In-Q-Tel, the strategic investment firm for the U.S. Intelligence Community

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. J. Ulvick ◽  
D. W. Tighe
Keyword(s):  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Investment Firm ◽  
The U.S

The Troubled Inheritance: The National Security Agency and the Obama Administration

2010 ◽  
pp. 241-256
Author(s):  
Matthew M. Aid
Keyword(s):  
Data Processing ◽  
National Security ◽  
Bush Administration ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
National Security Agency ◽  
Obama Administration ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
The U.S ◽  
The Coordinator ◽  
Signals Intelligence

This article discusses the National Security Agency under the Obama Administration. Upon his inauguration on January 20, 2009, Obama inherited from the Bush administration an intelligence community embroiled in political controversies. Of the sixteen agencies of the intelligence community, the National Security Agency (NSA) faced the greatest scrutiny from the new Obama administration and the Congress. NSA was the largest and the most powerful member of the U.S. intelligence community. Since its formation in 1952, NSA has managed and directed all U.S. government signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection. It is the collector and processor of communications intelligence (COMINT) and the primary processor of foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). And since 1958, NSA has been the coordinator of the U.S. government's national electronics intelligence (ELINT) program. It has also the task of overseeing the security of the U.S. government's communications and data processing systems, and since the 1980s, NSA has managed the U.S. government's national operation security (OPSEC) program. In this article, the focus is on the challenges faced by the NSA during the Bush administration; the role played by the NSA during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and the challenges faced by the Obama administration in confronting a series of thorny legal and policy issues relating to NSA's eavesdropping program.

Firm Equity Investment Decisions and U.S. GAAP and IFRS Consolidation Control Guidelines: An Empirical Analysis

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allison K. Beck ◽  
Bruce K. Behn ◽  
Andrea Lionzo ◽  
Francesca Rossignoli
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Investment Behavior ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Equity Investment ◽  
Bright Line ◽  
Accounting Scandals ◽  
Control Concept ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT It is asserted in the literature that rules-based accounting standards leave room for transaction structuring and that numerous accounting scandals have been linked to companies structuring transactions to avoid bright-line rules. Prior research suggests that bright-line accounting standards motivated companies to avoid the equity method or consolidation accounting by keeping their equity ownership percentages below the key thresholds of 20 percent and 50 percent. However, in recent years, much has changed regarding U.S. GAAP and IFRS principles, especially in terms of the guidelines surrounding business combinations and the concept of control. Now, given the similarity of the U.S. GAAP and IFRS equity investment accounting standards and their more recent emphasis on the control concept, one would not expect either U.S. GAAP or IFRS firms to engage in transaction-structuring behavior, holding concentrated ownership percentages at, or right below, 50 percent. Our study extends prior research by investigating whether this phenomenon (of investment percentages being concentrated right at 50 percent or just below) exists in today's FASB and IASB reporting environments and if so, why? Using ownership data from 2004–2008, we investigate whether firms engage in strategic investment behavior in the vicinity of the 50 percent ownership threshold within the U.S. GAAP and IFRS reporting environments. Interestingly, our univariate results indicate that despite a shift in the accounting standards to a more principles-based definition of control, U.S. GAAP-compliant and IFRS-compliant companies continue to behave in a manner indicative of purposeful transaction structuring around the 50 percent threshold, as evidenced by an unusually heavy concentration of investment at or below 50 percent. This finding could mean that U.S. GAAP- and IFRS-compliant companies (and their auditors) are continuing to anchor to the old bright-line guidance regarding consolidation accounting. We supplement our univariate tests with a regression analysis to examine potential incentives that could explain this investment behavior. We find that leverage has a significant positive marginal effect—increased leverage is associated with a greater likelihood of choosing to keep the investment level at or below 50 percent. Data Availability: The ownership data for this study were obtained from the Bureau van Dijk OSIRIS Ownership database. Data will be made available in accordance with the American Accounting Association's data integrity policy.

The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities

1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 356
Author(s):  
Patrick M. Morgan ◽  
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Domestic Activities ◽  
The U.S

The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note

2008 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Podvig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Large Degree ◽  
The United States ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Military Buildup ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Exchange ◽  
The U.S

The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accuracy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.

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