A Structural Estimation of Spatial Differentiation and Market Power in Input Procurement

Recent studies on Orthotrichoid mosses in Russia are summarized genus by genus. Orthotrichum furcatum Otnyukova is synonymized with Nyholmiella obtusifolia. Orthotrichum vittii is excluded from the Russian moss flora. Description of O. dagestanicum is amended. Fifty four currently recognized species from 9 genera of the Orthotrichaceae are presently known to occur in Russia; list of species with common synonyms and brief review of distribution in Russia is presented. Numerous problematic specimens with unresolved taxonomy were omitted for future. Revealed taxonomical inconsistencies in the genera Zygodon, Ulota, Lewinskya, Nyholmiella, Orthotrichum are briefly discussed. Main regularities of spatial differentiation of the family Orthotrichaceae in Russia are considered. Recently presented novelties contribute to the certain biogeographic pattern, indicating three different centers of diversity of the family, changing along longitudinal gradient. Unlike European one, continental Asian diversity of Orthotrichaceae is still poorly known, the Siberian specimens which were previously referred to European species in most cases were found to represent other, poorly known or undescribed species. North Pacific Region houses peculiar and poorly understood hot spot of diversity of Orthotrichoid mosses. Thus, these hot spots are obligatory to be sampled in course of revisions of particular groups, since they likely comprise under-recorded cryptic- or semi-cryptic species. Latitudinal gradient also contributes to the spatial differentiation of the revealed taxonomic composition of Orthotrichaceae.

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Vertical Boilerplate

10.31228/osf.io/svk6p ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

James Gibson

Keyword(s):

Market Power ◽

Real World ◽

Empirical Work ◽

Full Scale ◽

Market Mechanism ◽

Law School ◽

Information Cost ◽

Information Costs ◽

Policy Proposals ◽

Radical Solution

Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume that it represents the whole transaction. Yet real-world transactions often involve multiple layers of contracts, each with its own information costs. What is needed, then, is a “vertical” analysis, a study that examines fewer contracts of any one kind but tracks all the contracts the consumer encounters, soup to nuts. This Article presents the first vertical study of boilerplate. It casts serious doubt on the market mechanism and shows that existing scholarship fails to appreciate the full scale of the information cost problem. It then offers two regulatory solutions. The first works within contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, tweaking what the parties need to prove and who bears the burden of proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing both sellers and consumers to confront and minimize boilerplate’s information costs—an approach I call “forced salience.” In the end, the boilerplate experience is as deep as it is wide. Our empirical work should reflect that fact, and our policy proposals should too.

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