AbstractBy manipulating the reference pulses amplitude, a security vulnerability is caused by self-reference continuous-variable quantum key distribution. In this paper, we formalize an attack strategy for reference pulses, showing that the proposed attack can compromise the practical security of CVQKD protocol. In this scheme, before the beam splitter attack, Eve intercepts the reference pulses emitted by Alice, using Bayesian algorithm to estimate phase shifts. Subsequently, other reference pulses are re-prepared and resubmitted to Bob. In simulations, Bayesian algorithm effectively estimates the phase drifts and has the high robustness to noise. Therefore, the eavesdropper can bias the excess noise due to the intercept-resend attack and the beam splitter attack. And Alice and Bob believe that their excess noise is below the null key threshold and can still share a secret key. Consequently, the proposed attack shows that its practical security can be compromised by transmitting the reference pulses in the continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol.
Practical security of the continuous-variable quantum key distribution with real local oscillators under phase attack