Cooperation and Altruism

Author(s):  
David Sloan Wilson

People have always been fascinated by cooperation and altruism in animals, in part to shed light on our own propensity or reluctance to help others. Darwin’s theory added a certain urgency to the subject because the principle of “nature red in tooth and claw” superficially seems to deny the possibility of altruism and cooperation altogether. Some evolutionary biologists have accepted and even reveled in this vision of nature, giving rise to statements such as “the economy of nature is competitive from beginning to end . . . scratch an ‘altruist’ and watch a hypocrite bleed”. Others have gone so far in the opposite direction as to proclaim the entire earth a unit that cooperatively regulates its own atmosphere (Lovelock 1979). The truth is somewhere between these two extremes; cooperation and altruism can evolve but only if special conditions are met. As might be expected from the polarized views outlined above, achieving this middle ground has been a difficult process. Science is often portrayed as a heroic march to the truth, but in this case, it is more like the Three Stooges trying to move a piano. I don’t mean to underestimate the progress that been made—the piano has been moved—but we need to appreciate the twists, turns, and reversals in addition to the final location. To see why cooperation and altruism pose a problem for evolutionary theory, consider the evolution of a nonsocial adaptation, such as cryptic coloration. Imagine a population of moths that vary in the degree to which they match their background. Every generation, the most conspicuous moths are detected and eaten by predators while the most cryptic moths survive and reproduce. If offspring resemble their parents, then the average moth will become more cryptic with every generation. Anyone who has beheld a moth that looks exactly like a leaf, right down to the veins and simulated herbivore damage, cannot fail to be impressed by the power of natural selection to evolve breathtaking adaptations at the individual level. Now consider the same process for a social adaptation, such as members of a group warning each other about approaching predators.

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-198
Author(s):  
Wiktor Soral ◽  
Mirosław Kofta

Abstract. The importance of various trait dimensions explaining positive global self-esteem has been the subject of numerous studies. While some have provided support for the importance of agency, others have highlighted the importance of communion. This discrepancy can be explained, if one takes into account that people define and value their self both in individual and in collective terms. Two studies ( N = 367 and N = 263) examined the extent to which competence (an aspect of agency), morality, and sociability (the aspects of communion) promote high self-esteem at the individual and the collective level. In both studies, competence was the strongest predictor of self-esteem at the individual level, whereas morality was the strongest predictor of self-esteem at the collective level.


Author(s):  
James Aaron Green

Abstract In Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man (1863), Charles Lyell appraised the distinct contribution made by his protégé, Charles Darwin (On the Origin of Species (1859)), to evolutionary theory: ‘Progression … is not a necessary accompaniment of variation and natural selection [… Darwin’s theory accounts] equally well for what is called degradation, or a retrogressive movement towards a simple structure’. In Rhoda Broughton’s first novel, Not Wisely, but Too Well (1867), written contemporaneously with Lyell’s book, the Crystal Palace at Sydenham prompts precisely this sort of Darwinian ambivalence to progress; but whether British civilization ‘advance[s] or retreat[s]’, her narrator adds that this prophesized state ‘will not be in our days’ – its realization exceeds the single lifespan. This article argues that Not Wisely, but Too Well is attentive to the irreconcilability of Darwinism to the Victorian ‘idea of progress’: Broughton’s novel, distinctly from its peers, raises the retrogressive and nihilistic potentials of Darwin’s theory and purposes them to reflect on the status of the individual in mid-century Britain.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano Calvo Martín ◽  
Stamatios C. Nicolis ◽  
Isaac Planas-Sitjà ◽  
Jean-Christophe de Biseau ◽  
Jean-Louis Deneubourg

AbstractCockroaches, like most social arthropods, are led to choose collectively among different alternative resting places. These decisions are modulated by different factors, such as environmental conditions (temperature, relative humidity) and sociality (groups size, nature of communications). The aim of this study is to establish the interplay between environmental conditions and the modulation of the interactions between individuals within a group leading to an inversion of preferences. We show that the preferences of isolated cockroaches and groups of 16 individuals, on the selection of the relative humidity of a shelter are inversed and shed light on the mechanisms involved. We suggest that the relative humidity has a multi-level influence on cockroaches, manifested as an attractant effect at the individual level and as a negative effect at the group level, modulating the interactions.


