scholarly journals A Fund-Based Timberland Investment Performance Measure and Implications for Asset Allocation

1998 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 143-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon P. Caulfield

Abstract Timberland investment management companies and institutional investors use indexes to calculate the performance of timberland investments. Most indexes are based on hypothetical timberland properties. The Timberland Performance Index (TPI), a fund-based performance measure, provides composite returns for actual, institutionally owned timberlands. The TPI has several desirable attributes: it uses publicly available data from real properties, is weighted by asset value, has a sufficiently long historical record that meaningful comparisons can be made with other assets, and can be updated quarterly. The TPI is employed to demonstrate how adding timberland to a portfolio influences risk-return relationships for institutional portfolios. For the 1981-1996 period it is found that adding timberland tends to enhance returns for given levels of risk. This is consistent with previous research, which employed hypothetical timberland indexes for this purpose. South. J. Appl. For. 22(3):143-147.

1990 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 119-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Christian Zinkhan ◽  
Kossuth Mitchell

Abstract This paper explores two timberland index applications: asset allocation and investment performance evaluation. The Southern Timberland Index Fund (STIF), a southern pine index fund, is adopted for use in these applications. In the asset allocation application, the mean risk of risk-return efficient portfolios containing financial assets and the STIF is discovered to be 43% less than the mean risk of the efficient portfolios containing only financial assets. Efficient portfolios contain the STIF in proportions as high as almost 30%. As far as performance is concerned, a timberland index is suggested for use as a benchmark for evaluating (1) timberland investment managers and (2) the investment performance of timberland versus other investment alternatives. Before such applications become commonplace, it is concluded that problems associated with existing timberland indexes be addressed. South. J. Appl. For. 14(3):119-124.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo de Bever ◽  
Jagdeep Singh Bachher ◽  
Roman Chuyan ◽  
Ashby H. B. Monk

Author(s):  
Subrata Roy

The present study seeks to examine the mutual fund performance of the open-ended selected equity schemes of UTI based on multi-index measures as well as conditional multi-index measure. It is observed from the analysis that multi-index measure is able to capture the beta and alpha effects on market adjusted basis and the estimated coefficients is a better representative as compared to the single index measure. When time lagged (lagged at 1 month, 2 months, quarterly and yearly) multi-index measures are applied then the estimated coefficients (alpha & beta) which are market adjusted and time adjusted look more representative than the multi-index measure (without lagged effect). Finally, when we extended the time lagged multi-index measure on a conditional way (conditional on public information variables) then we observe that conditional multi-index lagged measure provides much more representative results in all respects as compared to the all measures after conditioning public information effects.


Author(s):  
Dionysia Katelouzou ◽  
Peer Zumbansen

This chapter explores corporate governance as a transnational regulatory field. Mirroring the rise in importance of the idea of shareholder wealth maximization as a firm’s definitive performance measure, corporate governance became a hotly contested field of competing visions of firms’ institutional and normative infrastructure in search of creating the most advantageous conditions to attract capital in volatile markets. This shift occurred at the same time that regulatory transformations in Western postindustrial societies since the early 1980s had begun to significantly shift public service provision and state-organized frameworks for old-age security guarantees and access to health services. Today’s corporate governance laboratory is a transnational force field, fought over by a host of different state and nonstate actors and also by private actors such as institutional investors. Meanwhile, following the financial crises in 2001, 2008 and 2020 and the simultaneously growing pressure on corporations from human rights, gender equality, and environmental groups, the corporate governance debate again is shifting. This time, a diversity of issues are being discussed under the corporate governance rubric, indicating a more comprehensive engagement with the firm’s purpose and functions and its societal obligations and responsibilities. Given the crucial role of firms as the residual claimants of a wide-ranging retreat of the state from its role in guaranteeing and providing a wide range of social functions, corporate governance is a mirror for the transformation of public and private power, and it has to address the twenty-first-century challenges, including global value chains and the proliferation of institutional investors, unfolding on a planetary scale.


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHARLES SUTCLIFFE

Over the last half century UK defined benefit pension schemes have followed the cult of the equity by investing a large proportion of their assets in equities. However, since the turn of the millennium this cult has faced two serious challenges – the halving of equity prices, and the complete rejection of equity investment by the Boots pension scheme in 2001. This paper summarises the history of the cult in the UK and the arguments advanced at the time to support its adoption. It then presents the case for the cult (excluding taxation, risk sharing and default insurance). This is followed by a detailed consideration of the validity of this case, including an examination of the relevant empirical evidence. It is concluded that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance, the asset allocation is indeterminate; and depends on the risk-return preferences adopted by the trustees.


This article focuses on asset owners, such as pension funds, and their models of investment management and describes the choice between insourcing, outsourcing, and re-intermediation. Drawing on the principal-agent problem and emphasizing the challenges facing asset owners when attempting to realize value from asset managers, the authors identify the dimensions of the management “problem.” Implications are drawn for the management practices of asset owners and the implementation of investment strategy combining in-house capabilities with external relationships. The authors also identify a set of metrics of performance that is consistent with superior long-term investment performance metrics to a range of asset owners, large and small.


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