From Crisis to Opportunity

2019 ◽  
pp. 199-230
Author(s):  
Anand Toprani

This chapter offers a reassessment of Germany’s oil strategy during World War II. Fuel consumption during Germany’s early campaigns (1939–40) was lower than expected, but the swift victory over France left the Third Reich in a quandary. Before the war, Europe had imported two-thirds of its petroleum consumption. Germany’s prewar efforts had only aimed to make it self-sufficient—the Third Reich could not hope, however, to replace the supplies other European nations had imported from overseas. German planners concluded that unless Germany took control of the oil resources of either the Soviet Union or the Middle East, fuel shortages would soon derail the entire war effort. This looming energy crisis in Europe strengthened Hitler’s ideological and strategic conviction that Germany should risk a two-front war in 1941 by attacking the Soviet Union before the United States could intervene.

2015 ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Wanda Jarząbek

The policy of the Polish government in exile during World War II has been the subject of numerous studies, but it still seems reasonable to trace their relation to crimes committed on Polish soil. The aim of this article is not to present the whole problem, but just outline the attitude towards German crimes. It must be remembered that the Polish government was also confronted with the occupation policy of the Soviet Union and the crimes committed in Volhynia and Galicia by Ukrainian nationalists. The final caesura of the article is the President’s decree of on punishment for war crimes released on March 30, 1943.The Polish government was of the opinion that the crimes should be punished primarily on the level of individuals who committed them, but the consequence of the criminal policy of the Third Reich should be the adoption of such a post-war policy against Germany that would guarantee compensation for victim countries, including compensation for material damage, and lead to a change in the German mentality, which was blamed partly responsible for the policy of the Third Reich. Such an attitude was shared by the anti-Hitler coalition countries.On the practical level, the Polish government’s policy had several stages. Initially, they collected information, tried to make it public and sough the cooperation of other countries. Despite numerous doubts were reported, they decided to amend the Polish criminal law to allow punishing war criminals more proportionally, as they thought, to the committed acts. The government’s activity probably influenced the attitude of the Allies, although it is difficult to accurately recognize and describe this issue. As a result of the situation after World War II, the new Polish authorities pursued a policy of punishing the guilty. Due to the international situation, i.e. the growing conflict between the coalition partners, many criminals escaped  punishment.


2019 ◽  
pp. 231-252
Author(s):  
Anand Toprani

This chapter places oil at the center of the Third Reich’s plans for the economic exploitation of the Soviet Union. It begins by reviewing Germany’s preoccupation with the Caucasian oilfields during World War I. The chapter then considers the strategic context behind Germany’s decision to launch Operation Barbarossa in 1941. It moves on to review technical details of seizing and rehabilitating the Soviet oilfields. Time was running out for the Germans, however—their supply position was already tenuous by the spring of 1941, and by the autumn Germany had burned through its entire operational reserve even as the German war plan against the Soviet Union began to stall. The failure of Operation Barbarossa ultimately doomed the German war effort, since the Third Reich lacked the means to destroy the Soviet Union before the entry of the United States into the war tipped the scales irrevocably against Germany.


Author(s):  
Panikos Panayi

In Germany, World War II does not usually form a distinct and compact period, as it does in other states, such as Great Britain, the United States, or Russia. The most recognized phases in the history of 20th-century Germany are the Kaiserreich (1890–1919), the Weimar Republic (1919–1933), the Third Reich (1933–1945), divided Germany (1945–1989), and reunified Germany (after 1989). World War II usually receives attention as part of the history of the Third Reich. On the other hand, historians of the war often approach the conflict from a German-centered perspective. Some differences exist between German and Anglo-American historians, with the former, especially those who work on local history, more likely to examine World War II as a distinct period, although some recent major works have begun to buck this trend in Anglo-American scholarship. In recent years, the multivolume Clarendon history Germany and the Second World War, translated from the German Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, has helped to unify the Anglo-American and German perspectives. Some of the publications included in this article, however, view the war in Germany as part of the wider history of the Third Reich. From the outset, Nazi Germany, and World War II within it, has given rise to a vast literature, which began as the Nazis rose to power and has continued unabated until the present. This article can therefore only provide the briefest of introductions to this enormous historiography by outlining the key publications in these areas: General Overviews; Push to War; Invasion of Eastern Europe; Bombing of German Cities; Economic Mobilization; Genocide; Foreign Workers and Prisoners of War; Local History; Women; Children; Repression and Resistance; Religion; Propaganda; and Defeat.


2021 ◽  
pp. 3-23
Author(s):  
Leszek (Aleksander) Szaruga (Wirpsza)

This article describes the course of World War II in the Intermarium region in relation both to the national policies of several countries and to the resistance movement organized by the communities opposing the Soviets as well as German domination. The first phase of events takes place in the period from September 1939 to the German invasion of the USSR; the second phase lasts until the end of the war and launches the partisan actions inspired by communist organizations on behalf of the Communist International (Comintern). The aim of the partisans’ actions was the resistance to the domination of the Third Reich and Italy achieved through diversions at the rear of the armies of the Axis powers. At the same time the Soviets’ joining the alliance results in treaties of the Big Three (The USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) establishing the political order for Europe after the end of WWII, particularly the subjugation of Intermarium countries by the Soviet domination.


