scholarly journals Extensions in graph normal form

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Walicki
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Fixed Points ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Special Cases

Abstract Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.

Lifting propositional proof compression algorithms to first-order logic

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Gorzny ◽  
Ezequiel Postan ◽  
Bruno Woltzenlogel Paleo
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Empirical Evaluation ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Automated Deduction ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Compression Algorithms ◽  
International Conference ◽  
First Order ◽  
Theorem Provers ◽  
Resolution Proofs

Abstract Proofs are a key feature of modern propositional and first-order theorem provers. Proofs generated by such tools serve as explanations for unsatisfiability of statements. However, these explanations are complicated by proofs which are not necessarily as concise as possible. There are a wide variety of compression techniques for propositional resolution proofs but fewer compression techniques for first-order resolution proofs generated by automated theorem provers. This paper describes an approach to compressing first-order logic proofs based on lifting proof compression ideas used in propositional logic to first-order logic. The first approach lifted from propositional logic delays resolution with unit clauses, which are clauses that have a single literal. The second approach is partial regularization, which removes an inference $\eta $ when it is redundant in the sense that its pivot literal already occurs as the pivot of another inference in every path from $\eta $ to the root of the proof. This paper describes the generalization of the algorithms LowerUnits and RecyclePivotsWithIntersection (Fontaine et al.. Compression of propositional resolution proofs via partial regularization. In Automated Deduction—CADE-23—23rd International Conference on Automated Deduction, Wroclaw, Poland, July 31–August 5, 2011, p. 237--251. Springer, 2011) from propositional logic to first-order logic. The generalized algorithms compresses resolution proofs containing resolution and factoring inferences with unification. An empirical evaluation of these approaches is included.

A First Course in Logic

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Proof Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
University Of Maryland ◽  
First Order ◽  
Science Philosophy ◽  
The University ◽  
Second Order Logic ◽  
Theory And Model

The ability to reason and think in a logical manner forms the basis of learning for most mathematics, computer science, philosophy and logic students. Based on the author's teaching notes at the University of Maryland and aimed at a broad audience, this text covers the fundamental topics in classical logic in an extremely clear, thorough and accurate style that is accessible to all the above. Covering propositional logic, first-order logic, and second-order logic, as well as proof theory, computability theory, and model theory, the text also contains numerous carefully graded exercises and is ideal for a first or refresher course.

Proof theory

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Completeness Theorem ◽  
Formal Proof ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Truth Table ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Formal Proofs ◽  
Systematic Method ◽  
First Order

As with any logic, the semantics of first-order logic yield rules for deducing the truth of one sentence from that of another. In this chapter, we develop both formal proofs and resolution for first-order logic. As in propositional logic, each of these provides a systematic method for proving that one sentence is a consequence of another. Recall the Consequence problem for propositional logic. Given formulas F and G, the problemis to decide whether or not G is a consequence of F. From Chapter 1, we have three approaches to this problem: • We could compute the truth table for the formula F → G. If the truth values are all 1s then we conclude that F → G is a tautology and G is a consequence of F. Otherwise, G is not a consequence of F. • Using Tables 1.5 and 1.6, we could try to formally derive G from {F}. By the Completeness Theorem for propositional logic, G is a consequence of F if and only if {F} ├ G. • We could use resolution. By Theorem1.76, G is a consequence of F if and only if ∅ ∈ Res(H) where H is a formula in CNF equivalent to (F ∧￢G). Using these methods not only can we determine whether one formula is a consequence of another, but also we can determine whether a given formula is a tautology or a contradiction. A formula F is a tautology if and only if F is a consequence of (A∨￢A) if and only if ￢F is a contradiction. In this chapter, we consider the analogous problems for first-order logic. Given formulas φ and ψ, how can we determine whether ψ is a consequence of φ? Equivalently, how can we determine whether a given formula is a tautology or a contradiction? We present three methods for answering these questions. • In Section 3.1, we define a notion of formal proof for first-order logic by extending Table 1.5. • In Section 3.3, we “reduce” formulas of first-order logic to sets of formulas of propositional logic where we use resolution as defined in Chapter 1.

