Epistemological Advantages

2020 ◽  
pp. 147-184
Author(s):  
Amie L. Thomasson
Keyword(s):  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Reliability Challenge ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking ◽  
Coming To Know ◽  
Modal Normativism ◽  
Integration Challenge

This chapter argues that accepting modal normativism brings significant epistemological advantages. Those who aim to account for modal knowledge face the integration challenge of reconciling an account of what is involved in knowing modal truths with a plausible story about how we can come to know them, and the reliability challenge of explaining how we could have evolved to have a reliable faculty for coming to know modal truths. Recent empiricist accounts of modal knowledge cannot solve these problems regarding specifically metaphysical modal truths—leaving us with the threat of skepticism about large portions of metaphysics. However, by giving a different functional story, the modal normativist can develop a plausible response to the remaining versions of both of these classic problems for modal epistemology. Modal normativists can also respond to further worries parallel to those raised by Sharon Street’s evolutionary debunking arguments in meta-ethics.

scholarly journals Belief Pills and the Possibility of Moral Epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations ◽  
Moral Facts

This chapter argues that evolutionary debunking arguments are dialectically ineffective. Such arguments rely on the premise that moral judgements can be given evolutionary explanations which do not invoke their truth. The challenge for the debunker is to bridge the gap between this premise and the conclusion that moral judgements are unjustified. After discussing older attempts to bridge this gap, this chapter focuses on Joyce’s recent attempt, which claims that ‘we do not have a believable account of how moral facts could explain the mechanisms…which give rise to moral judgements’. It argues that whether there is such an account depends on what it is permissible to assume about moral truth and that it is reasonable to make assumptions which allow for the possibility of at least partial moral epistemologies. The challenge for the debunker is to show that these assumptions are unreasonable in a way which does not render their debunking argument superfluous.

scholarly journals Eliminativism and Evolutionary Debunking

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Bagwell
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Multiple Realizability ◽  
Ordinary Object ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments ◽  
Theory Of Evolution ◽  
Scientific Support ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking

Eliminativists sometimes invoke evolutionary debunking arguments against ordinary object beliefs, either to help them establish object skepticism or to soften the appeal of commonsense ontology. I argue that object debunkers face a self-defeat problem: their conclusion undermines the scientific support for one of their premises, because evolutionary biology depends on our object beliefs. Using work on reductionism and multiple realizability from the philosophy of science, I argue that it will not suffice for an eliminativist debunker to simply appeal to some object-free surrogate theory of evolution that results from converting any scientific proposition about some object K into a proposition about simples arranged K-wise. In the process, I examine some hazards peculiar to eliminative reductions of scientific theories, and propose a trilemma for eliminativists who attempt to recoup generality for ontologically sparse reducing theories by appealing to pluralities of simples arranged K-wise. The paper is intended to define and develop the object debunker’s self-defeat problem for further study, and to clarify some of the ways sparse and abundant ontologies interact with scientific theory.

scholarly journals Did natural selection select for true religious beliefs?

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
HANS VAN EYGHEN ◽  
CHRISTOPHER T. BENNETT
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Darwinian Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking

Abstract Although it is commonly accepted that Darwinian evolution could select for true common-sense beliefs, it is altogether less certain that the same can be said for other classes of beliefs, such as moral or religious beliefs. This issue takes centre stage in debates concerning evolutionary debunking arguments against religious beliefs, where the rationality of beliefs is often dependent upon their production by an evolved faculty that is sensitive to truth. In this article, we consider whether evolution selected for true religious beliefs. We begin by highlighting the relevance of this question for broader philosophy of religion, then present a dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments for and against the proposition that true religious beliefs generate pragmatic success and hence can be selected for by evolution.

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