Chapter 8 More on Foreign Direct Investment in the AE-22, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union (Represented by the UK and Germany), and the USA

Author(s):  
M. Dutta
2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Globerman

Purpose The paper aims to provide an updated broad assessment of the environment for foreign direct investment (FDI) in light of the referendum vote in the UK to exit the European Union (Brexit), the election of Donald Trump as President of the USA and growing nationalist movements in Europe. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses an essay format to set out the main issues linking recent political developments to FDI. It reviews some relevant empirical literature to assess the identified linkages. Findings It seems reasonable to argue that there will be a reduction in FDI intensity on a global basis over the foreseeable future. It is also likely that the nature of FDI will move more toward being a substitute rather than a complement to trade. Originality/value The essay is original and valuable in the sense of offering a contemporary assessment of how important the recent political events may affect the FDI process.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-32
Author(s):  
Rumiana Yotova

ON 16 May 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its Opinion 2/15 concerning the competence of the EU to conclude the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore (EUSFTA) (ECLI:EU:C:2017:376). The Opinion was requested by the Commission which argued, with the support of the European Parliament (EP), that the EU had exclusive competence to conclude the EUSFTA. The Council and 25 of the Member States countered that the EUSFTA should be concluded as a mixed agreement – that is, by the EU and each of its members – because some of its provisions fell under the shared competence of the organisation or the competence of the Member States alone.


2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Janina Witkowska

This article discusses the conditions surrounding the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) between the developing countries of Asia (East Asia, South-East Asia, Southern Asia, and Western Asia) and the countries with membership in the European Union (EU), including the so-called ‘new’ Member States (EU12). At the intra-regional and inter-regional levels, the flow is especially affected by the world economic crisis, which has effected changes in the positions of the analyzed countries on a global scale. The integration processes taking place in the EU also significantly affect the intensity of FDI flow within the group, while the processes taking place in the developing countries of Asia are not yet sufficiently enough advanced to significantly affect the flow of FDI. Inter-regional FDI flows take place between the subject regions and sub-regions. The observed phenomenon of emerging Asian net exporters of capital in the form of FDI to the European Union may be strengthened by the process of Asian integration. For the new EU Member States the developing Asian countries may constitute an alternative source of capital in the crisis conditions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Jason Jacobs

AbstractWeaponization of state-backed, foreign investments by China is an emerging national security threat in the United States and the European Union. The U.S. and E.U. have espoused similar policy goals—to address the threat without closing their markets to foreign direct investment—while fostering increased cooperation between allied partners in screening transactions.On the surface, the recent, China-specific measures taken by the U.S. and the investment screening framework adopted by the E.U. appear reflective of an alignment of those policy goals. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that is exactly what is happening. However, closer examination reveals a stark divergence. The U.S. has a robust screening mechanism that has evolved into a weapon of economic warfare. The E.U. meanwhile, remains a patchwork of conflicting—or nonexistent—national regulations overlaid by a comparatively toothless investment screening framework.There is a tendency to attribute this divergence to structural differences between the United States and European Union. This in-depth comparison of U.S. and E.U. investment screening mechanisms exposes a split that goes beyond application and into actual policy. This revelation should temper expectations that the E.U. is equipping itself to block transactions that are of concern to the U.S.


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