Lowe’s New Ontological Argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter van Inwagen
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Modal Argument

In ‘A New Modal Version of the Ontological Argument,’ E. J. Lowe has presented a version of the ontological argument that does not, like other versions of the modal argument, make use of a ‘possibility’ premise. (e.g. ‘It is possible for a perfect being to exist’.) Three of the premises of this carefully formulated argument are: some necessary abstract beings exist; all abstract beings are dependent beings; all dependent beings depend for their existence on independent beings. This chapter is an examination of the ‘interplay’ between these three premises and a defense of the author’s conviction that the second of them is false.

The Ontological Argument

Philosophy ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 63 (243) ◽  
pp. 83-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Makin
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Modal Argument

I will offer a defence of Anselm's Ontological Argument, building on some suggestions made by Prior. The defence offered avoids one of the objections commonly levelled against the Ontological Argument. I will not consider whether the use of this objection (that ‘existence is not a predicate’) involves a misinterpretation of the argument as put forward by Anselm. It might, for example, be held that the argument of Proslogion 2 is programmatic, and points forward to Prosiogion 3, and arguments given by Anselm in his Reply to Gaunilo. In particular it might be denied that Anselm holds that what is greater about what exists in reality is just that it exists in reality. While what I have to say will start from points made by Prior, I do not intend to suggest that Prior holds that there is a defence possible for Anselm's argument such as I will offer. What I have to say involves emphasizing modal notions, and treating Anselm's argument as a modal argument. Thus it comes down to defending Anselm's argument in Proslogion 3 in preference to the Proslogion 2 argument.

Waiting for Godo… and Godan: Completing Rowe’s Critique of the Ontological Argument

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-86
Author(s):  
Roslyn Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
William Rowe

In his critique of Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence, William Rowe introduces the concepts of “magico” and “magican”—defining “magicos” as magicians that do not exist, and “magicans” as magicians that do exist—to help diagnose what may have gone wrong in Anselm’s argument. As I made my way through Rowe’s intriguing article, I found myself waiting for “Godo”—and for “Godan.” I expected Rowe to invoke these counterparts to his “magico” and “magican”—a non-existing God to correspond to his non-existing magician, and an existing God to correspond to his existing magician—to complete his argument. Alas, like Vladimir and Estragon, I waited in vain: neither Godo—nor Godan—ever appeared. In what follows I shall argue that their inclusion in Rowe’s argument would have settled the matter against Anselm far more decisively than do Rowe’s forays into the murky waters of question-begging.

Quality and Content

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intentional Content ◽  
Phenomenal Concept ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
Modal Argument ◽  
Demonstrative Thought ◽  
Naturalistic Theory ◽  
Phenomenal Concept Strategy ◽  
The One

The papers presented in this volume cover topics, such as the “phenomenal concept strategy,” to defend materialism from anti-materialist intuitions, the doctrine of representationalism about phenomenal character, the modal argument against materialism, the nature of demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology. On the one hand, I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy cannot work and that representationalism has certain fatal flaws, at least if it’s to be joined to a materialist metaphysics. On the other, I defend materialism from the modal argument, arguing that it relies on a questionable conflation of semantic and metaphysical issues. I also provide a naturalistic theory of demonstrative thought, criticizing certain philosophical arguments involving that notion in the process. I argue as well that the peculiarly subjective nature of secondary qualities provides a window into the nature of the relation between phenomenal character and intentional content, and conclude that relation involves a robust notion of acquaintance.

Anselm's Formula and the Logic of ‘God’

1973 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-288
Author(s):  
Paul M. van Buren
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Difference

Anselm built his meditation Proslogion on the formula ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’. The peculiarity of this phrase has been often remarked but not, I believe, fully appreciated. Properly understood, I shall argue, this formula, although unable to support the so-called ontological argument, throws important light on the logic of the religious use of the word ‘God’. My argument will turn on the difference between the two uses of the verb ‘conceive’ in Anselm's claim that we can conceive of that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

On the PROVER9 Ontological Argument

Philosophia ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 475-483
Author(s):  
T. Parent
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument

A Primordial Reply to Modern Gaunilos

1986 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-49
Author(s):  
James Patrick Downey
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Ontological Argument

Donald R. Gregory has recently argued that the monk Gaunilo's response to St Anselm's ontological argument succeeds in showing what is fundamentally wrong with any ontological argument, including modern modal versions. He holds that the Gaunilo strategy in fact demonstrates what it alleges, that reasoning which parallels the form and intent ofAnselm's reductio argument can ‘prove’ a priori the existence of quite unacceptable entities.

THE MODAL ARGUMENT FOR A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION

Ratio ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Horvath
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Modal Argument
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