Author(s):  
Greger Henriksson ◽  
Minna Räsänen

This chapter is based on the assumption that keeping the number and length of business and commuting trips at reasonable levels could contribute to reaching targets of environmental sustainability. The authors highlight a couple of options for reducing or avoiding business trips and commuting through workplace location or improved use of communications. They present case studies concerning travel and communications, carried out by using diaries and interviews. They also present relevant literature on social practices and sustainability goals in relation to use of ICT. The aim is to shed light on variation in the use of travel and communications on an individual level in work life. The case studies illustrate that such variation is mainly due to the concrete practices involved in execution of professional duties and roles. Duties that involve a clearly defined end result or product being delivered regularly by the member of staff are correlated to clearly defined needs for communications. Less clearly defined end results of the work duties seem to make it harder for the individual to plan and perform communication and travel in a more energy saving way. The difference in professional duties can thus be expressed in terms of clarity and maturity. Another factor that affect who can replace travel with ICTs is relations of power, e.g., when a purchaser dictates the terms for a subcontractor concerning how and where to “deliver” his working time, service or product. The importance of clarity, maturity and power aspects means that professional practices need to be studied at a detailed level to find out who could substitute ICTs for travel and how this could be done.


Author(s):  
Samir Okasha

‘Levels of selection’ examines the levels-of-selection question, which asks whether natural selection acts on individuals, genes, or groups. This question is one of the most fundamental in evolutionary biology, and the subject of much controversy. Traditionally, biologists have mostly been concerned with selection and adaptation at the individual level. But, in theory, there are other possibilities, including selection on sub-individual units such as genes and cells, and on supra-individual units such as groups and colonies. Group selection, altruistic behaviour, kin selection, the gene-centric view of evolution, and the major transitions in evolution are all discussed.


Author(s):  
Mohan Matthen

Physicalism appears to undermine the autonomy of ‘special sciences’ such as biology, and to leave little room for proprietary biological laws or causation. Mendel’s ‘Laws’ are so-called because they are fundamental to the subject-area, but since they describe causal processes that are wholly physical in nature, they seem to reduce to physical laws, given certain propositions about the composition of DNA. The same goes for other principles of the biological sciences. This argument has been challenged by Hilary Putnam, on the grounds that good explanations, for instance in mathematical terms, could range more widely than any given physical realization. Putnam argues that mathematics could thus have an autonomous role in science despite physicalism. Putnam’s insight has been applied to classical genetics by Philip Kitcher. A gene is a unit of inheritance that passes unchanged from parent to offspring according to certain rules. It is these rules that are essential to understanding inheritance, not details of interaction in the DNA substrate. Putnam and Kitcher here employ a notion similar to Aristotle’s ‘formal causes’ – functional and structural determinants of biological characteristics that are somewhat independent of material constitution. There are other conceptions of laws to be found in philosophy of science. Some think that they are propositions with the capacity to impart axiomatic structure to what is known about a domain. The principle of natural selection plays this role in biology, though it is a priori. Again, some think that laws are necessary truths: on cladistic systems of classification, the proposition that the common raven is a bird is arguably a law under this understanding. The nature of causal patterns in natural selection has been a matter of some discussion recently. The view that individual-level causes are sufficient to explain selection-outcomes is tempting to the reductionist, but distorts the explanatory aims of evolutionary theory. Clearly, evolutionary theory requires population-level causes. On the other hand, it has been questioned whether natural selection itself should be understood as a ‘force’ acting on a population, somewhat in the same manner as gravitation acts on a body. Statistical views of natural selection seek alternatives to this way of understanding selection. Finally, what are biological entities? Some ontologies admit no priority among collections of atoms – the argument is that an organism, for instance, is nothing more than such a collection. Many biologists, however, treat of composite entities as internally organized complex systems. On this view, cells, organisms, populations, and ecosystems have privileged ontological status.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuria Nadal-Burgues ◽  
Eduard Bonet

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present new aspects of the tension between creativity and productivity and improve the understanding on how research can be developed in very restricted environments, such as the context of an organization managed using the methods of Project Management. And more generally, it introduces the rhetoric of judgment as a fundamental aspect involved in the development and specification of projects. Design/methodology/approach – The theoretical approach is based on the phenomenological theory of human intentional action developed by Alfred Schutz, in which the notion of mental project is more flexible than that of project management. In it the concepts of subaction and repeated action are considered a combination of similar actions already performed. The Kantian notion of judgment is introduced to outline self-persuasion as a fundamental source of creativity. Findings – The introduction of an extended notion of project and routine involving judgment expands the rational, generic and technical notion of project management. And the rhetorical aspect of judgment, at the individual level, establishes the possibility to deliver unexpected outcomes that are considered creative. Originality/value – The proposed notions of project and routines mediated through the rhetoric of judgment present theoretical and practical progress in the subject of managing projects.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neus Feliu ◽  
Isabel C. Botero

