Self-Reflection, Perception, and Conceptual Thought

Author(s):  
Larry M. Jorgensen

This chapter argues that the two-fold representation of the self provides a basis for conceptual thought. Some argue that perception and conception are, for Leibniz, radically divided, as they are in Kant’s accounts of intuition and understanding. If this is right, then there is an apparent threat to continuity and therefore to the naturalness of Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. However, this chapter argues that Leibniz is not necessarily committed to a gap here. First, conception is grounded in and arises from perception. Second, insofar as there are primitive concepts, animals could very well have those primitives as well, lacking only the ability to develop those ideas into conscious conceptual cognition. And so the difference would be the presence of a certain kind of ability, which rational beings have that non-rational beings do not have. This difference can be conceived as on a continuum.

2020 ◽  
pp. 85-116
Author(s):  
Hubert J. M. Hermans

This chapter elaborates on the interplay between divergent I-positions in order to create the optimal conditions for learning from others and from oneself. In that context, a distinction is made between rumination, self-reflection, and multi-voicedness, with the latter being the most fertile basis for inner democracy. Much attention is given to the difference between debate and dialogue and how hate speech is an obstacle to both. The argument is presented that dialogue offers better conditions for innovation of the self as part of a boundary-crossing and globalizing society. The chapter also address the politicization of emotion and the limitations of empathy.


Author(s):  
Eva Walther ◽  
Claudia Trasselli

Abstract. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that self-evaluation can serve as a source of interpersonal attitudes. In the first study, self-evaluation was manipulated by means of false feedback. A subsequent learning phase demonstrated that the co-occurrence of the self with another individual influenced the evaluation of this previously neutral target. Whereas evaluative self-target similarity increased under conditions of negative self-evaluation, an opposite effect emerged in the positive self-evaluation group. A second study replicated these findings and showed that the difference between positive and negative self-evaluation conditions disappeared when a load manipulation was applied. The implications of self-evaluation for attitude formation processes are discussed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Sholeha Rosalia ◽  
Yosi Wulandari

Alif means the first, saying the Supreme Life and is Sturdy and has the element of fire and Alif is formed from Ulfah (closeness) ta'lif (formation). With this letter Allah mementa'lif (unite) His creation with the foundation of monotheism and ma'rifah belief in appreciation of faith and monotheism. Therefore, Alif opens certain meanings and definitions of shapes and colors that are in other letters. Then be Alif as "Kiswah" (clothes) for different messages. That is a will. "IQRO" is a revelation that was first passed down to the Prophet Muhammad. Saw. Read it, which starts with the letter Alif and ends with the letter Alif. The creation of a poem is influenced by the environment and the self-reflection of a poet where according to the poet's origin, in comparing in particular Alif's poetry from the two poets. The object of this research is the poetry of Zikir by D. Zawawi Imron and Sajak Alif by Ahmadun Yosi Herfanda. This study uses a comparative method and sociology of literature. Through a comparative study of literature between the poetry of Zikir D. Zawawi Imron and Sajak Alif Ahmadun Yosi Herfanda, it is hoped that the public can know the meaning of Alif according to the poet's view. With this research, the Indonesian people can accept different views on the meaning of Alif in accordance with their respective understanding without having to look for what is right and wrong. The purpose in Alif is like a life, in the form of letters like a body, a tree that is cut to the root, from the heart is split to the seeds, then from the seeds are split so that nothing is the essence of life. So, it is clear that Alif is the most important and Supreme letter. Talking about the meaning of Alif as the first letter revealed on earth. After the letter Alif was revealed, 28 other Hijaiyah letters were born. The letter Alif is made the beginning of His book and the opening letter. Other letters are from Alif and appear on him.


