AbstractThis paper argues against the rapid implementation of capacity mechanisms in Germany. There is no systematic, non-temporary market failure in the German wholesale electricity market which could justify such a Government intervention. Neither the low elasticity of demand nor debatable public good characteristics nor the potentially missing acceptance of price spikes can support the idea of that the energy only market may fail to guarantee reliability of supply. In addition, there are currently no resilient signs of any shortage of supply. In contrast, the German wholesale electricity market is still characterized by over-capacities. The worldwide experience with capacity mechanisms also demonstrates most of all that no capacity market design is ever stable, but subject to change in often quite short intervals. Potential low-cost options to safeguard security of supply include a strategic reserve against generation failures. In addition, the Federal Cartel Office should correct its position that dominant firms must not offer electricity at a price above the short-run marginal cost. Such a prescription forecloses the market and chokes off investment and would in most other cases be regarded as an anticompetitive foreclosure strategy of a dominant firm.
Market Evolution: Wholesale Electricity Market Design for 21st Century Power Systems