scholarly journals Seismic Analysis Issues in Design Certification Applications for New Reactors

Author(s):  
Richard Morante ◽  
Manuel Miranda ◽  
Jim Xu

The licensing framework established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” provides requirements for standard design certifications (DCs) and combined license (COL) applications. The intent of this process is the early resolution of safety issues at the DC application stage. Subsequent COL applications may incorporate a DC by reference. Thus, the COL review will not reconsider safety issues resolved during the DC process. However, a COL application that incorporates a DC by reference must demonstrate that relevant site-specific design parameters are within the bounds postulated by the DC, and any departures from the DC need to be justified. This paper provides an overview of several seismic analysis issues encountered during a review of recent DC applications under the 10 CFR Part 52 process, in which the authors have participated as part of the safety review effort.

Author(s):  
Manuel Miranda ◽  
Joseph Braverman ◽  
Xing Wei ◽  
Charles Hofmayer ◽  
Jim Xu

The licensing framework established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” provides requirements for standard design certifications (DCs) and combined license (COL) applications. The intent of this process is the early resolution of safety issues at the DC application stage. Subsequent COL applications may incorporate a DC by reference. Thus, the COL review will not reconsider safety issues resolved during the DC process. However, a COL application that incorporates a DC by reference must demonstrate that relevant site-specific design parameters are confined within the bounds postulated by the DC, and any departures from the DC need to be justified. This paper provides an overview of structural design challenges encountered in recent DC applications under the 10 CFR Part 52 process, in which the authors have participated as part of the safety review effort.


Author(s):  
Jim Xu ◽  
Sujit Samaddar

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a new process for licensing nuclear power plants under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” which provides requirements for early site permits (ESPs), standard design certifications (DCs), and combined license (COL) applications. In this process, an application for a COL may incorporate by reference a DC, an ESP, both, or neither. This approach allows for early resolution of safety and environmental issues. The COL review will not reconsider the safety issues resolved by the DC and ESP processes. However, a COL application that incorporates a DC by reference needs to demonstrate that pertinent site-specific parameters are confined within the safety envelopes established by the DC. This paper provides an overview of site parameters related to seismic designs and associated seismic issues encountered in DC and COL application reviews using the 10 CFR Part 52 process. Since DCs treat the seismic design and analysis of nuclear power plant (NPP) structures, systems, and components (SSC) as bounding to future potential sites, the design ground motions and associated site parameters are often conservatively specified, representing envelopes of site-specific seismic hazards and parameters. For a COL applicant to incorporate a DC by reference, it needs to demonstrate that the site-specific hazard in terms of ground motion response spectra (GMRS) is enveloped by the certified design response spectra of the DC. It also needs to demonstrate that the site-specific seismic parameters, such as foundation-bearing capacities, soil profiles, and the like, are confined within the site parameter envelopes established by the DC. For the noncertified portion of the plant SSCs, the COL applicant should perform the seismic design and analysis with respect to the site-specific GMRS and associated site parameters. This paper discusses the seismic issues encountered in the safety reviews of DC and COL applications. Practical issues dealing with comparing site-specific features to the standard designs and lessons learned are also discussed.


Author(s):  
Thomas S. LaGuardia

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established criteria for acceptable residual radioactivity related to decommissioning nuclear power plants in the US [1]. A level of 25 mRem per year to the maximum exposed individual by site-specific pathways analysis, with ALARA is acceptable to the NRC. Systems and structures containing very low levels of radioactivity that meet this criteria are deemed acceptable to abandon in place as part of the decommissioning process and termination of the license. Upon license termination by the NRC, the owner may then demolish and remove remaining structures. In practice, site-specific criteria imposed by local state mandates, company management decisions, real estate value, and long-term liability potential have driven nuclear plant licensees to adopt an alternative disposition for these materials. Although the reasons are different at each site, the NRC’s criteria of 25 mRem per year are not the controlling factor. This paper will describe the regulatory process for termination of the license, and the other factors that drive the decision to remove radioactive and non-radioactive material for decommissioning. Several case histories are presented to illustrate that the NRC’s criteria for license termination are not the only consideration.


Author(s):  
John O’Hara ◽  
Stephen Fleger

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) evaluates the human factors engineering (HFE) of nuclear power plant design and operations to protect public health and safety. The HFE safety reviews encompass both the design process and its products. The NRC staff performs the reviews using the detailed guidance contained in two key documents: the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711) and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). This paper will describe these two documents and the method used to develop them. As the NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of the guidance to ensure that they remain state-of-the-art design evaluation tools, we will discuss the topics being addressed in support of future updates as well.


Author(s):  
Ronald C. Lippy

The nuclear industry is preparing for the licensing and construction of new nuclear power plants in the United States. Several new designs have been developed and approved, including the “traditional” reactor designs, the passive safe shutdown designs and the small modular reactors (SMRs). The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) provides specific Codes used to perform preservice inspection/testing and inservice inspection/testing for many of the components used in the new reactor designs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews information provided by applicants related to inservice testing (IST) programs for Design Certifications and Combined Licenses (COLs) under Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 52) (Reference 1). The 2012 Edition of the ASME OM Code defines a post-2000 plant as a nuclear power plant that was issued (or will be issued) its construction permit, or combined license for construction and operation, by the applicable regulatory authority on or following January 1, 2000. The New Reactors OM Code (NROMC) Task Group (TG) of the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (NROMC TG) is assigned the task of ensuring that the preservice testing (PST) and IST provisions in the ASME OM Code to address pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints (snubbers) in post-2000 nuclear power plants are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the components will operate as needed when called upon. Currently, the NROMC TG is preparing proposed guidance for the treatment of active pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints with high safety significance in non-safety systems in passive post-2000 reactors including SMRs.


