scholarly journals Non-linear tradeoffs allow the cooperation game to evolve from Prisoner’s Dilemma to Snow Drift

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Chao ◽  
Santiago F. Elena
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Gene Products ◽  
The Public ◽  
Snow Drift ◽  
High Level ◽  
Level Production

The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favored because the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analyzed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the tradeoff between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the tradeoff is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size is increased. The nonlinearity was justified by the existence of real viral ultra-defectors, known as defective interfering (DI) particles, which gain a nonlinear advantage by being smaller. The evolution of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators creates the Snow Drift game, which promotes high-level production of public goods.

scholarly journals Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from Prisoner's Dilemma to Snowdrift

2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1854) ◽  
pp. 20170228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Chao ◽  
Santiago F. Elena
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Gene Products ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Defective Interfering Particles ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
High Level

The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size is increased. The nonlinearity was justified by the existence of real viral ultra-defectors, known as defective interfering particles, which gain a nonlinear advantage by being smaller. The evolution of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators creates the Snowdrift game, which promotes high-level production of public goods.

Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Dalibor Roháč
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Weakest Link ◽  
Game Of Chicken ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
The Difference

Abstract In this paper, we discuss several issues related to public goods provision. Unlike many Austrians, we do not think that the concept of public goods - or of collective action - is an inherently flawed idea, even though we reject the alleged welfare implications of public goods theory, as proposed by orthodox public finance literature. We then argue that the structure of a generic public goods problem is more a game of chicken or an assurance game than a prisoner's dilemma and that this has important implications with regard to the plausibility of cooperative outcomes. Namely, when the public goods problem has the weakest-link structure and can be represented as an assurance game, then the cooperative outcome will be self-enforcing. In many cases, the public goods problems can be transformed into weakest-link games or different mechanisms can be found to ensure cooperation. We also discuss the difference between a public goods problem and collusion. We assert that, unlike public goods problems, collusive agreements have the structure of a prisoner's dilemma. Overall, our paper suggests that there are reasons to be optimistic about stability and efficiency of stateless societal orders.

scholarly journals Cooperation evolves by the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward

2021 ◽  
Vol 94 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tetsushi Ohdaira
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract In the previous studies, the author proposes the payoff-difference-based probabilistic peer-punishment that the probability of punishing a defector increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a defector increases and shows that the proposed peer-punishment effectively increases the number of cooperators and the average payoff of all players. On the other hand, reward as well as punishment is considered to be a mechanism promoting cooperation, and many studies have discussed the effect of reward in the public goods game, a multiplayer version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Based on the discussion of those existing studies, this study introduces the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward that the probability of rewarding a cooperator increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a cooperator increases. The author utilizes the framework of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game of the previous study and shows that the reward of this study realizes the evolution of cooperation except some cases. Graphic abstract

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation: The analysis of the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Kurokawa
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cost Ratio ◽  
Personal Cost ◽  
Model Setting

The existence of cooperation demands explanation in terms of natural selection. Prisoner’s dilemma is a framework often used when studying the evolution of cooperation. In prisoner’s dilemma, most previous studies consider the situation wherein an individual who cooperates will give an opponent an amount b at a personal cost of c, where b > c > 0 while an individual who defects will give nothing. This model setting is convenient; however, previous studies have not considered the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and different cost while in reality, it is natural to consider that a different player has a different benefit and different cost. Here, we raise the following question: Taking that a different individual has a different benefit and a different cost into consideration, what strategy is likely to evolve? In this paper, we focus on the direct reciprocity and analyze the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost. We obtain the condition for the evolution in the general case. And in addition, we have revealed that under a specific condition as the interaction repeats longer and the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger and the cooperating probability is more sensitive to the benefit the opponent provides, the establishment of cooperation is more likely.

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