Philanthropy in family enterprises operates at the crossroads of family, business, and society. Most of the research in this area is approached from the business or the individual level; thus, we have a fragmented understanding of philanthropy in family enterprises. This article presents a systematic review of the literature on the subject. Based on 55 sources published between 1988 and 2014, we explain the drivers of this behavior, the vehicles used to practice it, and the outcomes tied to the practice of philanthropy in family enterprises. We identify gaps in our understanding and provide ideas for future research.


2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (06) ◽  
pp. 1250077 ◽  
Author(s):  
DIRK VAN ROOY

This paper introduces a connectionist Agent-Based Model (cABM) that incorporates detailed, micro-level understanding of social influence processes derived from laboratory studies and that aims to contextualize these processes in such a way that it becomes possible to model multidirectional, dynamic influences in extended social networks. At the micro-level, agent processes are simulated by recurrent auto-associative networks, an architecture that has a proven ability to simulate a variety of individual psychological and memory processes [D. Van Rooy, F. Van Overwalle, T. Vanhoomissen, C. Labiouse and R. French, Psychol. Rev. 110, 536 (2003)]. At the macro-level, these individual networks are combined into a "community of networks" so that they can exchange their individual information with each other by transmitting information on the same concepts from one net to another. This essentially creates a network structure that reflects a social system in which (a collection of) nodes represent individual agents and the links between agents the mutual social influences that connect them [B. Hazlehurst, and E. Hutchins, Lang. Cogn. Process. 13, 373 (1998)]. The network structure itself is dynamic and shaped by the interactions between the individual agents through simple processes of social adaptation. Through simulations, the cABM generates a number of novel predictions that broadly address three main issues: (1) the consequences of the interaction between multiple sources and targets of social influence (2) the dynamic development of social influence over time and (3) collective and individual opinion trajectories over time. Some of the predictions regarding individual level processes have been tested and confirmed in laboratory experiments. In a extensive research program, data is currently being collected from real groups that will allow validating the predictions of cABM regarding aggregate outcomes.


1979 ◽  
Vol 205 (1161) ◽  
pp. 599-604 ◽  

Having heard the papers given at this discussion meeting, one must agree that, whether or not one accepts all details of every statement made, there has been in the last 20 years a vast advancein evolutionary comprehension, associated partic­ularly with advances in molecular biology, the theory of group selection, and the application of games theory to much of animal behaviour. On the one hand, our understanding of the nature of the inception of genetic variation has increased out of all recognition; on the other, numbers of phenomena which formerly were the subject of oleographed colour-plates showing ‘bizarre habits’ or ‘outlandish structures’ in popular natural histories are now brought into general theories which give us the means of asking answerable questions about them, and even making predictions. All of this greatly extends the scope of evolutionary theory. There is, however, one major field of enquiry not mentioned by Maynard Smith - rightly, since it has had as yet very little influence on evolutionary theory - and that is natural selection as it actually goes on in the wild. Much of the work we have heard about at this meeting implies natural selection. If it can be shown that of different behavioural strategies directed to the same goal one is more efficient than the others, in expenditure of energy, use of a limited resource, or in resistance to the introduction of other strategies, then the others are less well adapted in these respects and may be expected to be selected out. In general, any demonstration of function implies the possibility of malfunction and the probability of selection acting to keep that function efficient. In some behavioural situations, the implied selection may be intense. A cock robin that is not sufficiently aggressive will not hold a territory and will not breed; but equally, if it is a little too aggressive and drives off both cocks and hens, it will hold a territory but will still not breed. Similarly, in Tinbergen’s remarkable study of eggshell removal in gulls, taking too long away from the nest in removing the shell may leave the chick a prey to neighbour gulls. But staying to protect them and leaving the broken shell in the nest may mean that it is visible to predators, who then kill the chick. In such examples as these, selection against inappropriate behaviour may be from 50 to 100%, and no population geneticist could doubt the efficacy of such a strength.


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