Fiscal Policy Coordination

Author(s):  
Charlotte Rommerskirchen

This chapter sets the scene for this study by providing historical context and introducing the key aspects, processes, and players of fiscal policy coordination. In so doing it charts key developments of pre-crisis fiscal policy coordination, before turning to the creation of the European crisis agreement, the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), and finally the reform packages post-crisis. Despite impressions to the contrary, the procedures for fiscal policy coordination are extensive, albeit enforced and reinforced with little political and legal power. Although there is persistent continuity for some ideas and procedures—the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its fear of stability free riding chief among them—new innovations and reforms have made inroads.

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (125) ◽  
pp. 637-648
Author(s):  
Hansjörg Herr

The terrorattack hit the western world in a situation of a sharp cyclical downturn in the USA, Europe and Japan. Mainly because of increased uncertainty the downturn will be intensified by the attack. Immediately after the attack US monetary and fiscal policy became even more expansive. In Europe monetary policy reacted very reluctantly. Active fiscal policy in the Euro-area is nearly not existing as the Stability and Growth Pact as well as neo-liberal ideology prevents fiscal measures. The inactive economic policy in the Euro-area is not only dangerous for Europe but also a depressing factor for the world economy.


2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-193
Author(s):  
Marco Ciaffi

Abstract Brunila, A. - Buti, M. - Franco, D. (eds), 2001, The Stability and Growth Pact: The Architecture of Fiscal Policy in EMU, New York, Palgrave, pp. 438, hardcover, ISBN<italic/> 0-333-96145-5, US$69.95.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim Truger

Abstract Fiscal rules such as the European Stability and Growth Pact and the German debt brake have been suspended in the Covid19-pandemic in order to provide emergency measures and to overcome the crisis. Now, the controversial debate is back again: When should governments return to fiscal rules? Should they return to fiscal rules, at all? This article argues that it is not so much a question whether governments should return to fiscal rules at all, but to which kind of rules they should return. Following the deficit bias argument and the need for fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union some kind of limitation for government debt and some kind of fiscal rules may easily be justified. However, that does not mean that governments should return exactly to the previously existing rules, because these are economically flawed. Recently the argument for reform has become even stronger due to new empirical evidence about the macroeconomic effectivity of fiscal policy, the experience of the dysfunctionality of the existing rules during the Euro crisis and the fact that the cost of public debt has been reduced dramatically because of persistently low if not negative nominal interest rates.


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