Comparative International Law, Foreign Relations Law, and Fragmentation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul B. Stephan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Third ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
British Commonwealth ◽  
Distinct Field

This chapter considers the rise of foreign relations law as a way of thinking about the legal dimensions of international relations. It connects this development to the emergence of comparative international law and anxieties about fragmentation in international law. Each of these fields challenges conventional ways of thinking about international law and thus seems to bolster those who would dismiss international law as irrelevant or ineffectual. The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first describes contemporary foreign relations law as a distinct field that emerged in the United States in the late 1990s and developed independently in parts of the British Commonwealth and Europe. It traces the parallels with and differences between foreign relations law and comparative international law. The second section considers the possibility these complementary trends, as well as concerns about fragmentation, pose a threat to international law as conventionally conceived. The third section responds to these concerns.

Customary International Law and U.S. Judicial Power

2020 ◽  
pp. 251-264
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Lee
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Third

This chapter describes specific points of divergence between the Third and Fourth Restatements of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States regarding how U.S. courts should engage with customary international law. The Third Restatement, adopted in 1987, envisioned U.S. courts fluent in and engaged with international law, deploying a U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence in dialogue with international law and lawyers. Customary international law was a central feature of this vision because it was the prime pathway for human rights litigation in federal courts when U.S. treaty-based human-rights initiatives had stalled. Appearing thirty years later, the Fourth Restatement exhibits a fundamentally different orientation toward customary international law. Customary international law is no longer embraced as it was in the Third Restatement as an opportunity to play offense, to advance the international law of human rights. That vision inspired a reaction among some U.S. legal scholars who questioned the U.S. federal law status of customary international law and the legitimacy of U.S. judges advancing the customary international law of human rights. The Fourth Restatement seeks a middle ground by defending against this revision of customary international law’s status role in the United States, concerned that the revisionist view might encourage and provide cover for U.S. courts to dismiss cases and claims with foreign policy ramifications that they should be adjudicating. The approaches of the two Restatements, taken together, have contributed to the disengagement of U.S. judges from customary international law altogether, to the detriment of U.S. conduct of foreign policy and contrary to the original constitutional specification of the judicial power of the United States as reflected in Article III, the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established the federal courts, and early historical practice.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Sarah H Cleveland ◽  
Paul B. Stephan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Political Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
The Third ◽  
History Of

This introductory chapter serves as a foreword for the volume. It sketches the history of past restatements and the evolution of the latest one. The first (confusingly called Second) Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States brought widespread attention to the term “foreign relations law.” It staunchly defended the proposition that foreign relations, no matter how imbued with discretion and prerogative, still must rest on law. The Third Restatement, prepared during a period of what to many seemed constitutional retrenchment and a loosening of judicial supervision over public life, offered a robust defense of the proposition that, “In conducting the foreign relations of the United States, Presidents, members of Congress, and public officials are not at large in a political process; they are under law.” Moreover, it insisted that the judiciary, as much as the executive and Congress, creates and enforces this law. To the extent that the Third Restatement rested its claims on its view of the state of customary international law, other influential actors pushed back. The Fourth Restatement revisits the Third’s claims, especially about the central role of the judiciary, in light of the evolution of both U.S. and international law and practice.

Foreign Relations Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-61
Author(s):  
Karen Knop
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The U.S

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.

The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and Its Laws of Race Development

2020 ◽  
pp. 3-42
Author(s):  
Robert Vitalis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Historical Sociology ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
American Science ◽  
The Way

We now know that the ‘birth of the discipline’ of international relations in the United States is a story about empire. The foundations of early international relations theory are set in not just international law and historical sociology but evolutionary biology and racial anthropology. The problem is the way in which scholars today deal with the place of race in the thought of John Hobson, Paul Reinsch, and virtually all other social scientists of the era. The strand of thought that still resonates in our own time about empire, states, and the like is raised up and depicted as the scientific or theoretical core in the scholars’ work, while the strand that involves now archaic racial constructs is downgraded and treated instead as mere ‘language’, ‘metaphors’, and ‘prejudices’ of the era. To undo this error and recover in full the ideas of early international relations theorists it is necessary to bring the work of historians of conservative and reform Darwinism to bear on the first specialists and foundational texts in international relations.

Blackout: How Long, O Lord, How Long?

2012 ◽  
pp. 419-440
Author(s):  
Maurice N. Eisendrath
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
The South ◽  
The Third ◽  
Eastern Front ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
War Effort ◽  
British Commonwealth ◽  
One Year

This chapter presents a sermon by Maurice N. Eisendrath, delivered on the third Rosh Hashanah of the war. The situation of Canadian rabbis was precariously positioned between those of American preachers to the south and British preachers to the east. Canada, as part of the British Commonwealth, had long been part of the war effort, so the debate over whether or not to enter the war was not an issue, as it still was for colleagues in the United States. On the other hand, Canada was not directly affected by the war as was Britain, where one year earlier London had suffered a sustained air attack unprecedented in its devastation (a situation that certainly affected the mood in Toronto on the previous Rosh Hashanah, as the preacher reminds his listeners). Now, although the battles on the recently opened Eastern Front were of almost unimaginable ferocity, to many Canadians the war seemed distant; life at home seemed almost normal, as it did to many in the United States. This was precisely the mindset that Eisendrath set out to censure.

Remarks by Stephen Pomper

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 123-127
Author(s):  
Stephen Pomper
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Single Event ◽  
Humanitarian Emergency ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Face ◽  
Legal Justification ◽  
The U.S

We are having this conversation now because of the April 7 strikes on the Shayrat Airfield in Syria, but the question of how one justifies forcible measures in the context of a humanitarian emergency, and in the face of a deadlocked Security Council, is one that deserves urgent attention beyond the context of any single event. Progress toward answering this question has, however, been mired in a long-standing debate between those who believe that there is no credible international law justification for humanitarian intervention—and that the U.S. government should instead justify interventions like those taken at Kosovo and Shayrat as morally “legitimate”—and those who believe a legal justification can and should be put forward. I am very much in the latter camp and will use my time now to explain how I arrived at this position as a policy and as a legal matter by looking at three questions: the first question is whether legal justification is the direction that the United States should go in as a matter of policy. The second question is whether legal justification is credibly available as a matter of international law. The third question (which assumes the answer to the first and second is yes) is how to go about articulating and disseminating such a justification. Let me take these in order.

Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law

1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malvina Halberstam
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The United States ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Foreign State ◽  
The Supreme Court

Among the more controversial provisions of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), are the sections dealing with the act of state doctrine in Tentative Draft No. 4. Section 428 provides: “Subject to §429, courts in the United States will refrain from examining the validity of an act of a foreign state taken in its sovereign capacity within the state’s own territory.” This provision, of course, is based on the Supreme Court decision in Sabbatino. The Court there stated, “the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government” even if it is alleged that the taking is contrary to international law.

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