scholarly journals Subliminal influence on preferences? A test of evaluative conditioning for brief visual conditioned stimuli using auditory unconditioned stimuli

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (9) ◽  
pp. 160935 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Heycke ◽  
Frederik Aust ◽  
Christoph Stahl

In the field of evaluative conditioning (EC), two opposing theories—propositional single-process theory versus dual-process theory—are currently being discussed in the literature. The present set of experiments test a crucial prediction to adjudicate between these two theories: Dual-process theory postulates that evaluative conditioning can occur without awareness of the contingency between conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US); in contrast, single-process propositional theory postulates that EC requires CS-US contingency awareness. In a set of three studies, we experimentally manipulate contingency awareness by presenting the CSs very briefly, thereby rendering it unlikely to be processed consciously. We address potential issues with previous studies on EC with subliminal or near-threshold CSs that limited their interpretation. Across two experiments, we consistently found an EC effect for CSs presented for 1000 ms and consistently failed to find an EC effect for briefly presented CSs. In a third pre-registered experiment, we again found evidence for an EC effect with CSs presented for 1000 ms, and we found some indication for an EC effect for CSs presented for 20 ms.

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Heycke ◽  
Frederik Aust ◽  
Christoph Stahl

In the field of evaluative conditioning (EC), two opposing theories—propositional single-process theory versus dual-process theory—are currently being discussed in the literature. The present set of experiments test a crucial prediction to adjudicate between these two theories: Dual-process theory postulates that evaluative conditioning can occur without awareness of the contingency between conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US); in contrast, single-process propositional theory postulates that EC requires CS-US contingency awareness. In a set of three studies, we experimentally manipulate contingency awareness by presenting the CSs very briefly, thereby rendering it unlikely to be processed consciously. We address potential issues with previous studies on EC with subliminal or near-threshold CSs that limited their interpretation. Across two experiments, we consistently found an EC effect for CSs presented for 1000 ms and consistently failed to find an EC effect for briefly presented CSs. In a third pre-registered experiment, we again found evidence for an EC effect with CSs presented for 1000 ms, and we found some indication for an EC effect for CSs presented for 20 ms.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 858-866 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Bertram Gawronski ◽  
Robert Balas

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US). Expanding on the debate between dual-process and propositional accounts, two studies investigated the relative effectiveness of counter-conditioning and counter-instructions in reversing EC effects on implicit and explicit evaluations. After conditioned evaluations were acquired via CS-US pairings, participants were either (1) presented with repeated CS-US pairings of the opposite valence or (2) given instructions that the CSs will be paired with USs of the opposite valence. Although both procedures reversed previously conditioned explicit evaluations, only directly experienced CS-US pairings reversed previously conditioned implicit evaluations. The findings question the functional equivalence of counter-conditioning and counter-instructions hypothesized by single-process propositional accounts. Yet, they support dual-process accounts, suggesting that associative and propositional processes jointly contribute to EC effects.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Heycke ◽  
Christoph Stahl

Evaluative Conditioning (EC) changes the preference towards a formerly neutral stimulus (Conditioned Stimulus; CS), by pairing it with a valent stimulus (Unconditioned Stimulus; US), in the direction of the valence of the US. When the CS is presented subliminally (i.e., too briefly to be consciously perceived), contingency awareness between CS and US can be ruled out. Hence, EC effects with subliminal CSs would support theories claiming that contingency awareness is not necessary for EC effects to occur. Recent studies reported the absence of EC with briefly presented CSs when both CS and US were presented in the visual modality, even though the CSs were identified at above-chance levels. Challenging this finding, Heycke and colleagues (2017) found some evidence for an EC effect with briefly presented visual stimuli in a cross-modal paradigm with auditory USs, but that study did not assess CS visibility. The present study attempted to replicate this EC effect with different stimuli and a CS visibility check. Overall EC for briefly presented stimuli was absent, and results from the visibility check show that an EC effect with briefly presented CSs was only found, when the CSs were identified at above-chance levels.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Bertram Gawronski ◽  
Robert Balas

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US). According to propositional accounts, EC effects should be qualified by the relation between the CS and the US. Dual-process accounts suggest that relational information should qualify EC effects on explicit evaluations, whereas implicit evaluations should reflect the frequency of CS–US co-occurrences. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that, when relational information was provided before the encoding of CS–US pairings, it moderated EC effects on explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. In Experiment 3, relational information moderated EC effects on both explicit and implicit evaluations when it was provided simultaneously with CS–US pairings. Frequency of CS–US pairings had no effect on implicit evaluations. Although the results can be reconciled with both propositional and dual-process accounts, they are more parsimoniously explained by propositional accounts.


1981 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janice Kay ◽  
Anthony Marcel

It is widely held that there are two (non-semantic) processes by which oral reading may be achieved: (a) by known words visually addressing lexical storage of their complete orthography and phonology; (b) by parsing a letter string into graphemes which are translated by rule into phonemes. Irregular words (HAVE) rely on the former, new and non-words rely on the latter. Recent evidence casts doubt on this view; to meet some of this data a revised version is presented. An alternative view is that the phonology of both words and non-words, at each encounter, is retrieved by analogy with all known words having matching segments. In a mixed list of words and non-words, presented singly for pronunciation, phonologically ambiguous non-words (NOUCH) were preceded critically by words with the same ambiguous segments, either pronounced regularly (COUCH) or irregularly (TOUCH). Standard (and revised) dual-process theory predicts that preceding words will not affect pronunciation of non-words; analogy theory predicts that they will. Significant biasing effects, compared to control conditions, support analogy theory, but a further modification to dual-process theory enables it to deal with these results. However the presence in critical non-words of morphemes pronounced consistently or inconsistently with the biased pronunciations significantly affected biasing. This makes the case for lexical analogy theory even stronger. Formal knowledge (descriptive spelling-sound rules) may be used consciously, but does not reflect tacit processes in oral reading, which are better described by a single-process lexical analogy model.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oulmann Zerhouni ◽  
Johan Lepage

Abstract. The present study is a first attempt to link self-reported difficulties in everyday emotion regulation (ER) with evaluative conditioning (EC). We conducted a within-subject study in which participants (n = 90) filled the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) and were exposed to neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) paired with mildly or highly arousing negative unconditioned stimuli (USs) and positive USs. Participants then filled a contingency awareness measure. Results showed (i) that CSs paired with highly arousing negative USs were more negatively evaluated, (ii) that the EC effect with highly and mildly arousing negative USs was stronger among participants with greater self-reported difficulties in everyday ER. Moreover, participants were more likely to be aware of the CS-US contingencies with highly (vs. mildly) arousing negative USs. Implications for the understanding of maladaptive behaviors and for future directions in EC research are discussed.


Author(s):  
Chienkuo Mi ◽  
Shane Ryan

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.


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