Proportionality in International Law

Author(s):  
Judith Gardam

In the most general terms proportionality requires a balance to be drawn between frequently conflicting values. Consequently, its application depends on a subjective value judgment and that very indeterminacy sometimes sits uneasily within law. Proportionality, nevertheless, is a pervasive and familiar concept within both the civil and criminal national legal systems of states. The norm first found expression in international law in the doctrine of the just war, the Christian version of which formed the basis of the secular just war writings of early commentators on the developing discipline of international law, such as Grotius and de Vattel. Nowadays the principle is reflected either explicitly or implicitly in several diverse areas of international law. It appears explicitly as either a treaty norm—as, for example, in the regulation of targeting decisions in International Humanitarian Law (IHL)—or as a customary norm in the case of self-defense and Countermeasures. In other situations, proportionality operates as a judicial mechanism of review implicit in the need to balance competing interests such as in European Union Law (EU Law), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), and the dispute settlement regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Proportionality is also a component of Maritime Law and Delimitation, the Law of Treaties, and International Criminal Law (ICL). The norm even has considerable support as constituting that elusive concept, a general principle of international law. The significance and scope of its role varies widely depending on the area of international law in question and determines to a considerable extent the amount of literature available on the topic. Despite its increasing importance in international law, exactly what proportionality requires of a particular decision maker in any given area of international law remains unsettled and is the subject of widespread judicial and scholarly debate. There is no one meaning of proportionality that is common in all contexts in which it operates or any consensus as to its application across the board. In order to provide some structure to the debate scholars have identified two major analytical approaches to the application of proportionality that they see reflected in state practice and jurisprudence: the so-called “quantitative” approach where the response is tailored or equivalent to the action against which it is to be measured, and the so called “qualitative” approach where other factors are to be taken into account. It is not suggested in the literature that all practice fits neatly into one or other category, but they are useful for the purposes of analysis and much of the material that follows incorporates these concepts.

Author(s):  
Paola Gaeta ◽  
Jorge E. Viñuales ◽  
Salvatore Zappalá

This book provides an authoritative account of international law. It preserves and extends Antonio Cassese’s exceptional combination of a historically informed, conceptually strong, and practice-infused analysis of international law, comparing the treatment of most issues in classical international law with the main subsequent developments of this constantly evolving field. Part I of the book covers the origins and foundations of the international community. Part II is about the subjects of the international community, including States, international organizations, individuals, and other international legal subjects. Part III examines the main processes of international law-making and the normative interactions between different norms, of both domestic and international law. Part IV studies the mechanisms of implementation of international law, including State responsibility, diplomatic and judicial means of dispute settlement, and enforcement mechanisms. Part V covers a number of areas which have undergone particular development and reached a high level of specialization, namely, UN law, the law governing the use of force, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law, international environmental law, and international economic law (trade and investment).


2012 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-584 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Sarkin

This article examines the question whether jus cogens includes the prohibition of enforced disappearances, and why this is important. It surveys the meaning, context, development, status and position of jus cogens as well as enforced disappearance in international law, including their relationship to each other. It surveys the status of enforced disappearance in international law in general, as well as in international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law. The article scans the historical developments of international law, including developments over the last few decades, to indicate that the prohibition against enforced disappearance has attained jus cogens status. The legal framework is examined, including the jurisprudence that has emanated from a variety of sources. Specific treaties that deal with enforced disappearance are reviewed including the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICED). What jus cogens is, what the controversies are that surround it, the different ways that it is understood within different schools of thought, and how these issues impact on whether the prohibition of enforced disappearance has attained jus cogens status are studied. The historical developments around enforced disappearances are examined in some detail to determine what its status is, particularly in relation to state practice, so as to determine whether it is jus cogens.


2020 ◽  
pp. 359-392
Author(s):  
Gloria Gaggioli ◽  
Pavle Kilibarda

International human rights law and international humanitarian law absolutely prohibit all forms of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (CIDT) at all times and against anyone, even the worst of criminals. International criminal law moreover provides for the individual criminal responsibility of perpetrators. Nevertheless, there remains a number of legal and practical challenges to overcome in order to ensure the effectiveness of this prohibition. The most visible challenge pertains to the implementation of the prohibition not only in domestic law but also in the concrete practice of law enforcement officials and other State agents. Other—less visible and insufficiently discussed—challenges concern laws and practices that may indirectly impact the effectiveness of the prohibition of torture and CIDT and whose acceptability under public international law is not crystal clear. For instance, is the prohibition of using evidence obtained through torture/CIDT (so-called exclusionary rule) absolute and applicable in all cases? How far does the international law obligation to prosecute and punish torture/CIDT perpetrators go? To what extent may individual perpetrators of torture/CIDT invoke mitigating circumstances or even justifications to avoid or diminish punishment for the commission of such acts in extreme circumstances? Does the passing of lenient sentences upon individual perpetrators of ill-treatment entail the responsibility of the State as a failure to punish? The present chapter will discuss these issues in light of contemporary international practice of various human rights bodies (treaty bodies and UN special procedures) and international/mixed criminal courts and tribunals.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniele Amoroso

Recent advances in robotics and AI have paved the way to robots autonomously performing a wide variety of tasks in ethically and legally sensitive domains. Among them, a prominent place is occupied by Autonomous Weapons Systems (or AWS), whose legality under international law is currently at the center of a heated academic and diplomatic debate. The AWS debate provides a uniquely representative sample of the (potentially) disruptive impact of new technologies on norms and principles of international law, in that it touches on key questions of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law, and State responsibility. Against this backdrop, this book’s primary aim is to explore the international legal implications of autonomy in weapons systems, by inquiring what existing international law has to say in this respect, to what extent the persisting validity of its principles and categories is challenged, and what could be a way forward for future international regulation on the matter. From a broader perspective, the research carried out on the issue of the legality of AWS under international law aspires to offer some more general insights on the normative aspects of the shared control relationship between human decision-makers and artificial agents. Daniele Amoroso is Professor of International Law at the Law Department of the University of Cagliari and member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) contrattualistica internazionale” presso il Ministero del Commercio con l’Estero (ora Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico – Commercio Internazionale).