Author(s):  
Thomas G. Scarbrough

In a series of Commission papers, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) described its policy for inservice testing (IST) programs to be developed and implemented at nuclear power plants licensed under 10 CFR Part 52. This paper discusses the expectations for IST programs based on those Commission policy papers as applied in the NRC staff review of combined license (COL) applications for new reactors. For example, the design and qualification of pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints through implementation of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard QME-1-2007, “Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants,” as accepted in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100 (Revision 3), “Seismic Qualification of Electrical and Active Mechanical Equipment and Functional Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,” will enable IST activities to assess the operational readiness of those components to perform their intended functions. ASME has updated the Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code) to improve the IST provisions for pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints that are incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations with applicable conditions. In addition, lessons learned from performance experience and testing of motor-operated valves (MOVs) will be implemented as part of the IST programs together with application of those lessons learned to other power-operated valves (POVs). Licensee programs for the Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) will be implemented for components in active nonsafety-related systems that are the first line of defense in new reactors that rely on passive systems to provide reactor core and containment cooling in the event of a plant transient. This paper also discusses the overlapping testing provisions specified in ASME Standard QME-1-2007; plant-specific inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria; the applicable ASME OM Code as incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations; specific license conditions; and Initial Test Programs as described in the final safety analysis report and applicable RGs. Paper published with permission.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jinghan Zhang ◽  
Jun Zhao ◽  
Jiejuan Tong

Nuclear safety goal is the basic standard for limiting the operational risks of nuclear power plants. The statistics of societal risks are the basis for nuclear safety goals. Core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) are typical probabilistic safety goals that are used in the regulation of water-cooled reactors currently. In fact, Chinese current probabilistic safety goals refer to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and they are not based on Chinese societal risks. And the CDF and LERF proposed for water reactor are not suitable for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR), because the design of HTGR is very different from that of water reactor. And current nuclear safety goals are established for single reactor rather than unit or site. Therefore, in this paper, the development of the safety goal of NRC was investigated firstly; then, the societal risks in China were investigated in order to establish the correlation between the probabilistic safety goal of multimodule HTGR and Chinese societal risks. In the end, some other matters about multireactor site were discussed in detail.


Author(s):  
Eugene Imbro ◽  
Thomas G. Scarbrough

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has established an initiative to risk-inform the requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) for the regulatory treatment of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) used in commercial nuclear power plants. As discussed in several Commission papers (e.g., SECY-99-256 and SECY-00-0194), Option 2 of this initiative involves categorizing plant SSCs based on their safety significance, and specifying treatment that would provide an appropriate level of confidence in the capability of those SSCs to perform their design functions in accordance with their risk categorization. The NRC has initiated a rulemaking effort to allow licensees of nuclear power plants in the United States to implement the Option 2 approach in lieu of the “special treatment requirements” of the NRC regulations. In a proof-of-concept effort, the NRC recently granted exemptions from the special treatment requirements for safety-related SSCs categorized as having low risk significance by the licensee of the South Texas Project (STP) Units 1 and 2 nuclear power plant, based on a review of the licensee’s high-level objectives of the planned treatment for safety-related and high-risk nonsafety-related SSCs. This paper discusses the NRC staff’s views regarding the treatment of SSCs at STP described by the licensee in its updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) in support of the exemption request, and provides the status of rulemaking that would incorporate risk insights into the treatment of SSCs at nuclear power plants.


Author(s):  
David Alley

This paper provides a historical perspective on the need for, and development of, buried and underground piping tanks programs at nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plant license renewal activities, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Buried Piping Action Plan, and the rationale for addressing the issue of buried pipe through an industry initiative as opposed to regulation are discussed. The paper also addresses current NRC activities including the results of Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspections of buried piping programs at nuclear power plants as well as Nuclear Regulatory Commission involvement in industry and standards development organizations. Finally, the paper outlines the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s future plans concerning the issue of buried piping at US nuclear power plants.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Hambric ◽  
Samir Ziada ◽  
Richard J. Morante

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has approved several extended power uprates (EPU) for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). In some of the BWRs, operating at the higher EPU power levels and flow rates led to high-cycle fatigue damage of Steam Dryers, including the generation of loose parts. Since those failures occurred, all BWR owners proposing EPUs have been required by the USNRC to ensure that the steam dryers would not experience high-cycle fatigue cracking. This paper provides an overview of BWR steam dryer design; the fatigue failures that occurred at the Quad Cities (QC) nuclear power plants and their root causes; a brief history of BWR EPUs; and a discussion of steam dryer modifications/replacements, alternating stress mechanisms on steam dryers, and structural integrity evaluation methods (static and alternating stress).


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