissibility of hearsay (exceptions to the hearsay rule) and the probative value of hearsay evidence. The author suggests ways in which courts can handle these issues.


2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-293
Author(s):  
James Sloan

AbstractIn the “RUF case”, the Special Court for Sierra Leone considered charges brought against senior officials of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in relation, inter alia, to a series of notorious attacks against the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in May 2000. In finding the accused guilty of certain of the crimes charged, the Trial Chamber relied heavily on single-source evidence, hearsay evidence and circumstantial evidence. The Trial Chamber addressed a number of difficult factual and legal issues relating to the definition of peacekeeping and the status of robust peacekeepers for the first time; however, not all such findings appear to have been accurately grounded in fact and law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 697-711 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Gergen

Extending early work on the limits of hypothesis testing, I propose that psychological explanations for behavior draw their intelligibility from tautology. A reliance on tautology is born of the impossibility for ostensively defining the explanans (e.g., the state of mind presumably giving rise to action). Thus, one makes psychological sense by explaining a given behavior in terms of a “miniaturized” form of itself. Further, because each definition of a mental term relies on another mental term for its meaning, we enter a condition of unbridled diffusion of definition. We may thus account for psychological explanations far removed from simple or transparent tautology. Through extended definitional sequences, we find that any given behavior can be explained by virtually any randomly drawn motive or trait. This includes otherwise counter-intuitive or paradoxical explanations. These developments bear importantly on the grounding assumptions for psychological research, mental and diagnostic testing, and psychotherapy.


2018 ◽  
pp. 933
Author(s):  
Lucinda Vandervort

This article examines the operation of “reasonable steps” as a statutory standard for analysis of the availability of the defence of belief in consent in sexual assault cases and concludes that application of section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, as presently worded, often undermines the legal validity and correctness of decisions about whether the accused acted with mens rea, a guilty, blameworthy state of mind. When the conduct of an accused who is alleged to have made a mistake about whether a complainant communicated consent is assessed by the hybrid subjective-objective reasonableness standard prescribed by section 273.2, many decision-makers rely on extra-legal criteria and assumptions grounded in their personal experience and opinion about what is reasonable. In the midst of debate over what the accused knew and what steps were “reasonable,” given what the accused knew, the legal definition of consent in section 273.1 is easily overlooked and decision-makers focus on facts that are legally irrelevant and prejudice rational deliberation. The result is failure to enforce the law. The author proposes: (1) that section 273.2 be amended to reflect the significant developments achieved in sexual consent jurisprudence since enactment of the provision in 1992; and (2) that, in the interim, the judiciary act with resolve to make full and proper use of the statutory and common law tools that are presently available to determine whether the accused acted with mens rea in relation to the absence of sexual consent.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-88
Author(s):  
Daniel Visser ◽  
Niall R Whitty

This essay addresses the question: when should pre-citation interest be awarded in actions for unjustified enrichment in Scots law? The answer depends mainly on the definition of the elements of enrichment liability, the manner of acquiring the enrichment, the type of enrichment-debtor, and his or her state of mind. The essay argues that (a) generally the actual interest earned (or saved) should be awarded, aided by a rebuttable presumption that interest was earned at a specified rate; (b) interest should normally be awarded at market rates where the defender knows that s/he holds the money or asset unjustifiably; and (c) in enrichment by interference with the pursuer's rights to money or other assets, an interest award might represent the time-value of exercising those rights during the period of interference.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.


Author(s):  
Richard Glover

This chapter discusses the following: the basic terminology of the law of evidence and the often inconsistent use of these terms; the terminology of the qualities of evidence, including the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence; hearsay evidence; documentary evidence (both primary and secondary); real evidence, including material objects, demeanour, appearance, and views of the locus in quo; the terminology of the form of evidence (oral, documentary and real evidence); the terminology of facts to be proved; facts in issue; facts forming part of the res gestae; facts relevant to facts in issue; standards of comparison; and the terminology of admissibility and weight.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter discusses the law on offences involving intoxication. It distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary intoxication, and between ‘specific’ and ‘basic’ intent. Cases are presented to show that state of mind is both a necessary element in the definition of an offence as well as in some defences. Just as intoxication may cause a person to lack the mens rea of an offence so it may cause him to have the necessary mental element of a defence.


Evidence ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo

Chapter 11 discusses the law on hearsay evidence. It covers the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, now governed by the Civil Evidence Act 1995; other proceedings in which the hearsay rule is inapplicable; and the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings.


2021 ◽  
pp. 262-294
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo

Chapter 11 discusses the law on hearsay evidence. It covers the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, now governed by the Civil Evidence Act 1995; other proceedings in which the hearsay rule is inapplicable; and the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document