Self-Reflection, Perception, and Conceptual Thought
This chapter argues that the two-fold representation of the self provides a basis for conceptual thought. Some argue that perception and conception are, for Leibniz, radically divided, as they are in Kant’s accounts of intuition and understanding. If this is right, then there is an apparent threat to continuity and therefore to the naturalness of Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. However, this chapter argues that Leibniz is not necessarily committed to a gap here. First, conception is grounded in and arises from perception. Second, insofar as there are primitive concepts, animals could very well have those primitives as well, lacking only the ability to develop those ideas into conscious conceptual cognition. And so the difference would be the presence of a certain kind of ability, which rational beings have that non-rational beings do not have. This difference can be conceived as on a continuum.