IPO Valuation

Author(s):  
Sanjai Bhagat ◽  
Jun Lu ◽  
Srinivasan Rangan

This chapter studies the valuation of 6,199 IPOs during 1998–2015 for Australia, Canada, China, Germany, India, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. Net income is positively related to initial public offering (IPO) valuation in each of the eight countries. The economic impact of net income is largest for Chinese IPOs and smallest for Australian IPOs. Book value is positively and significantly related to IPO valuation in Canada, Germany, India, and the United States. Capital expenditure is significantly and positively related to IPO valuation in Canada, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There is a positive and statistically significant relation between insider retention and IPO valuation in China, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States; positive but marginally significant relationship for India and Japan. Underwriter reputation has a positive and statistically significant relationship for IPOs in China, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 1620-1650 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Filatotchev ◽  
Salim Chahine ◽  
Garry D. Bruton

Building on the institutional perspective on capital markets, we examine the process of legitimation that underpins investor valuation of initial public offerings in the context of institutional polycentricism. We focus on the impact of board interlocks of the CEO and internal and external board members on investor perceptions of initial public offering firms in the United States and United Kingdom. We find that the extent of board members’ interlocks relates positively to the extent of the CEO’s interlocks, but this relationship is stronger in the United Kingdom than in the United States. More extensive interlocks lead to higher valuations in the United Kingdom than in the United States. This is the result of differences in institutional confluences that underpin corporate governance in the two culturally related countries.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Rehana Cassim

Abstract Section 162 of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 empowers courts to declare directors delinquent and hence to disqualify them from office. This article compares the judicial disqualification of directors under this section with the equivalent provisions in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States of America, which have all influenced the South African act. The article compares the classes of persons who have locus standi to apply to court to disqualify a director from holding office, as well as the grounds for the judicial disqualification of a director, the duration of the disqualification, the application of a prescription period and the discretion conferred on courts to disqualify directors from office. It contends that, in empowering courts to disqualify directors from holding office, section 162 of the South African Companies Act goes too far in certain respects.


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