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

AbstractThe ongoing Syrian civil war calls for a re-evaluation of using force to protect human rights. This article does not rake over the much-debated issue of whether a right of humanitarian intervention exists as lex lata. Instead, it addresses the little reviewed normative issue of whether the right should exist in international law to support and reflect a pluralistic understanding of sovereignty. Despite advancements in international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, this wider fabric of international law preserves Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. It denies any right of humanitarian intervention.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-253
Author(s):  
RUPERT ELDERKIN

AbstractInternational criminal law (ICL) developed in large part from international humanitarian law during the mid-to-late twentieth century. The International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent institution to investigate and prosecute ICL cases finally was established in 2002. Although widely supported, certain states feared that the ICC would diminish national sovereignty. Yet, in formal legal terms, ICL and the ICC’s Rome Statute are just like other branches of public international law in terms of their relationship with national constitutional arrangements. ICL does not challenge states’ primary executive and judicial powers; it does not introduce any general rights for citizens or particularly onerous obligations for states that are already subject to the rule of law; and its intrusion on national sovereignty is only in evidence when a state’s leaders either are responsible for atrocities or are incapable of protecting their citizens from such atrocities. ICL thus is very different from international human rights law (IHRL), which directly impacts national constitutional arrangements. When ICL does come into play, however, arguably it may perform quasi-constitutional functions, in particular offering the only means under public international law to remove state officials from office when they are believed responsible for the most harmful abuses of power.


2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 959-1010
Author(s):  
Marco Sassòli ◽  
Marie-Louise Tougas

The transfer of Afghan detainees to Afghan authorities by Canadian forces raised concerns in public opinion, in Parliament, and was the object of court proceedings and other enquiries in Canada. This article aims to explore the rules of international law applicable to such transfers. The most relevant rule of international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to prisoners of war in international armed conflicts. However, the conflict in Afghanistan, it is argued, is not of an international character. The relevant provision could nevertheless apply based upon agreements between Canada and Afghanistan and upon unilateral declarations by Canada. In addition, international human rights law (IHRL) and the very extensive jurisprudence of its mechanisms of implementation on the obligations of a state transferring a person to the custody of another state where that person is likely to be tortured or treated inhumanely will be discussed, including the standard of care to be applied when there is an alleged risk of torture. While IHL contains the rules specifically designed for armed conflicts, IHRL may in this respect also clarify as lex specialis the interpretation of concepts of IHL. Finally, the conduct of Canadian leaders and members of the Canadian forces is governed by international criminal law (ICL). This article thus demonstrates how IHL, IHRL, and ICL are intimately interrelated in contemporary armed conflicts and how the jurisprudence of human rights bodies and of international criminal tribunals informs the understanding of IHL rules.


Author(s):  
Bruch Carl ◽  
Payne Cymie R ◽  
Sjöstedt Britta

This chapter looks at how the concern for the environment in relation to armed conflict can be addressed from several bodies of international law. These diverse bodies of law emerged largely isolated from one another: international humanitarian law, international environmental law, international criminal law, international human rights law, the United Nations (UN) Charter, and so on. Hence, a fragmented and unclear legal framework protects the environment in times of armed conflict. The chapter focuses on the interlinkages between international environmental law and other bodies of international law to protect the environment in relation to armed conflict. The thesis is that international environmental law norms are increasingly shaping protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict, in contrast to the relative rigidity of international humanitarian law norms, which is traditionally the starting point for analysing wartime environmental protection. The chapter begins with a brief consideration of international law applicable during all temporal phases of armed conflict: before conflict (including conflict prevention); during conflict; and after conflict. It then explores the issues and relevant law particular to specific phases.


Author(s):  
Roger O'Keefe

International law protects cultural property in armed conflict from damage and destruction and from all forms of misappropriation against belligerents who have always looked to raze or plunder the enemy’s cultural heritage. ‘Cultural property’ may include buildings and other monuments of historic, artistic or architectural significance, as well as artworks, antiquities, manuscripts, books, archaeological sites, and archives. This chapter focuses on the relevant bodies of international law and international humanitarian law designed to protect cultural property during armed conflict, including multilateral treaties such as the Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments (also known as the Roerich Pact) and the Hague Convention of 1954 and its two Protocols. It also examines international human rights law, international cultural heritage law, and international criminal law under the respective rubrics of war crimes and crimes against humanity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 403-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDRE SKANDER GALAND

AbstractInternational human rights law (IHRL), international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) have trouble staying faithful to the two pillars of customary international law – state practice andopinio juris. In ICL, theTadićInterlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction and theKupreškićTrial Judgement have even gone as far as enunciating new models to identify customs. In this article, I show that the approaches to customs’ identification postulated in these two cases were conflict-avoidance techniques used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to bring together IHRL and IHL. The crux of the matter in theTadićandKupreškićcases was that the human rights of the victims of war crimes committed in internal conflicts required that a new approach to customary international law be adopted. Thus, the criminal aspect of IHL (i.e., ICL) was updated, and conceptual conflicts between IHL and IHRL were avoided.


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