Libertarian Paternalism, Manipulation, and the Shaping of Preferences

Author(s):  
Jason Hanna

This chapter considers libertarian paternalism, or “nudging,” as championed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. It focuses especially on the objection that such intervention is wrongly manipulative. The chapter begins by arguing that the charge of manipulation is most likely to be made against preference-shaping paternalism, which aims to influence behavior by operating on a person’s desires from the inside. It then argues that manipulation typically involves one person’s affecting another person’s deliberation for the worse: the victim of manipulation is typically led to act on bad reasons or ignore or downplay relevant considerations. This rough account of manipulation, it is argued, vindicates most of the preference-shaping strategies favored by Thaler and Sunstein. The chapter concludes by examining more problematic means of influence, such as subliminal messaging, and argues that they do not pose any distinctive threat to a pro-paternalist view.

Author(s):  
James R. Otteson

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue for “libertarian paternalism,” defined as the strategy to devise policy that will “maintain or increase freedom of choice” and at the same time “influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better”. These two goals are often in conflict, and striking the right balance between them has proved difficult in both theory and practice. Where does Adam Smith fall in this debate? This chapter argues that Smith developed his own version of “libertarian paternalism.” It differs in important ways from that of Thaler and Sunstein, but it shares with them an attempt to balance respect for individual autonomy with a desire to help people lead better lives. Smith’s position accommodates the importance of both liberty and paternalism in enabling individuals to construct lives worth living, while avoiding some of the problems that have beset more recent versions of libertarian paternalism.


2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (01) ◽  
pp. 263-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anuj C. Desai

In their 2008 bookNudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein use research from psychology and behavioral economics to argue that people suffer from systematic cognitive biases. They propose that policy makers mitigate these biases by framing people's choices in ways that help people act in their own self‐interest. Thaler and Sunstein call this approach “libertarian paternalism,” and they market it as “the Real Third Way.” In this essay, I argue that the book is a brilliant contribution to thinking about policy making but that “choice architecture” is not just a solution to the problem of cognitive biases. Rather, it is a means of approaching any kind of policy making. I further argue that policy makers must take externalities into account, even when using choice architecture. Finally, I argue that libertarian paternalism can best be seen as motivated by what Sunstein has celebrated in his work on constitutional theory: a humility about the possibility of policy‐maker error embodied in Learned Hand's famous aphorism about the “spirit of liberty” and an attempt to reduce social conflicts by searching for what John Rawls called an “overlapping consensus.”


2021 ◽  
pp. 026327642199944
Author(s):  
Nicholas Gane

Given the growing prominence of nudge economics both within and beyond the academy, it is a timely moment to reassess the philosophical and political arguments that sit at its core, and in particular what Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein call libertarian paternalism. The first half of this paper provides a detailed account of the main features of this form of paternalism, before moving, in the second half, to a critical evaluation of the nudge agenda that questions, among other things, the gendered basis of paternalistic governance; the idea of ‘nudging for good’; and the political values that underpin nudge. The final section of this paper builds on the existing work of John McMahon by asking whether libertarian paternalism should be understood as a new, hybrid form of neoliberalism, or, rather, as a post-neoliberal form of governance that has emerged out of, and flourished in, the post-crisis situation.


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