Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto G. de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Language Of Thought ◽  
Conceptual Representation ◽  
Jerry Fodor ◽  
Present Book ◽  
Cognitive Revolution ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Language Of Thought Hypothesis

It is patent that the so-called cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s was the result of ideas emerging at the confluence of psychology, linguistics, philosophy, computer science, and neuroscience—what became known as cognitive science. In the last 60 years or so, Jerry Fodor has been one of the most important exponents of this revolution. He has advanced key ideas on the foundations of cognitive science, in particular on the nature of mental representation and on mental processes seen as computations over symbols. Many of his contributions have been the subject of deep divides and have generated classical controversies. The chapter provides a rough guide to Fodor’s contributions to psycholinguistics, to the modularity of mind, to atomism as a theory of conceptual representation, to the language of thought hypothesis, and to cognitive architecture more broadly—topics that figure prominently in the present book.

On Concepts, Modules, and Language

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Language Production ◽  
Language Of Thought ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Noam Chomsky ◽  
Jerry Fodor ◽  
Language And Vision ◽  
Cognitive Revolution ◽  
First Time

What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading? These and other questions are addressed in this volume by leading cognitive scientists as they examine the work of one of cognitive science’s most influential and polemical figures: Jerry Fodor. Newly commissioned chapters by Noam Chomsky, Tom Bever, Merrill Garrett, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Zenon Pylyshyn, Janet Fodor, Randy C. Gallistel, Ernie Lepore, Mary C. Potter, Lila R. Gleitman, and others, put in perspective Fodor’s contribution to cognitive science by focusing on three main themes: the nature of concepts, the modularity of language and vision, and the language of thought. This is a one-of-a-kind series of essays on cognitive science and on Fodor. In this volume, Chomsky contrasts his view of modularity with that of Fodor’s; Bever discusses the nature of consciousness, particularly regarding language perception; Garrett reassesses his view of modularity in language production; Pylyshyn presents his view of the connection between visual perception and conceptual attainment; Gallistel proposes what the biological bases of the computational theory of mind might be; and Piattelli-Palmarini discusses Fodor’s views on conceptual nativism. These and many other key figures of cognitive science are brought together, for the first time, to discuss their work in relation to that of Fodor’s, who is responsible for advancing many of cognitive science’s most important hypotheses. This volume—for students and advanced researchers of cognitive science—is bound to become one of the classics in the field.

Intentionalism, Cognition, and Representation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual State ◽  
Content Of Experience

This chapter continues consideration of reductive intentionalism without embracing the doctrine, framing it in the context of cognitive science. Cognition, including perception, is representation. An agent’s cognitive, perhaps perceptual, state is a relation binding the agent to a proposition by means of her mental representation. Intentionalism would explicate the phenomenal character of a perceiver's experience in terms of the content of her prevailing perceptual representation. While minimal intentionalism maintains that the phenomenal character of the perceiver's experience merely supervenes on her representation's content, maximal intentionalism would reduce character to content. For maximal intentionalism maintains that phenomenal character is simply what introspection finds. Yet, according to maximal intentionalism, introspection, when tuned to conscious perception, detects only the content of experience. Hence, the maximalist identifies phenomenal character with the content carried by perceptual representation.

Précis ofUnified theories of cognition

1992 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Newell
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Unified Theories

AbstractThe book presents the case that cognitive science should turn its attention to developing theories of human cognition that cover the full range of human perceptual, cognitive, and action phenomena. Cognitive science has now produced a massive number of high-quality regularities with many microtheories that reveal important mechanisms. The need for integration is pressing and will continue to increase. Equally important, cognitive science now has the theoretical concepts and tools to support serious attempts at unified theories. The argument is made entirely by presenting an exemplar unified theory of cognition both to show what a real unified theory would be like and to provide convincing evidence that such theories are feasible. The exemplar is SOAR, a cognitive architecture, which is realized as a software system. After a detailed discussion of the architecture and its properties, with its relation to the constraints on cognition in the real world and to existing ideas in cognitive science, SOAR is used as theory for a wide range of cognitive phenomena: immediate responses (stimulus-response compatibility and the Sternberg phenomena); discrete motor skills (transcription typing); memory and learning (episodic memory and the acquisition of skill through practice); problem solving (cryptarithmetic puzzles and syllogistic reasoning); language (sentence verification and taking instructions); and development (transitions in the balance beam task). The treatments vary in depth and adequacy, but they clearly reveal a single, highly specific, operational theory that works over the entire range of human cognition, SOAR is presented as an exemplar unified theory, not as the sole candidate. Cognitive science is not ready yet for a single theory – there must be multiple attempts. But cognitive science must begin to work toward such unified theories.

scholarly journals On the Subject of Objects: Four Views on Object Perception and Tool Use

1970 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarja Susi ◽  
Tom Ziemke
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Tool Use ◽  
Theoretical Biology ◽  
Object Perception ◽  
Entry Point ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Von Uexküll ◽  
Functional Tone

