Islamic State threat looms over security in Indonesia

Subject Islamic State threat. Significance Over the last year, Islamic State group (ISG) has expanded its presence in Indonesia. The government estimates that at least 56 Indonesians joined ISG in Iraq and Syria in mid-2014 -- a figure that may have reached 500 by end-2014. Of these, at least 200 are estimated to have returned, with some believed to be planning attacks in Indonesia. Despite the somewhat equivocal stance of national and local authorities on secularism, the threat posed by ISG to security is taken seriously. Impacts Social media and legitimate religious networks are the top two avenues for ISG recruitment in Indonesia and the broader region. Financial institutions, state buildings and tourist destinations are likely targets for terrorist attacks. Inter-regional intelligence cooperation on tackling ISG networks is likely to intensify. South-east Asian countries will seek greater US counterterrorism support. Civil society calls for a clearer state position on secularism will intensify, but they may go unheeded.

Significance The process looks in danger. Serious local conflicts in south-eastern Turkey are straining tensions between Kurds and the government, even though guerrilla warfare has not resumed. Kurdish self-confidence is rising because of its fighters' success in expelling Islamic State group (ISG) from Kobani. However, dialogue between the government and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan continues, and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu seems more sensitive to Kurdish aspirations than his predecessors. Impacts Ocalan's leadership of the PKK is unshakable, but his ability to persuade his followers to avoid clashes on the streets is weakening. The conflict between the Kurds and Islamists inside Turkey will grow. Public opinion, including conservative religious elements, will block significant concessions to the Kurds, limiting the government's scope. The Kurds are emerging as a key regional opponent of Islamist politics.


Significance The June 26 suicide attack inside the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque killed 27 people and was Kuwait's worst terrorist attack in over three decades. The attack, claimed by Islamic State group (ISG) and carried out by a Saudi citizen, was intended to inflame sectarian tensions that have spiralled in recent years. US officials have long identified Kuwait as an epicentre of funding and other forms of materiel assistance for participants in the Syrian civil war. However, unlike Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where support largely has flowed in one direction toward Sunni rebel groups, Kuwaitis have provided high-profile support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. Impacts The government will use the attack to reinforce its narrative that the bidun constitute a security threat rather than a human rights issue. Initial solidarity among Kuwait Sunni and Shia could dissipate quickly into political wrangling over the government's response. Kuwaiti salafi aid will boost hardline Islamist rebel groups in Syria. Key commercial and business interests, and oil installations are unlikely to be affected seriously by the rising terrorist threat. Reinforced security measures will further restrict political freedoms in the GCC's most open state.


Subject Lone-actor terrorist motivations. Significance Recent lone-actor terrorist attacks in Orlando, Nice, Munich and elsewhere have made this threat salient for the public and policymakers alike. The number of lone-actor attacks has almost trebled since 1990 -- from a base rate of 5-6 per year, according to recent research. Yet the authorities find these types of attacks difficult to detect and disrupt ahead of time. Impacts Lone-actor attacks are likely to recur in the West while authorities struggle to respond. Islamic State group (ISG)-inspired lone-actor attacks may incentivise far-right lone actors to respond violently and vice-versa. The rise of encrypted messaging services and the dark net will fuel the debate around policing this problem without curbing free speech.


Significance The bill's declared purpose is to prevent the import of foreign ideologies and to give law enforcement wider authority, in particular for 'special' security operations, arrests and searches. Its origins lie not in recent events in Nardaran but the destabilisation of the Middle East after the 'Arab spring', the chair of the parliamentary committee on religious organisations and public associations, Siyavush Novruzov, said. The secular regime sees a rising threat in radical Islam, represented by both Islamic State group (ISG) and a multitude of smaller groups. Impacts The government will strive for socioeconomic stability at all costs, expanding benefits and using the State Oil Fund's substantial reserves. The deteriorating regional security situation may undercut Azerbaijan's strategy of becoming a prime supplier of gas to Turkey and the EU. Baku will become more tempted to use anti-terrorism and anti-extremism as a political weapon against the domestic non-religious opposition. Azerbaijan's Shia form 75% of its Muslims, who form 97% of the population.


