One Foot In and One Foot Out, 1990–1997

2020 ◽  
pp. 201-226
Author(s):  
Stephen Wall
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Conservative Party ◽  
Maastricht Treaty ◽  
German Reunification ◽  
Exchange Rate Mechanism ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Right ◽  
Rate Mechanism ◽  
The Eu

John Major had none of Thatcher’s reservations about German reunification and wanted to put Britain at the heart of Europe. But he faced growing Euroscepticism inside the Conservative Party. At Maastricht, Major secured for the UK the right to opt out or, later to opt in, to the proposed European single currency. The significance of this opt out for the longer term British sense of detachment from the rest of the EU was not then obvious. The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the UK, and the Major government, both nearly foundered, when the UK was forced out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1991. Europe became a toxic issue in the Conservative Party. Mad Cow Disease triggered a policy of non-cooperation by the UK with the rest of the EU. Major championed the enlargement of the EU to include the newly freed countries of eastern and central Europe.

Odd man out: rethinking British policy on European monetary integration

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Aspinwall
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Exchange Rate Mechanism ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Rate Mechanism

This article examines British preferences on European monetary integration. It challenges dominant theories of preference formation, suggesting an alternative explanation focusing on governmental majority. Empirical evidence is presented on both UK economic behaviour and the views of domestic economic interests, as well as government majority. The article also analyses first and second-hand accounts of the main players involved in three cases: the decision not to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979, the decision to join the ERM in 1990, and the decision to opt out of stage 3 of Economic and Monetary Union.

Europe's monetary malaise: international institutions and domestic policy commitments

1996 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Sandholtz
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
European Monetary System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Exchange Rate Mechanism ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Belgian Franc ◽  
Rate Mechanism

A yearlong nightmare for the European Monetary System (EMS) began in September 1992. Amid name–calling, finger–pointing, and hand–wringing, the British pound and the Italian lira dropped out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). In succeeding months, virtually every other ERM currency came under attack.1 Three of them—the Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo, and the Irish punt—devalued within the system. Three others—the French franc, the Belgian franc, and the Danish krone—avoided devaluation, but only at the price of recurrent and costly rounds of intervention by multiple central banks. Finally, in August 1993, the defenders of the parities surrendered. The twelve EMS countries agreed to expand the fluctuation margins from 2.25 per cent on either side of parity (6 per cent for Spain, Portugal and the UK) to 15 per cent on either side of parity. The wider margins eliminated the potential for speculative attacks, but left the system only the thinnest veneer of exchange rate coordination. This article seeks not to assess the causes of the crisis but rather to explain why the EMS governments did not defuse it with a realignment—the mechanism built into the ERM for precisely such occasions.

Minister. At first sight it is an interesting example of a reverse linkage between national and European developments. This book has highlighted a number of occasions when the course of European integration was profoundly influenced, even determined, by national political developments. The deposition of Thatcher was an occasion on which European issues apparently impacted decisively on national politics. However, occasion and cause are not always synonymous and the reality is slightly different. European issues were undoubtedly the occasion for the change of Prime Minister. However, the underlying causes lay in domestic politics – particularly the poll tax fiasco – and a fear amongst Conservative back-benchers that the next general election could be lost if changes were not made. There is little evidence that the replacement of Margaret Thatcher by John Major changed British attitudes towards the Community, soon to become the Union. Differences between leading British government ministers remained and splits over European issues in the Conservative party were to deepen, especially after the 1992 elections. Other European leaders now had to deal with a much weaker British Prime Minister – not necessarily an advantage. Although there is little evidence that the changed external context had much impact on the IGCs and the shape of the Treaty on European Union, the same may not necessarily be true for developments immediately post-Maastricht. The ratification process was more difficult than that for any other treaty. A referendum in Denmark rejected the entire Treaty, a situation only reversed by special concessions and opt outs. President Mitterand called a referendum in France, largely in the hope of boosting his own waning popularity, and came within a whisker of losing. In Britain the ratification process in Parliament was delayed by the growing split in the Conservative party re-inforced by a crisis in the European Monetary System. When Britain had finally joined the exchange rate mechanism in 1990, the pound sterling – which had for some time previously been shadowing the mark – was valued at a high rate which simply could not be sustained. Faced with enormous and uncontrollable speculative movements and unwilling to seek an agreed currency revaluation, Britain simply pulled out of the exchange rate mechanism in September 1992. Thereafter with the Conservative party increasingly adopting the line on Europe which had theoretically cost Thatcher her job, ratification of Maastricht was for some time on a knife edge. This chapter is entitled ‘From Commmunity to Union’. An apparent relaunching of the integration process with the single market initiative promoted another of those relatively brief and infrequent waves of what has

2006 ◽  
pp. 88-88
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Conservative Party ◽  
High Rate ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Exchange Rate Mechanism ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
The Exchange Rate ◽  
Rate Mechanism

scholarly journals A new exchange rate mechanism for the Euro age

1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 277-281
Author(s):  
Christa Randzio-Plath
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Exchange Rate Mechanism ◽  
Rate Mechanism

The Scottish Conservatives and Europe: The Reluctant Brexit Party

2020 ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
Anthony Salamone
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Conservative Party ◽  
Political Context ◽  
The European Union ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Future Prospects ◽  
Four Dimensions ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

As Scottish Conservative leader, Ruth Davidson was a prominent campaigner for a ‘Remain’ vote in the European Union referendum of June 2016. Following the 2017 general election, meanwhile, Davidson repositioned herself as someone who could – aided by 13 Scottish Tory MPs in the House of Commons – influence the Brexit negotiations and nudge the UK Conservative Party towards a ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ deal with the EU. This chapter considers the impact of Brexit on the Scottish Conservatives during the leadership of Ruth Davidson in four dimensions: Brexit’s distinct Scottish political context, its electoral consequences, the conduct of Brexit within the UK, and the Brexit negotiations themselves. It concludes with reflections on the future prospects for the Scottish party in light of all four dimensions.

Article 142 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Member State ◽  
Exchange Rate Policy ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Member States ◽  
Exchange Rate Mechanism ◽  
Rate Policy ◽  
The Exchange Rate ◽  
Rate Mechanism

Article 124(1) EC Each Member State with a derogation shall treat its exchange-rate policy as a matter of common interest. In so doing, Member States shall take account of the experience acquired in cooperation within the framework of the exchange-rate mechanism.

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