Conclusion The American and Westminster Models

Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This concluding chapter identifies the four major causes of the growth and origin of judicial review in the G-20 common law countries and in Israel. First, the need for a federalism umpire, and occasionally a separation of powers umpire, played a major role in the development of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in the United States, in Canada, in Australia, in India, and most recently in the United Kingdom. Second, there is a rights from wrongs phenomenon at work in the growth of judicial review in the United States, after the Civil War; in Canada, with the 1982 adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; in India, after the Indira Gandhi State of Emergency led to a massive trampling on human rights; in Israel, after the Holocaust; in South Africa, after racist apartheid misrule; and in the United Kingdom, after that country accumulated an embarrassing record before the European Court of Human Rights prior to 1998. This proves that judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation often occurs in response to a deprivation of human rights. Third, the seven common law countries all borrowed a lot from one another, and from civil law countries, in writing their constitutions. Fourth, and finally, the common law countries all create multiple democratic institutions or political parties, which renders any political attempt to strike back at the Supreme Court impossible to maintain.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This book is about the stunning birth and growth of judicial review in the civil law world, since 1945. In Volume I of this two-volume series, I showed that judicial review was born and grew in common law G-20 constitutional democracies and in Israel primarily: (1) when there is a need for a federalism or a separation of powers umpire, (2) when there is a rights from wrongs dynamic, (3) when there is borrowing, and (4) when the political structure of a country’s institutions leaves space within which the judiciary can operate. The countries discussed in Volume I were the following: (1) the United States, (2) Canada, (3) Australia, (4) India, (5) Israel, (6) South Africa, and (7) the United Kingdom....


Author(s):  
Michael Thomas

<p>This paper is intended to serve as an update for psychiatrists on notable developments of the<em> Tarasoff</em> doctrine in the United States and United Kingdom. Most clinicians will be familiar with the basic <em>Tarasoff</em> doctrine. However, the author suspects that many clinicians will be troubled to learn the extent to which <em>Tarasoff</em> liability has extended in some jurisdictions.</p><p>Accordingly, the first part of this paper addresses notable judicial treatment of <em>Tarasoff</em> in several state jurisdictions within the United States. The second part discusses the more conservative approach of the United Kingdom, which affords clinicians discretion to warn potential victims in certain circumstances. The United Kingdom has struggled with, and so far rejected, the imposition of a <em>Tarasoff</em>-duty. However, a recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights opens the door for something comparable to <em>Tarasoff</em> in the United Kingdom. The final part offers a critique of the<em> Tarasoff</em> doctrine and suggests that other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, may be wise to avoid this problematic doctrine.</p>


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter discusses the origins and growth of judicial review in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Judicial review in the United Kingdom under the Human Rights Act is best explained by borrowing from the United States, Canada, Germany, and the European Court of Human Rights. The emergence of judicial review in the United Kingdom also coincided with the devolution of power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, thus creating a need for a federalism umpire. This was vividly illustrated by a recent U.K. Supreme Court separation of powers umpiring opinion; and by a 2019 umpiring ruling, which upheld Scotland’s highest court, while overturning an English and Welsh court on the justiciability and breadth of The Queen’s power to prorogue Parliament. The adoption by the United Kingdom of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as a judicially enforced Bill of Rights, was done, in part, out of embarrassment that the United Kingdom kept losing so many human rights cases when they were heard by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). There is, accordingly, a mild rights from wrongs story that explains the adoption of the Human Rights Act of 1998, although a desire to borrow that which was fashionable and in style provides the major explanation for the adoption of this act.


2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 440-495
Author(s):  
John T. Parry

In Ahmad and Others v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) upheld the extradition of several suspected terrorists to the United States, despite the possibility that if convicted, the suspects could face life sentences and imprisonment or both, in a “supermax” prison. This decision marks another important step in the development of the Court’s Article 3 extradition jurisprudence. It also illustrates the uneasy tension between that jurisprudence and the efforts of European states to cooperate with U.S. anti-terror initiatives.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the common law countries: the Diffuse Model and the Second Look Model. The Diffuse Model of judicial review originated in the United States and has spread to India, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most of the countries of Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (except for the Netherlands), and Japan. It is premised on the idea that a country’s written constitution is its supreme law and that courts, when deciding cases or controversies that are properly before them, are thus duty-bound to follow the constitution, which is supreme law, and not a contrary statute whenever those two items conflict. Meanwhile, the essence of the Second Look Model of judicial review is that a Supreme or Constitutional Court ought to have the power of judicial review, subject to some kind of legislative power of override. This, it is said, best harmonizes the advantages of a written constitution and a bill of rights enforced by courts with the imperatives of democratic self-government. The underlying goal is to obtain the advantages of both constitutional government and also of democratic government.


Author(s):  
Sabine Jacques

This chapter examines the relevance of freedom of expression to the parody exception. It first considers the debate on the interaction between intellectual property rights and fundamental rights before discussing the ways in which freedom of expression may address the excessive expansion of exclusive rights as well as the outer limits of the parody exception. The chapter explains how human rights are embodied in the parody exception and how factors established in the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence may legitimately restrict freedom of expression. It also explores how national legislators and courts in France, Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom strike a balance between freedom of expression values and copyright values. It shows that the outer limits of the parody exception in each jurisdiction are determined by the influence of freedom of expression on copyright, the margin of appreciation, and the proportionality test.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier García Oliva

The enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is the most recent legal mechanism developed to protect believers, beliefs and religious feelings in the United Kingdom. Despite the recognition of a certain degree of overlap between the different categories, this article proposes a broad distinction between legal devices which protect believers and those which safeguard beliefs and religious feelings. The common law offence of blasphemy is analysed, taking into consideration the response of both the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights. The endorsement of the English law of blasphemy by Strasbourg is particularly relevant. Furthermore, this paper focuses on different instruments that, throughout the last few decades, have been articulated to protect the faithful, such as the crimes of religiously aggravated offences and the offence of incitement to religious hatred.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This second volume builds on the story of Volume I as to the origins and growth of judicial review in the key G-20 constitutional democracies, which include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, India, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, and the European Union. In addition to discussing the judicial review systems of the major civil law countries in this Volume, I also discuss the birth and growth in power of the European Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights, both of which hear cases ffrom common law as well as civil law countries. This Volume considers the four major theories that help to explain the origins of judicial review, which I discussed as to common law countries. Volume II identifies which theories of the origination and growth in power of judicial review apply best in the various countries discussed. Volume II considers not only what gives rise to judicial review originally, but also what leads to the growth of judicial power over time. My positive account of what causes the birth and growth of judicial review in so many very different countries over such a long period of time may have normative implications for those constitution writers who want a strong form of judicial review to come into being.


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