The Anti-Inflammatory Basis of Equality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant J. Rozeboom
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Anti Inflammatory ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Do So

We are moral equals, but in virtue of what? The most plausible answers to this question have pointed to our higher agential capacities, but we vary in the degrees to which we possess those capacities. How could they ground our equal moral standing, then? This chapter argues that they do so only indirectly. Our moral equality is most directly grounded in a social practice of equality, a practice that serves the purpose of mitigating our tendencies toward control and domination that interpreters of Rousseau call “inflamed amour-propre.” We qualify as participants in this practice of equality by possessing certain agential capacities, but it is our participation in the practice, and not the capacities themselves, that makes us moral equals. Thus, in contrast with recent accounts that simply posit a threshold above which capacity-variations are ignored, this chapter proposes moving from a capacity-based to a practice-based view of moral equality.

scholarly journals Meriting Concern and Meriting Respect

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Garthoff
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Kantian Theory ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Conscious Animals ◽  
Do So

Recently there has been a somewhat surprising interest among Kantian theorists in the moral standing of animals, coupled with a no less surprising optimism among these theorists about the prospect of incorporating animal moral standing into Kantian theory without contorting its other attractive features. These theorists contend in particular that animal standing can be incorporated into Kantian moral theory without abandoning its logocentrism: the claim that everything that is valuable depends for its value on its relation to rationality. In this essay I raise doubts about the prospects for accommodating animal moral standing within a logocentric Kantianism. I argue instead that the best way to incorporate animal moral standing into Kantian theory is to admit more radical departures from Kant’s position by maintaining that consciousness is a locus of moral standing independent from rationality.I propose that we should attribute moral standing to all conscious animals because the capacity of consciousness is the criterion distinguishing individuals whose well-being generates reasons from individuals whose well-being fails to do so. We need such a criterion because we speak of the well-being of things, such as artifacts and meteorological phenomena, which clearly lack moral standing. Having already argued against the Kantian view that the criterion of moral standing is rationality, I proceed to argue that consciousness is also superior to its other principal rival for the criterion of moral standing: life.On the view that emerges from this discussion, we have obligations to show concern for conscious individuals by treating their well-being as providing us with reasons for action; the view thus endorses the criterion of moral standing typically advanced by utilitarians. On this view we also have a distinct class of obligations to show respect for conscious rational individuals; the view thus endorses the Kantian claim that persons have a distinctive (and a higher) moral status in virtue of their possession of rational capacities. In this essay thus begin to show how a principal insight of each leading approach to modern moral theory may be captured in a unified theory.

scholarly journals Practices of Piety: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Islamic Movements

Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 520
Author(s):  
Aaron Rock-Singer
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Gender Segregation ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Islamic Movements ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Do So

This article challenges the dominant organization-centered focus of the study of Islamic movements, and argues for a turn towards social practice. To do so, it traces the rise and spread of Egypt’s leading Salafi movement, Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya (e. 1926) and its role in popularizing a series of distinct practices between 1940 and 1990. Based on the full run of this movement’s magazine, al-Hadi al-Nabawi (the Prophetic Guide, 1936–66) and al-Tawhid (Monolatry, 1973–93), the article explores the conditions in which practices such as praying in shoes and bareheaded, gender segregation and the cultivation of a fist-length beard were both politically viable and strategically advantageous. In doing so, it not only casts light on the trajectory of this movement, but also shows how and why the articulation and performance of distinct social practices are central to how Islamic movements shape society.

The Principle of Fairness and States’ Duty to Obey International Law

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lefkowitz
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
International Context ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
Technical Sense ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Do So

I employ the principle of fairness to argue that many existing states have a moral duty to obey international law simply in virtue of its status as law. On this voluntarist interpretation of the principle of fairness, agents must accept (in a technical sense) the benefits of a cooperative scheme in order to acquire an obligation to contribute to that scheme’s operation. I contend that states can accept the benefits international law provides, and that only if they do so do states have a fair-play duty to obey international law. In addition, I demonstrate that A. John Simmons’ criticisms of the attempt to use the principle of fairness to establish a duty to obey domestic law – both with respect to understanding the legal order as a cooperative scheme, and to agents’ acceptance of benefits – do not apply in the international context.

scholarly journals Common Worlding Pedagogies: Opening Up to Learning with Worlds

