An Independent President or Administrator?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Belco ◽  
Brandon Rottinghaus
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Dual Roles ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Do So

Chapter 6 explores the unilateral actions of the president’s dual roles after legislation (bills) is on Congress’s agenda. At this stage, presidents can bargain with Congress over the formulation of legislation. Independent presidents use unilateral orders to preempt the lengthy legislative process and administrators do so to issue unilateral orders to support legislation. Presidents are clearly interested in issuing unilateral orders that work to their advantage whether it is to prevent legislation from progressing or to facilitate legislative progress when it is otherwise slowed by collective action problems in Congress. Presidents are more likely to use unilateral orders to preempt legislation when the issue is on their agenda, there is greater friction between the branches, Congress is internally divided, and presidents have greater discretion to act.

scholarly journals Integrating simultaneous prosocial and antisocial behavior into theories of collective action

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. e1501220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Basurto ◽  
Esther Blanco ◽  
Mateja Nenadovic ◽  
Björn Vollan
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Antisocial Behavior ◽  
Market Integration ◽  
Antisocial Behaviors ◽  
Economic Diversification ◽  
Resource Governance ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Multimethod Approach ◽  
Do So

Trust and cooperation constitute cornerstones of common-pool resource theory, showing that “prosocial” strategies among resource users can overcome collective action problems and lead to sustainable resource governance. Yet, antisocial behavior and especially the coexistence of prosocial and antisocial behaviors have received less attention. We broaden the analysis to include the effects of both “prosocial” and “antisocial” interactions. We do so in the context of marine protected areas (MPAs), the most prominent form of biodiversity conservation intervention worldwide. Our multimethod approach relied on lab-in-the-field economic experiments (n= 127) in two MPA and two non-MPA communities in Baja California, Mexico. In addition, we deployed a standardized fishers’ survey (n= 544) to verify the external validity of our findings and expert informant interviews (n= 77) to develop potential explanatory mechanisms. In MPA sites, prosocial and antisocial behavior is significantly higher, and the presence of antisocial behavior does not seem to have a negative effect on prosocial behavior. We suggest that market integration, economic diversification, and strengthened group identity in MPAs are the main potential mechanisms for the simultaneity of prosocial and antisocial behavior we observed. This study constitutes a first step in better understanding the interaction between prosociality and antisociality as related to natural resources governance and conservation science, integrating literatures from social psychology, evolutionary anthropology, behavioral economics, and ecology.

scholarly journals Overcoming Collective Action Problems Facing Chinese Workers: Lessons from Four Protests against Walmart

ILR Review ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (5) ◽  
pp. 1078-1105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunyun Li ◽  
Mingwei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Future Development ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Strategic Capacity ◽  
Labor Activists ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Chinese Workers ◽  
Do So

In contrast to various structural accounts of collective inaction or short-lived contention of Chinese workers, the authors take an agency-centered approach to explain how the few sustained labor protests during closure bargaining develop against all odds. They suggest that workers’ capacity to resolve collective action problems is essential to understanding why a few contending workers are able to sustain protests whereas many others fail to do so. They argue that workplace representatives and external labor activists are crucial for helping Chinese workers resolve the collective action problems that prevent the formation of sustained labor protests. Their comparative analysis of four protests against Walmart store closures—including one unusually long, one relatively sustained, and two short-lived—shows how presence and strategic capacity of workplace representatives and external labor activists shape protest duration. The authors conclude by discussing lessons learned from these cases of closure bargaining for future development of labor contention in China.

Strategic Imperatives of Japan's SNTV Electoral System and the Cooperative Innovations of the Former Opposition Parties

1996 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 312-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAYMOND V. CHRISTENSEN
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Optimal Number ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
The Common ◽  
Do So ◽  
Opposition Parties

Single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral systems create severe collective-action problems for political parties. If multimember districts are used, large political parties must run the optimal number of candidates in each district and divide the vote equally between those candidates. Failure to do so will cost a party seats. In Japan, the former parties of the non-Communist opposition cooperated in all national elections from 1971 to 1990. In their efforts to cooperate, these parties as a group faced collective-action problems. To compensate for these problems, these parties modified their methods of cooperation. The widespread nature of these innovations in cooperation rebuts the common assertions that the Japanese opposition acted irrationally or incompetently.

scholarly journals Agency in historical institutionalism coalitional work in the creation, maintenance, and change of institutions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Emmenegger
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Historical Institutionalism ◽  
Sociological Institutionalism ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
The Creation

AbstractInstitutionalism gives priority to structure over agency. Yet institutions have never developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups. This paper develops a conceptual framework for the role of agency in historical institutionalism. Based on recent contributions following the coalitional turn and drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, it argues that agency plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of social coalitions that stabilize but also challenge institutions. Without such agency, no coalition can be created, maintained, or changed. Similarly, without a supporting coalition, no contested institution can survive. Yet, due to collective action problems, such coalitional work is challenging. This coalitional perspective offers a robust role for agency in historical institutionalism, but it also explains why institutions remain stable despite agency. In addition, this paper forwards several portable propositions that allow for the identification of who is likely to develop agency and what these actors do.

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