2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Brigitte Hilmer

Kunst kann dann als reflexiv interpretiert werden, wenn Reflexivität nicht auf propositionalen Gehalt oder sogar sprachliche Artikulation angewiesen ist. Reflexion tritt auf in den Modi der Selbstbeziehung des Lebendigen, des Überlegens und der Selbstreferenz im Symbolischen. Kunst ist ein Reflexionsmedium, das diese Modi beansprucht und miteinander verflicht. Eine spezifisch ästhetische Reflexivität ist von und nach Kant nach dem Vorbild der transzendentalen Reflexion und in Konkurrenz zu ihr etabliert worden. Sie läßt sich als Reflexivität des ästhetischen Urteils, als emphatisches Gemachtsein, als Rückwendung auf Wahrnehmungsvollzüge oder als Begriffsreflexion verstehen. Dabei wird die Unterscheidung von Anschauung und Verstand in deren Zusammenspiel oder Abspaltung vorausgesetzt. Von der Analogie zur transzendentalen Reflexion löst sich aber erst ein Verständnis von ästhetischer Reflexivität, das von den drei Modi und ihrer Verflechtung ausgeht.<br><br>Reflexivity does not presuppose linguistic articulation or even propositional content. If it did, art could not be called reflexive. Reflexivity can be found in the self-contact of the living, in mental reflection or in symbolic self-reference. Art is a medium which claims these different modes of reflexivity and intertwines them. Aesthetic reflexivity as such has been established by Kant and his epigones, following the model of transcendetal reflection. Thus it could be specified as the reflexive structure of aesthetic judgement, or as an emphasis on a work’s being created, or as a reference to perception itself in the process of perceiving, or as a way of reflecting concepts. Aesthetic reflexivity can only be detached from the model of transcendental reflection, if it is seen as oriented towards the interaction among the three modes of reflection mentioned above, leaving aside the difference, interplay or competition between perception and conceptual capacities.


This book addresses different linguistic and philosophical aspects of referring to the self in a wide range of languages from different language families, including Amharic, English, French, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Newari (Sino-Tibetan), Polish, Tariana (Arawak), and Thai. In the domain of speaking about oneself, languages use a myriad of expressions that cut across grammatical and semantic categories, as well as a wide variety of constructions. Languages of Southeast and East Asia famously employ a great number of terms for first-person reference to signal honorification. The number and mixed properties of these terms make them debatable candidates for pronounhood, with many grammar-driven classifications opting to classify them with nouns. Some languages make use of egophors or logophors, and many exhibit an interaction between expressing the self and expressing evidentiality qua the epistemic status of information held from the ego perspective. The volume’s focus on expressing the self, however, is not directly motivated by an interest in the grammar or lexicon, but instead stems from philosophical discussions of the special status of thoughts about oneself, known as de se thoughts. It is this interdisciplinary understanding of expressing the self that underlies this volume, comprising philosophy of mind at one end of the spectrum and cross-cultural pragmatics of self-expression at the other. This unprecedented juxtaposition results in a novel method of approaching de se and de se expressions, in which research methods from linguistics and philosophy inform each other. The importance of this interdisciplinary perspective on expressing the self cannot be overemphasized. Crucially, the volume also demonstrates that linguistic research on first-person reference makes a valuable contribution to research on the self tout court, by exploring the ways in which the self is expressed, and thereby adding to the insights gained through philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science.


Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

The crucial interpretive hypothesis of the present book is that central parts of Spinoza’s theoretical philosophy, and in particular his philosophy of mind established in Part Two of the Ethics, can only be understood against the backdrop of the conviction that subjective experience is explainable, and that its successful explanation is ethically relevant because it makes us wiser, freer, and happier. The introduction discusses, in a general manner, what requirements a philosophical system that aims do this must fulfill. Such a system, it is argued, commits itself to a realist version of extreme rationalism that maintains the difference between thought and reality; it cannot, as is sometimes assumed, turn into some form of absolute idealism. Furthermore, in looking at how this fits with Spinoza’s approach in the Ethics, the book shows how the structure of Part Two, along with Spinoza’s proceeding in geometrical manner, must be comprehended.


1993 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Mele

John Christman, in ‘Autonomy and Personal History,’ advances a novel genetic or historical account of individual autonomy. He formulates ‘the conditions of the [i.e., his] new model of autonomy’ as follows:(i) A person P is autonomous relative to some desire D if it is the case that P did not resist the development of D when attending to this process of development, or P would not have resisted that development had P attended to the process;(ii) The lack of resistance to the development of D did not take place (or would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection;and(iii) The self-reflection involved in condition (i) [sic] is (minimally) rational and involves no self-deception. (11)


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