2021 ◽  
pp. 74-88
Author(s):  
Affrica Taylor ◽  
Tatiana Zakharova ◽  
Maureen Cullen
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
Pedagogical Approach ◽  
Research Project ◽  
Early Childhood Research ◽  
Guiding Principles ◽  
Opening Up ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Do So

Common worlding is a collective pedagogical approach. It is also a deliberate move to open up education to worlds beyond narrow human preoccupations and concerns and beyond its standard framing as an exclusively social practice. In this article, we identify some of the guiding principles that underpin this approach and explain how they work out in practice. We do so by offering a selection of illustrative vignettes drawn from the Walking with Wildlife in Wild Weather Times early childhood research project in Canberra, Australia, and from the Witnessing the Ruins of Progress early childhood research collaboratory in Ontario, Canada.

Dignity and Equality in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen
Keyword(s):  
Social Inequality ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

The chapter explores the ambiguity of the notion of dignity in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. On the one hand, dignity (dignatio) denotes the moral status of human beings in virtue of which they have to treat each other as equals. On the other hand, Pufendorf holds dignity and natural equality to be compatible with social inequality, notably with servitude and slavery. Moreover, when he deals with the comparative value and reputation (existimatio) of human beings, he admits that their moral status is conditioned by their readiness to behave as social beings. Human beings can thus lose their basic moral standing and are then considered as common enemies of all.

scholarly journals Englishization and the politics of translation

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie Victoria Wilmot ◽  
Susanne Tietze
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
International Business ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
English Language ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Call To Action ◽  
Address Translation ◽  
Methodological Considerations ◽  
Multilingual Research ◽  
Do So

Purpose This study aims to investigate the treatment of translation within the international business and management (IBM) literature to highlight colonialist assumptions inscribed in this treatment as a result of the hegemonic status of English. Design/methodology/approach This investigation takes the form of a systemic literature review to examine the treatment of translation in the IBM literature through a postcolonial lens. Findings The findings demonstrate that despite growing interest in language in international business, matters of translation have received comparatively little attention. However, those articles that do address translation matters tend to do so in five key ways, including epistemological/methodological considerations, exploring translator agency, the investigations of the discursive void/conceptual fuzziness between languages, and approaches that discuss translation as social practice. Research limitations/implications Despite the authors’ critique of English-language hegemony, this literature review is restricted to English-language journals, which the authors acknowledge as problematic and discuss within the article. Practical implications In exposing the limited treatment of translation within the literature, the authors provide a call to action for IBM scholars to be more explicit in their treatment of translation to ensure representation of cultural and linguistic Others, rather than providing domesticated accounts of multilingual research. Originality/value Although there have been other articles that have examined translation in the past, this paper is the first to do so through a postcolonial lens, demonstrating from a linguistic perspective the colonialist assumptions that are still prevalent in IBM knowledge production, as evidenced by the treatment of translation in the field.

scholarly journals Ways of pointing to artworks: a Wittgensteinian approach = Formas de apuntar a las obras de arte: un enfoque wittgensteiniano

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Salvador Rubio Marco
Keyword(s):  
Aesthetic Experiences ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
The Aesthetic ◽  
Main Criticism ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Realist Concept ◽  
Do So

Abstract: The aim of P. Kivy’s recent De Gustibus: Arguing about Taste and Why We Do It (2015) is to answer to the very same question in terms of an emphasis on belief based on «phenomenological» (if not also ontological) «art-realism». Those who disagree on taste do so because they (explicitly or implicitly) see, in judgments relating to properties of artworks, the expression of beliefs, some of which are «true», and true in virtue of correctly reporting «facts» (non-aesthetic art-relevant facts, aesthetic art-relevant facts, or art value facts), and they try to convince others of what they think is «real» about art. Kivy follows the traces of this phenomenology of «beautiful» found in Hume’s work (and vs. Kant’s work). The main criticism is that it is actually possible to defend an alternative approach to understanding art in terms of «aspects» (an allegedly ‘anti-realist’ concept), so as to take account of rationality, disputes and the role of facts regarding judgments of taste. Kivy does not concede enough attention to the aesthetic experiences of seeing now what we were unable to see before (the «dawning» of an aspect), for example.Key words: Kivy, taste, phenomenology, belief, aesthetics, Wittgenstein.Resumen: El objetivo del reciente De Gustibus. Arguing about Taste and Why We Do It (2015), de P. Kivy es responder a la pregunta incluida en el título de su libro en términos de un énfasis en la creencia que se basa en un realismo en arte «fenomenológico» (si no también ontológico): quienes que disputan sobre «gusto» suelen hacerlo porque ellos (explícita o implícitamente) ven los juicios concernientes a las propiedades de las obras de arte como expresando creencias, algunas de las cuales son verdaderas, y verdaderas en virtud de reportar hechos correctamente (hechos no estéticos relevantes para el arte, hechos estéticos relevantes para el arte o hechos de valor artístico), y tratan de convencer a otros de lo que ellos piensan que es ‘real’ sobre el arte. Kivy sigue el rastro de esa fenomenología de ‘lo bello’ a partir de la obra de Hume (y contra la obra de Kant). Mi crítica principal es que es posible defender un enfoque alternativo de la comprensión del arte en términos de aspectos (un concepto supuestamente «antirrealista») a fin de tener en cuenta la racionalidad, las disputas y el papel de los hechos con respecto a los juicios de gusto. Kivy no presta suficiente atención a las experiencias estéticas de ver ahora lo que no podíamos ver antes (el «aparecer» de un aspecto), por ejemplo.Palabras claves: Kivy, gusto, fenomenología, creencia, estética, Wittgenstein.

