FLOATING CURRENCIES, CAPITAL CONTROLS, OR CURRENCY BOARDS: WHAT'S THE BEST REMEDY FOR THE CURRENCY CRISES?

1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay Singal
2004 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Irwin

2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvika Neeman ◽  
Gerhard Oskar Orosel

Abstract We analyze the behavior of foreign banks who sequentially provide credit to finance projects in an emerging market. The foreign banks are exposed to both project-risks and the macro-economic risk of a currency crisis, and there are no bailout guarantees. Nevertheless, we show that it is often the case that banks provide too much credit too easily and that this behavior may precipitate the onset of a currency crisis. We demonstrate how the imposition of capital controls in the form of taxes and subsidies on foreign investment may improve the situation. Whereas most of the literature on currency crises focuses its analysis on debtor countries and thus on the borrowers' side, our paper illustrates that the lenders' side also deserves attention.


Author(s):  
Rae Weston

The conventional explanations of currency crises have not proved fruitful .Aykens (2005) proposes a social theory of currency crises which he shows is able to account for the interwar gold standard crisis. In this paper we explain the elements of Aykens theory, propose a brief extension of it and demonstrate with respect to currency boards, specifically those of Bosnia-Herzogovina and of Argentina both how affective trust is achieved and also how it is destroyed.


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