Partition

2020 ◽  
pp. 28-53
Author(s):  
Francine R. Frankel

The partition of India into the two independent states of India and Pakistan created strategic anomalies. India lost the advantage of its own geographic position, which had placed it across the Arabian Sea close to the sea lanes leading to the Persian Gulf in the west and astride the Bay of Bengal adjacent to Southeast Asia on the east. Pakistan, divided by one thousand miles of Indian territory, was considered virtually indefensible without a powerful ally—most obviously, the United States. As the Cold War took hold, India’s potential as a great power counted for less than Pakistan’s strategic location close to the oil fields of the Middle East. Nehru believed India’s decision to join the British Commonwealth protected India from sloping too much toward the United States.

1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Pastor

For 40 years, the United States was so fearful of a thermonuclear bang that it barely noticed the whimper when the Cold War ended. There was not even any agreement on the date of the war’s end. Still, the people of the United States sensed its eagle had completed a great adventure and was returning to its nest, and that’s where they wanted it.President George Bush was more sensitive to the shift in the balance of power in the Persian Gulf than to the swing in US mood. His quick success in the Persian Gulf lifted his popularity to a zenith, making his reelection defeat the next year all the more painful and seemingly inexplicable.


Author(s):  
Richard F. Kuisel

This chapter discusses the confluence of events that shaped relations between France and the United States in the 1990s. These include the war in the Persian Gulf, which had barely subsided when a downward spiral into ethnic strife seized the inhabitants of Yugoslavia. At the same time the United States and France engaged in diplomatic brinkmanship over trade and waged a contest over reform of the Atlantic Alliance. Transatlantic sparring often occurred on many fronts and one struggle tended to complicate the other. The discussion in this chapter will be thematic rather than chronological, beginning with war, and then security, followed by trade, the “indispensable nation,” and more war, and concluding with the topic of the hyperpower.


2021 ◽  
pp. 108-151
Author(s):  
Rebecca Lissner

This chapter studies the Persian Gulf War. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, the United States was focused primarily on Europe, where rapid changes to the regional security order provided early signals of the nation’s dawning preeminence, but few indications of what a “new world order” would entail. Beyond the Soviet Union, there were no clear threats to U.S. global interests, and emergent American grand strategy envisioned a world where economic and diplomatic power would predominate, resulting in some measure of multipolarity. Yet the shock and awe of the war revealed that the United States stood alone as the world’s sole superpower, backed by international political support—including from a surprisingly deferential Russia—as well as unprecedented military preponderance. Washington therefore moved toward a more militarily assertive form of hegemony, characterized by the discretionary use of force to enforce the terms of the “new world order.” The war also inaugurated the preoccupation with Iraq and nonproliferation as central focuses of post–Cold War foreign policy.


Worldview ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 17-22
Author(s):  
Francis X. Gannon

As President Carter prepared for his first official visit to Mexico in February, 1979, to discuss, among other things, U.S. access to its neighbor's new-found oil, the U.S. secretary of energy, James R. Schlesinger, warned that the security of the Western democracies could be completely undermined if instability became endemic in the Persian Gulf and the flow of oil to Europe, Japan, and the United States was sharply curtailed.There was considerable irony in this situation. As columnist James Reston observed in the New York Times, the president was not going to Mexico "to deal with the price of Mexican gas—though that is an immediate and divisive problem—but with the price of neglect.


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