scholarly journals The moral standing of the dead

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1754) ◽  
pp. 20170270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Luper
Keyword(s):  
Moral Standing ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
The Dead ◽  
Do So

In choosing to do certain things, we appear to presuppose that we can act in the interests the dead, and that we have a duty to do so. For example, some of us go to great lengths to carry out their final wishes. Given that the dead no longer exist, however, it seems that nothing can be good or bad for them: they lack prudential interests. In that case, it is hard to see how we could owe them anything. They seem to lack moral standing altogether. In this essay, I will rebut this line of thought. I will claim that in some cases things that happen after people die are indeed good or bad for them. Their interests can still be advanced or hindered, so the dead have moral standing. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary thanatology: impacts of the dead on the living in humans and other animals’.

Teleological Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Portmore
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Do So

A teleological reason to φ is a reason to φ in virtue of the fact that φ-ing would either itself promote a certain end or is appropriately related to something else that would promote that end. And teleological reasons divide into direct and the indirect kinds, depending on whether the first or second of these two disjuncts applies. Thus, supposing that our end is to maximize utility, the fact that my killing one to save two would maximize utility is a direct teleological reason for me to do so, whereas the fact that my killing one to save two is prohibited by the code of rules whose universal acceptance would maximize utility is an indirect teleological reason for me to refrain from doing so. This chapter discusses various types of reasons, such as epistemic reasons (that is, reasons to believe), and whether all, some, or none of them are teleological. The chapter pays particularly close attention to the issue of whether all practical reasons (that is, reasons for action) are teleological.

scholarly journals Supervising in English: The Doctoral Thesis, Professor/Student Discourse, and Social Practice

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (30) ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Jane Mattisson
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Language ◽  
Doctoral Students ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
Cultural Practice ◽  
Teacher Interaction ◽  
Doctoral Thesis ◽  
Scholarly Identity ◽  
High Level ◽  
Rules Of The Game ◽  
Do So

My article investigates the situation, goals, and discourse praxis of professors supervising doctoral students writing in English. It is part of a wider project examining student-teacher interaction which is designed to improve written communication, particularly at the higher levels of academic study. Like the students they supervise, the five professors studied are English as a Foreign Language users, and all give instruction exclusively in English. Based on separate interviews with each professor, my study demonstrates that there is a tendency among doctoral supervisors to focus on the content and form of the thesis to the detriment of socio-cultural practice, i.e., the discourse between the professor and student, as well as the recognition of the text as a piece of social practice, shaped by a particular kind of academic public and the rules of scholarship that have been developed over time. The type of social practice that students bring with them varies from culture to culture. I argue that a doctoral thesis bears witness not only to the student’s ability to conduct research at a high level, but also to the creation of a distinct scholarly identity that is the result of effective discourse between professor and student, whereby the professor communicates “the rules of the game” that lead to a successful career both at university and after. My paper reflects on how we as teachers/supervisors can promote the formation of scholarly identity through the medium of English as a Foreign Language. I do so by focusing on the five supervisors’ knowledge of English, their ability to provide guidance in English, and their awareness of the importance of promoting scholarly identity in English. The article concludes with some reflections on the type of support required, if any, from native English teachers.

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