Significance Iran's armed forces have suffered a number of high-profile casualties in Syria and Iraq in recent weeks. General Mohammad Ali Allah-Dadi was killed in an Israeli airstrike inside Syria in January, while General Hamid Taqavi was killed by the Islamic State group (ISG) in Iraq in late December. Taqavi was the highest-ranking officer to be killed since the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. Both men were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Iran's elite military force that conducts all of Tehran's military operations outside the country's borders. As rising instability threatens Iran's interests, the IRGC has stepped up its deployment across the region, raising the risk of military overstretch. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the IRGC is at loggerheads with the government of President Hassan Rouhani as nuclear negotiations approach their next deadline. Impacts IRGC dominance in Tehran policy-making will prevent any wider rapprochement with Washington. Resolution to the Syrian civil war will require regional political agreement involving Iran. Tensions with Saudi Arabia are at risk of further escalation. Demands on the defence budget will increase, raising fiscal strain on government.


Subject Assessment of the 'Khorasan Group' Significance The US-led coalition's airstrikes in Syria since 2014 have focused on the Islamic State group (ISG). However, they have also struck the 'Khorasan Group' -- a collection of veteran al-Qaida operatives that allegedly plots terrorist attacks abroad, and that operates on the edges of Syria's al-Qaida affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN). Beginning in late 2014, Washington warned repeatedly that the Khorasan Group was plotting attacks in Europe and the United States, and that it was recruiting holders of Western passports who would be able to enter and transit Western countries more easily. Impacts Al-Qaida outside Syria will likely pursue terrorist attacks that punish the West for its policies in the Muslim world. ISG will also carry out terrorist attacks in an effort to assert its leadership over the global jihadist movement. Without an imminent threat from the Khorasan Group, the West will have difficulty making a case for targeting JaN. JaN will retain a base of Syrian opposition support so long as it does not invite international retaliation by supporting an attack abroad.


Significance These operations follow the recapture of Tikrit, Sinjar, Ramadi and Fallujah from Islamic State group (ISG) in the past 18 months. Western countries backing the government and supporting its military campaign have pledged to increase their support for initiatives to stabilise recaptured areas. However, these initiatives have significant drawbacks that limit their prospects of success. Impacts Western criticism of Baghdad's military campaigns and anti-ISG strategy will remain muted. International aid organisations will be at risk of attack. Absent meaningful reconciliation, ISG will drive new terrorist attacks in Iraq, other Middle East conflict zones and the West.


Subject Islamist terrorism in Bangladesh. Significance An Italian aid worker was killed on September 27 in Dhaka, and a Japanese development worker was killed on October 2 in northern Bangladesh. The Islamic State group (ISG) claimed responsibility for both killings, although the government is sceptical of ISG involvement. These are the first attacks on foreign targets in Bangladesh since 2004, but follow a succession of strikes against secular bloggers. Impacts The greatest risk of violence lies in tensions within and between parliamentary parties. India-Bangladesh counterterrorism cooperation will intensify. UK and US security is more at risk from home-grown jihadis than immigrants.


Significance They were responding to increasingly serious attacks on Turkish soldiers and police by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) guerrillas in eastern Turkey. With President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowing fierce retribution, and conflicts between the authorities and the local population growing in the Kurdish-dominated south-east, the country is braced for full-scale war, just as it prepares for fresh parliamentary elections on November 1. Impacts Business and the economy face a sharp downturn with the lira growing steadily weaker. The conflict with the Kurds will intensify and Kurdish demands for full-scale independence will increase. The government will not seek a compromise with the Kurds and will be prepared to allocate any resources needed for a military solution. A more authoritarian style of government is likely to emerge after November. Turkey looks increasingly vulnerable to serious Islamic State group (ISG) attacks in urban centres, though probably not before the election.


Significance A Thai court blocked the order on August 6, but the government is expected to push back forcefully. This comes as South-east Asian governments struggle to contain disinformation on COVID-19, which is fuelling vaccine hesitancy and thwarting attempts to contain the virus. Impacts Forthcoming elections in some of the region's countries will boost the use of disinformation. Rising support for Western over Chinese vaccines will fuel anti-China sentiment online and possibly violence against ethnic Chinese. Disinformation on COVID-19 by Islamic State and local jihadists, particularly in Indonesia, raises the risk of terrorist attacks.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document