Structures and first-order logic

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Function Symbol ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Ternary Relation ◽  
Specific Element ◽  
First Order ◽  
Lower Case ◽  
Second Order Logic

First-order logic is a richer language than propositional logic. Its lexicon contains not only the symbols ∧, ∨, ￢, →, and ↔ (and parentheses) from propositional logic, but also the symbols ∃ and ∀ for “there exists” and “for all,” along with various symbols to represent variables, constants, functions, and relations. These symbols are grouped into five categories. • Variables. Lower case letters from the end of the alphabet (. . . x, y, z) are used to denote variables. Variables represent arbitrary elements of an underlying set. This, in fact, is what “first-order” refers to. Variables that represent sets of elements are called second-order. Second-order logic, discussed in Chapter 9, is distinguished by the inclusion of such variables. • Constants. Lower case letters from the beginning of the alphabet (a, b, c, . . .) are usually used to denote constants. A constant represents a specific element of an underlying set. • Functions. The lower case letters f, g, and h are commonly used to denote functions. The arguments may be parenthetically listed following the function symbol as f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). First-order logic has symbols for functions of any number of variables. If f is a function of one, two, or three variables, then it is called unary, binary, or ternary, respectively. In general, a function of n variables is called n-ary and n is referred to as the arity of the function. • Relations. Capital letters, especially P, Q, R, and S, are used to denote relations. As with functions, each relation has an associated arity. We have an infinite number of each of these four types of symbols at our disposal. Since there are only finitely many letters, subscripts are used to accomplish this infinitude. For example, x1, x2, x3, . . . are often used to denote variables. Of course, we can use any symbol we want in first-order logic. Ascribing the letters of the alphabet in the above manner is a convenient convention. If you turn to a random page in this book and see “R(a, x, y),” you can safely assume that R is a ternary relation, x and y are variables, and a is a constant.

SKEPTICAL ABDUCTION

1993 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 511-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. MARQUIS
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Real Problem ◽  
Logical Framework ◽  
First Order ◽  
Selective Generation ◽  
The Given ◽  
Reasonable Prospect

Abduction is the process of generating the best explanation as to why a fact is observed given what is already known. A real problem in this area is the selective generation of hypotheses that have some reasonable prospect of being valid. In this paper, we propose the notion of skeptical abduction as a model to face this problem. Intuitively, the hypotheses pointed out by skeptical abduction are all the explanations that are consistent with the given knowledge and that are minimal, i.e. not unnecessarily general. Our contribution is twofold. First, we present a formal characterization of skeptical abduction in a logical framework. On this ground, we address the problem of mechanizing skeptical abduction. A new method to compute minimal and consistent hypotheses in propositional logic is put forward. The extent to which skeptical abduction can be mechanized in first—order logic is also investigated. In particular, two classes of first-order formulas in which skeptical abduction is effective are provided. As an illustration, we finally sketch how our notion of skeptical abduction applies as a theoretical tool to some artificial intelligence problems (e.g. diagnosis, machine learning).

Minimal predicates, fixed-points, and definability

2005 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 696-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Van Benthem
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Logic ◽  
Fixed Points ◽  
Expressive Power ◽  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Technical Result ◽  
Unique Existence ◽  
First Order ◽  
Preservation Theorem

AbstractMinimal predicates P satisfying a given first-order description ϕ(P) occur widely in mathematical logic and computer science. We give an explicit first-order syntax for special first-order ‘PIA conditions’ ϕ(P) which guarantees unique existence of such minimal predicates. Our main technical result is a preservation theorem showing PIA-conditions to be expressively complete for all those first-order formulas that are preserved under a natural model-theoretic operation of ‘predicate intersection’. Next, we show how iterated predicate minimization on PIA-conditions yields a language MIN(FO) equal in expressive power to LFP(FO), first-order logic closed under smallest fixed-points for monotone operations. As a concrete illustration of these notions, we show how our sort of predicate minimization extends the usual frame correspondence theory of modal logic, leading to a proper hierarchy of modal axioms: first-order-definable, first-order fixed-point definable, and beyond.