Author(s):  
Pavel Gotovetsky

The article is devoted to the biography of General Pavlo Shandruk, an Ukrainian officer who served as a Polish contract officer in the interwar period and at the beginning of the World War II, and in 1945 became the organizer and commander of the Ukrainian National Army fighting alongside the Third Reich in the last months of the war. The author focuses on the symbolic event of 1961, which was the decoration of General Shandruk with the highest Polish (émigré) military decoration – the Virtuti Militari order, for his heroic military service in 1939. By describing the controversy and emotions among Poles and Ukrainians, which accompanied the award of the former Hitler's soldier, the author tries to answer the question of how the General Shandruk’s activities should be assessed in the perspective of the uneasy Twentieth-Century Polish-Ukrainian relations. Keywords: Pavlo Shandruk, Władysław Anders, Virtuti Militari, Ukrainian National Army, Ukrainian National Committee, contract officer.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”


1953 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-167
Author(s):  
S. Bernard

The advent of a new administration in the United States and the passage of seven years since the end of World War II make it appropriate to review the political situation which has developed in Europe during that period and to ask what choices now are open to the West in its relations with the Soviet Union.The end of World War II found Europe torn between conflicting conceptions of international politics and of the goals that its members should seek. The democratic powers, led by the United States, viewed the world in traditional, Western, terms. The major problem, as they saw it, was one of working out a moral and legal order to which all powers could subscribe, and in which they would live. Quite independently of the environment, they assumed that one political order was both more practicable and more desirable than some other, and that their policies should be directed toward its attainment.


2018 ◽  
pp. 52-62
Author(s):  
Oksana Salata

The second world and its constituent German-Soviet wars became the key events of the 20th century. Currently, the study of domestic and foreign historiography in the context of the disclosure of the information policy of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, the information confrontation of the Nazi and Soviet systems of information and psychological infl uence on the enemy population is relevant. Thanks to the work of domestic and foreign scholars, the attraction of new archival materials and documents, the world saw scientifi c works devoted to various aspects of the propaganda activities of Nazi Germany, including in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Among them are the works of Ukrainian historians: A. Podolsky, Y. Nikolaytsya, P. Rekotov, O. Lysenko, V. Shaikan, M. Mikhailyuk, V. Grinevich; Russian historians M. I. Semiaryagi, E. Makarevich, V. I. Tsymbal and G. F. Voronenkova. An analysis of scientifi c literature published in Germany, England and the United States showed that the eff ectiveness and negative eff ects of German information policy are revealed in the works of German historians and publicists O. Hadamovsky, N. Muller, P. Longerich, R. Coel, et al. Along with the works devoted to armed confrontation, one can single out a study in which the authors try to show the information technologies and methods of psychological action that were used by the governments of both countries to infl uence the consciousness and the moral and psychological state of their own population and the enemy’s population, on the results of the Second World War. Most active in the study of Nazi propaganda and information policy of the Third Reich, in general, were the German historians, in particular E. Hadamovskie , G. Fjorsterch and G. Schnitter, and others. The value of their work is to highlight the process of the creation in 1933–1945 of the National Socialist Party in Germany of an unprecedented system of mass manipulation in the world’s history, fully controlled by the Nazi leadership of the information space. Thus, an analysis of the works of domestic and foreign scholars shows that the information confrontation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was extremely powerful, since both warring parties possessed the most up-to-date information and ideological weapon. Unfortunately, today there is no comprehensive study of this problem that could reveal all aspects of the information confrontation in the modern information world.


2021 ◽  

Assessments of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s performance as the Supreme Allied Commander during World War II and the nation’s thirty-fourth president have evolved across the more than seventy-five years from the conclusion of World War II in 1945 to the dedication in 2020 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial in Washington, DC. Historians have sought to explain Eisenhower’s unlikely rise from his modest upbringing in Abilene, Kansas, to his ascendance to command of western allies in the European theater. Selected over several senior officers in 1942 to command the invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch), Eisenhower initially experienced a series of setbacks and controversies resulting from inexperienced troops, incompetent subordinate leaders, a formidable enemy, and political deals with leaders of Vichy France. Although historians continue to debate his decisions regarding command and strategy in the European theater, they generally praise Eisenhower’s ability to maintain the western alliance amid national rivalries, professional jealousies, strong personalities, and competing political ambitions. Assessments of Eisenhower’s performance as president have undergone a remarkable transformation. Initially ranked in 1961 near the bottom in assessments of presidential leadership, he currently appears within the top tier. Initial accounts in the 1960s portrayed Eisenhower as a bumbling, docile president who appeared to be out of touch with the basic policies and operations of his administration. He appeared unwilling to address the major issues confronting American society, and to defer to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on matters of foreign policy and national security. For his critics, Eisenhower perilously, inflexibly, and imprudently relied upon the superiority of the nation’s nuclear arsenal to contain communist expansion, then allowed the Soviet Union to beat the United States into space and create a missile gap. Scholars collectively labeled “Eisenhower Revisionists” assessing declassified documents beginning in the mid-1970s forged a revised consensus that Eisenhower was clearly thoughtful, informed, and firmly in command of his administration. Moreover, the nation’s nuclear arsenal retained and even strengthened its predominance of power. “Postrevisionist” analysts generally concur that Eisenhower was clearly the dominant decision-maker and developed an effective policy development process, but they question the efficacy of some of his decisions and policies, including his management of crises in this dangerous period of the Cold War, his increased use of covert operations and propaganda, his approach to decolonization, and his efforts to ease tensions and slow the nuclear arms race.


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