Human Rights, Natural Rights, and their Applicability beyond the State–Individual Relationship

Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser

Chapter 4 starts by briefly recalling the traditional, state-centred human rights narrative and the main reasons for a state-focused approach to human rights law: human rights law is widely understood as obligations of states towards individuals living under their jurisdiction. The chapter’s main section, however, presents an alternative view, argueing that philosophically, human rights may also be understood as individual rights that apply not only vis-à-vis governments but also vis-à-vis other actors. Diverting from the mainstream human rights narrative, the chapter shows that this understanding not only finds support in important philosophical accounts on human rights but is also reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

2021 ◽  
pp. 173-195
Author(s):  
Javier Hernández ◽  
Santiago Dussan

This article argues that the conceptions of natural rights in Hobbes’s theory and of economic, social and cultural rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have three common features that serve to justify the thesis that a satisfactory order of coexistence cannot be achieved without extensive state power. Both conceptions identify rights with interests whose satisfaction is considered paramount. Both perspectives see the state as the shaper of the legal order that rights do not create. Finally, both see the state as the entity that must monopolize the management of individual interests represented in rights. This article suggests that these findings are paradoxical when confronted with the main motivation behind the drafting of the Declaration.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Pennington

One of the most notable characteristics of Western societies has been the development of individual and group rights in legal, theological, and philosophical thought of the first two millennia. It has often been noted that thinkers in Non-Western societies have not had the same preoccupation with rights. The very concept of rights is laden with numerous problems. Universality is the most basic and difficult. If human rights are only a product of Western ideas of justice, they cannot have universality. In an age that is dominated by conceptions of law embracing some form of legal positivism, many scholars recognize only individual rights that have been established by the constitutional jurisprudence of individual countries or their legal systems. Historically, the emergence of rights in European jurisprudence is intimately connected with the terms ius naturale and lex naturalis in Western jurisprudence and theological thought. Human beings may never agree on universal rules of a natural law, but they might agree on universal precepts that shape the penumbra of rights surrounding natural rights.


Author(s):  
Paul David Mora

SummaryIn its recent decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Italy had failed to respect immunities enjoyed by Germany under international law when the Italian courts allowed civil actions to be brought against Germany for alleged violations of international human rights law (IHRL) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC) committed during the Second World War. This article evaluates the three arguments raised by Italy to justify its denial of immunity: first, that peremptory norms of international law prevail over international rules on jurisdictional immunities; second, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for serious violations of IHRL or the LOAC; and third, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for torts committed by foreign armed forces on the territory of the forum state in the course of an armed conflict. The author concludes that the ICJ was correct to find that none of these arguments deprived Germany of its right under international law to immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the Italian courts.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter looks at how, among those engaged in the promotion of human rights, there is general agreement that rights are an aspect of humanity. They are not dependent on such characteristics as race, nationality, or gender, nor do they depend on a person's presence within the territory of a particular political entity. Rights, most proponents agree, are ethical norms with a legal content that requires that they should be honored and enforced by public institutions. Some rights, it is generally conceded, may be temporarily abridged by the state because of exigent circumstances; others may never be violated, no matter the context or the purported justification. In the view of many of their proponents, the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Rights are indivisible.


Author(s):  
Allison Christians

This chapter explores the prospects for bringing legal claims seeking accountability for human rights harms due to tax policies and practices. There are a number of ways in which an individual may raise a claim that their rights have been violated in connection with taxation, each of which generally depends on some recognized relationship between the claimant and the person, entity, or institution being asked to remedy the perceived wrong. Meanwhile, there are at least three distinct kinds of relationships involving the state that could theoretically give rise to human rights claims in respect of tax. These three relationships are those among, first, individuals and their own states; second, individuals and foreign states; and, third, states among themselves as members of the international community. In each case, organizations may be formed to represent the interests of individuals, but at stake in all cases is the protection of individual rights.


Author(s):  
Carozza Paolo G

This article examines the issue of human dignity in relation to human rights. It analyses the functions and principle of human dignity and its use in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments. It suggests that human dignity seems to help justify expansive interpretations of human rights and strengthens the centrality and importance of the right in question and limiting possible exceptions or limitations to that right. This article also contends that the difficulty of reaching greater consensus on the meaning and implications of human dignity in international human rights law may be attributed to the fact that it refers to both a foundational premise of human rights and to a principle that affect interpretation and application of specific human rights.


Human Affairs ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-310
Author(s):  
Luiz Gustavo Da Cunha De Souza

Abstract The paper deals with a possible tension within Axel Honneth’s theory of justice as presented in his Freedom’s Right. It takes as its point of departure Georg Lohmann’s objection that Honneth loses sight of the critical potential associated with positive right and tries to discuss it critically both exposing Lohmann’s and Honneth’s position. From the complex of problems identified thereby, the paper moves to a discussion of Émile Durkheim’s theory of State, with which it helps to provide a possible contribution to the discussion between positive, individual rights and the normative framework of social freedom.


Author(s):  
Fernando Arlettaz

Summary The League of Nations established, in the interwar period, a legal regime for the protection of minorities which considered them as intermeditate groups between the State and the individuals. On the contrary, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by the United Nations, assumed a radically individualistic point of view and did not include any mention to minority rights. The travaux préparatoires of the Universal Declaration suggest that the question of minorities caused strong tension among States and that, for this reason, they avoided its inclusion in the 1948 document.


Author(s):  
Bielefeldt Heiner, Prof ◽  
Ghanea Nazila, Dr ◽  
Wiener Michael, Dr

This chapter discusses various human rights violations that arise in the context of constructing, owning, accessing, using, protecting, and preserving places of worship or other religious sites. When members of religious communities wish to construct and own places of worship they often face restrictions that are imposed by the State or competing claims by other religious communities. In this context, the conversion of places of worship as well as their confiscation and unfair restitution provisions may lead to further problems for religious communities. Furthermore, access to religious sites and their use is often unduly restricted by the State, impeded in practice by non-State actors, or hampered by religious precepts which discriminate against some people within the same religious or belief community. The chapter also discusses issues of interpretation, including the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the context of religious sites, the obligations of various duty-bearers, and sacred sites of indigenous peoples.


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