ERM II

Author(s):  
Ulla Neergaard

From the very beginning, an essential cornerstone of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). It has been in force since 1 January 1999, ie from the initiation of the third phase of the EMU. Its overall purpose is to link currencies of Member States outside the euro area to the euro. Its importance lies in the fact that aspiring Member States must first join the mechanism for at least two years before being admitted as members of the euro area, as ERM II ‘membership’ is one of the four convergence criteria, which are required to be fulfilled for a Member State’s eventual adoption of the euro.

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Aspinwall

This article examines British preferences on European monetary integration. It challenges dominant theories of preference formation, suggesting an alternative explanation focusing on governmental majority. Empirical evidence is presented on both UK economic behaviour and the views of domestic economic interests, as well as government majority. The article also analyses first and second-hand accounts of the main players involved in three cases: the decision not to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979, the decision to join the ERM in 1990, and the decision to opt out of stage 3 of Economic and Monetary Union.


2020 ◽  
pp. 171-200
Author(s):  
Stephen Wall

Thatcher got less money back from her EEC partners than she had argued for but secured a lasting deal to replace endless yearly battles for refunds. Arguments over reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) continued. Thatcher championed economic liberalization in Europe, but was opposed to the Treaty changes needed to bring it about. She compromised and got most of what she wanted, at the price of accepting that economic and monetary union (a single currency) would be pursued. Her attempt at a closer relationship with Kohl and Mitterrand was rebuffed. The Bruges speech created shockwaves around Europe. Thatcher and Howe (Foreign Secretary until 1989) were at odds over Europe. He helped force her to agree to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Her stridency provoked his resignation from government and her downfall. Her policies and legacy tend to be caricatured.


Author(s):  
Leo Flynn

Article 124(1) EC Each Member State with a derogation shall treat its exchange-rate policy as a matter of common interest. In so doing, Member States shall take account of the experience acquired in cooperation within the framework of the exchange-rate mechanism.


Author(s):  
Menelaos Markakis

This chapter looks at the crisis-induced legal, institutional, and economic developments within the Economic and Monetary Union. It consists of two parts. First, there will be a brief sketch of the crisis-related developments. These include the setting-up of financial mechanisms, the European Central Bank’s interventions to combat the crisis, the enhanced oversight of national fiscal and economic policy, and the increased supervision over the financial sector. Second, there will be a ‘first assessment’ of their constitutional and structural implications. Two sets of issues will be examined here: issues of legal principle; and the bearing of the enacted measures on European economic integration. Three key arguments will be made in this chapter. First, it will be argued that the measures enacted have led to legislative fragmentation and have exacerbated problems of transparency and complexity which already existed in this area. Second, it will be shown that the chosen form of action has consequences for institutional balance in the EU, democratic control, and judicial review. Third, it will be argued that the enactment of measures which are only applicable to Euro area Member States has served to deepen economic integration within the Euro area and to further differentiate it from economic integration in non-Euro area Member States. Further, certain areas of the single market have integrated more deeply in the Euro area. It will be concluded that the various reforms which have been implemented have strengthened the EU economic governance framework from a legal, institutional, and economic perspective.


Author(s):  
Eugenia Dumitriu Segnana ◽  
Alberto de Gregorio Merino

The Council of the European Union (EU) occupies a central place in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), even more so than in any other Union policies. It exercises in this area a variety of roles going from a forum for coordination of national policies to legislative functions and executive powers. The different crises that affected the Union and in particular the euro area in the last ten years have strengthened its prominent position, in no small part due to the Council’s ownership by the Member States. Alongside the Council, the Euro Group, which is presided by a fixed-term president, has developed itself as the informal forum where Ministers from the Member States whose currency is the euro discuss matters of common interest. Its role has been decisive, in particular in the Cypriot and Greek crisis, which could have put into question the very existence of the euro area as a whole.


Subject Bulgaria’s moves towards euro adoption. Significance Bulgaria wants to participate in the EU’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), which fixes non-euro currencies against the euro within a fluctuation band. Problem-free participation for at least two years is one of the convergence criteria for eventually entering the euro-area. Bulgaria’s motivation is mostly political: to align the country, geographically and economically on the EU’s periphery, with core EU institutions and gain a place at the negotiating table as the post-Brexit EU faces major changes. Impacts All three major ratings agencies class Bulgarian sovereign debt as investment grade (albeit the second-lowest grade) with positive outlook. There are doubts whether Bulgaria can qualify to join the euro within the minimum two years. There is opposition to euro adoption from some shadowy groups preferring a less-regulated, more loosely supervised financial environment. Circles seeking to weaken EU influence and bring Bulgaria closer to Russia will step up efforts to thwart the process.


1990 ◽  
Vol 133 ◽  
pp. 7-23

We start our forecast this time with an exchange rate 9½ per cent higher in the third quarter of this year than we anticipated in May. The main reason for the appreciation of sterling was probably a reassessment by the market of the likely course of UK monetary policy over the next year or two. The likelihood of an early and significant fall in interest rates has receded, as forecasts of the underlying rate of inflation have been revised up. At the same time the commitment to join the exchange-rate mechanism has become firmer, and the Chancellor has been interpreted as wishing to ‘talk the rate up’.


Author(s):  
Lucia Quaglia

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is one of the most important policy areas of the European Union (EU). Academic research on EMU in political science is well-established and ever-evolving, like EMU itself. There are three main “waves” of research on EMU, which have mostly proceeded in a chronological order. The first wave of scholarly work has focused on the “road” to EMU, from the setting up of the European Monetary System in 1979 to the third and final stage of EMU in 1999. This literature has explained why and how EMU was set up and took the “asymmetric” shape it did, that is to say, a full “monetary union,” whereby monetary policy was conducted by a single monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), but “economic union” was not fully fledged. The second wave of research has discussed the functioning of EMU in the 2000s, its effects and defects. EMU brought about significant changes in the member states of the euro area, even though these effects varied across macroeconomic policies and across countries. The third wave of research on EMU has concerned the establishment of Banking Union from 2012 onward. This literature has explained why and how Banking Union was set up and took the “asymmetric” shape it did, whereby banking supervision was transferred to the ECB, but banking resolution partly remained at the national level, while other components of Banking Union, namely a common deposit guarantee scheme and a common fiscal backstop, were not set up. Subsequently, the research has begun to explore the functioning of Banking Union and its effects on the participating member states.


2021 ◽  
pp. 251-275
Author(s):  
Dermot Hodson

Since 1999, a subset of EU member states—known collectively as the euro area—has delegated exclusive competence for monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB), while giving limited powers to the European Commission, ECOFIN, and the Eurogroup in other areas of economic policy. The euro crisis provided the first major test of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), as a sovereign debt crisis spread between member states and threatened to tear the single currency apart. The ECB and two new institutions—the European Stability Mechanism and Euro Summit—helped to keep the euro area together but at significant economic and political cost. EU institutions were better prepared for the initial economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the crisis still produced important institutional changes. The COVID-19 recovery fund Next Generation EU gives the Commission and Council a major new role in economic policy, albeit a temporary one for now. The EMU illustrates three key dimensions of EU institutional politics: the tension between intergovernmental versus supranational institutions, leaders versus followers, and legitimacy versus contestation. It also reveals the explanatory power of new institutionalism among other theoretical perspectives.


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