This paper addresses the relation between an agent and its environment, and more specifically, how subjects perceive object/artefacts/tools and their (possible) use. Four different conceptions of the relation between subject and object are compared here: functional tone (von Uexküll), equipment (Heidegger), affordance (Gibson), and entry point (Kirsh). even as these concepts have developed within different disciplines (theoretical biology, philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science) and in very different historical contexts, they are used more or less interchangeably in much of the literature, and typically conflated under the label of ‘affordance’. However, at closer inspection, they turn out to have not only similarities, but also substantial differences, which are identified and discussed here. Given that the relation between subjects and their objects is crucial to understanding human cognition and interaction with tools and technology, as well as robots’ interaction with their environment, we argue that these differences deserve some more attention than they have received so far.

scholarly journals On the Cognitive Foundation of Lexical Classification of the Subject World

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Alexey D. Koshelev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Cognition ◽  
Language Of Thought ◽  
Human Species ◽  
Specific Level ◽  
Human Ability ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Lexical Classification

The paper presents a language of thought (a set of cognitive units and relations) used to provide non-verbal definitions for the following five concepts: ARMCHAIR, MUG, RAVINE, LAKE, TREE. These definitions make it possible to describe concepts on two levels of specificity. On the first level, a concept is presented as a holistic cognitive unit. On the second, more specific, level, the same concept is viewed as a partitive system, i.e. a hierarchical system of its parts, the latter being smaller concepts into which the original holistic unit is decomposed. A hypothesis is advanced that such structure is inherent to all visible objects. The partitive system is argued to play a major role in human cognition. It, first, provides for an in-depth understanding of the perceived objects through understanding the role of their parts, and, second, underlies the formation of the hierarchy of concepts with respect to their generality. Besides, it can be considered as one of the defining properties of the human species as it accounts for the human ability to purposefully change the world.

Mental Representation and Mental Presentation: Reflections on some definitions in The Oxford Concise Dictionary

2002 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 19-36
Author(s):  
Gregory McCulloch
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Cold Water

To the memory of Alan WhiteThe idea of mental representation occupies a rather prominent place in much contemporary discussion, both in philosophy and cognitive science, and not as a particularly controversial idea either. My reflections here, however, are intended to douse much of that discussion with some cold water. I should emphasize at the outset that I have no problems at all with the very idea of mental representation. What I find quite unsatisfactory is the philosophical or doctrinal underpinning of much current theorising about it. Anyway, I shall suggest that talk of mental representation needs at least to be supplemented with, if not actually replaced by, a distinct notion of mental presentation, which cannot be reduced to it. But I start with the notion of an impression.

Coordination, negotiation, and social attention

2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 416-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oren Bader ◽  
Aya Peri Bader
Keyword(s):  
Built Environment ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Social World ◽  
Social Attention ◽  
Urban Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Urban Architecture ◽  
Architectural Space ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
The Subject

Living with others is a key factor shaping our urban life. Their bodily presence scaffolds our social world and is involved in the way the built environment appears to us. In this article we highlight the influence of the embodied presence of other human beings on the constitution of a special type of urban architecture — the extraordinary architectural space. Our analysis, which lies at the intersection between architecture, phenomenology and cognitive science, suggests that being in the direct presence of others constitutes this extraordinary architectural space in the sense that it transforms the built setting into a negotiated place and reveals for the subject some of its extraordinary properties. The architectural examples we discuss show that these intersubjective advantages are often embedded in and encouraged by the design of such built objects.

Fodor's Very Deep Thought

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Montminy
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Role Theory ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
Jerry Fodor ◽  
Deep Pit ◽  
Deep Thought

Pooh rubbed his nose with his paw, and said that the Heffalump might be walking along, humming a little song, and looking up at the sky, wondering if it would rain, and so he wouldn't see the Very Deep Pit until he was half-way down, when it would be too late. (A.A. Milne, Winnie-the-Pooh)Jerry Fodor is loath to have content be constituted, even in part, by inferential relations. This loathing, I will argue, gets him into trouble. In his latest book, Concepts, Fodor contrasts informational atomism, his view of concepts and their content, with inferential role theory. The latter, he argues, is almost certainly false. This strikes cognitive science at its core, he adds, since the major theories of concepts currently in vogue in cognitive science are all variants on inferential role theory.

scholarly journals Folk psychology, eliminativism, and the present state of connectionism

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-196
Author(s):  
Vanja Subotic
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Short Term Memory ◽  
Distributed Processing ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Connectionist Models ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Long Short Term Memory

Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul Churchland, a radical opponent of folk psychology and a prominent supporter of eliminative materialism. I aim to examine whether current connectionist models based on long-short term memory (LSTM) neural networks can back up these arguments in favor of eliminativism. Nonetheless, I will rather put my faith in the eliminativism of the limited domain. This position amount to the following claim: even though that connectionist cognitive science has no need whatsoever for folk psychology qua theory, this does not entail illegitimacy of folk psychology per se in other scientific domains, most notably in humanities, but only if one sees folk psychology as mere heuristics.

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