A NORMAL FORM FOR FIRST-ORDER LOGIC OVER DOUBLY-LINKED DATA STRUCTURES

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 205-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEVEN LINDELL
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Data Structures ◽  
Linked Data ◽  
Linear Time ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Information Storage ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Total Size ◽  
Bounded Degree ◽  
First Order

We use singulary vocabularies to analyze first-order definability over doubly-linked data structures. Singulary vocabularies contain only monadic predicate and monadic function symbols. A class of mathematical structures in any vocabulary can be elementarily interpreted in a singulary vocabulary, while preserving notions of total size and degree. Doubly-linked data structures are a special case of bounded-degree finite structures in which there are reciprocal connections between elements, corresponding closely with physically feasible models of information storage. They can be associated with logical models involving unary relations and bijective functions in what we call an invertible singulary vocabulary. Over classes of these models, there is a normal form for first-order logic which eliminates all quantification of dependent variables. The paper provides a syntactically based proof using counting quantifiers. It also makes precise the notion of implicit calculability for arbitrary arity first-order formulas. Linear-time evaluation of first-order logic over doubly-linked data structures becomes a direct corollary. Included is a discussion of why these special data structures are appropriate for physically realizable models of information.

scholarly journals SUBFORMULA AND SEPARATION PROPERTIES IN NATURAL DEDUCTION VIA SMALL KRIPKE MODELS

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER MILNE
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Careful Attention ◽  
Classical Propositional Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Invalid Inference ◽  
Subformula Property

Various natural deduction formulations of classical, minimal, intuitionist, and intermediate propositional and first-order logics are presented and investigated with respect to satisfaction of the separation and subformula properties. The technique employed is, for the most part, semantic, based on general versions of the Lindenbaum and Lindenbaum–Henkin constructions. Careful attention is paid (i) to which properties of theories result in the presence of which rules of inference, and (ii) to restrictions on the sets of formulas to which the rules may be employed, restrictions determined by the formulas occurring as premises and conclusion of the invalid inference for which a counterexample is to be constructed. We obtain an elegant formulation of classical propositional logic with the subformula property and a singularly inelegant formulation of classical first-order logic with the subformula property, the latter, unfortunately, not a product of the strategy otherwise used throughout the article. Along the way, we arrive at an optimal strengthening of the subformula results for classical first-order logic obtained as consequences of normalization theorems by Dag Prawitz and Gunnar Stålmarck.

Properties of first-order logic

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Beth Definability ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Infinite Model

We show that first-order logic, like propositional logic, has both completeness and compactness. We prove a countable version of these theorems in Section 4.1. We further show that these two properties have many useful consequences for first-order logic. For example, compactness implies that if a set of first-order sentences has an infinite model, then it has arbitrarily large infinite models. To fully understand completeness, compactness, and their consequences we must understand the nature of infinite numbers. In Section 4.2, we return to our discussion of infinite numbers that we left in Section 2.5. This digression allows us to properly state and prove completeness and compactness along with the Upward and Downward Löwenhiem–Skolem theorems. These are the four central theorems of first-order logic referred to in the title of Section 4.3. We discuss consequences of these theorems in Sections 4.4–4.6. These consequences include amalgamation theorems, preservation theorems, and the Beth Definability theorem. Each of the properties studied in this chapter restrict the language of first-order logic. First-order logic is, in some sense, weak. There are many concepts that cannot be expressed in this language. For example, whereas first-order logic can express “there exist n elements” for any finite n, it cannot express “there exist countably many elements.” Any sentence having a countable model necessarily has uncountable models. As we previously mentioned, this follows from compactness. In the final section of this chapter, using graphs as an illustration, we discuss the limitations of first-order logic. Ironically, the weakness of first-order logic makes it the fruitful logic that it is. The properties discussed in this chapter, and the limitations that follow from them, make possible the subject of model theory. All formulas in this chapter are first-order unless stated otherwise. Many of the properties of first-order logic, including completeness and compactness, are consequences of the following fact: Every model has a theory and every theory has a model. Recall that a set of sentences is a “theory” if it is consistent (i.e. if we cannot derive a contradiction). “Every theory has a model” means that if a set of sentences is consistent, then it is satisfiable.

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