scholarly journals Unpacking Non-Dualistic Design: The Soma Design Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Kristina Höök ◽  
Steve Benford ◽  
Paul Tennent ◽  
Vasiliki Tsaknaki ◽  
Miquel Alfaras ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Creative Process ◽  
The Body ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
First Person ◽  
Embodied Interaction ◽  
Analytical Work ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Design Workshop ◽  
Design Case ◽  
Design Stance

We report on a somaesthetic design workshop and the subsequent analytical work aiming to demystify what is entailed in a non-dualistic design stance on embodied interaction and why a first-person engagement is crucial to its unfoldings. However, as we will uncover through a detailed account of our process, these first-person engagements are deeply entangled with second- and third-person perspectives, sometimes even overlapping. The analysis furthermore reveals some strategies for bridging the body-mind divide by attending to our inner universe and dissolving or traversing dichotomies between inside and outside ; individual and social ; body and technology . By detailing the creative process, we show how soma design becomes a process of designing with and through kinesthetic experience, in turn letting us confront several dualisms that run like fault lines through HCI’s engagement with embodied interaction.

Blind Men Speaking of Colors: Paul's Recollection and the Self-Image of Early Thirteenth-Century Theologians

2014 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-446
Author(s):  
Ayelet Even-Ezra
Keyword(s):  
Thirteenth Century ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
Knowledge Of God ◽  
The Third ◽  
Self Image ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Third Person

In the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Paul writes: It is doubtless not profitable for me to boast. I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord: I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago—whether in the body I do not know, or whether out of the body I do not know, God knows—such a one was caught up to the third heaven. And I know such a man—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows—how he was caught up into Paradise and heard inexpressible words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter. Of such a one I will boast; yet of myself I will not boast, except in my infirmities. (2 Cor 12:1–5 nkiv) This brief and enigmatic account is caught between multiple dialectics of power and infirmity, pride and humility, unveiling and secrecy. At this point in his letter Paul is turning to a new source of power in order to establish his authority against the crowd of boasting false apostles who populate the previous paragraphs. He wishes to divulge his intimate, occult knowledge of God, but at the same time keep his position as antihero that is prevalent throughout the epistle. These dialectics are enhanced by a sophisticated play of first and third person. The third person denotes the subject who experienced rapture fourteen years ago, while the first person denotes the narrator in the present. Only after several verses does the reader realize that these two are in fact the same person. This alienation allows Paul the intricate play of boasting, for “of such a one I will boast, yet of myself I will not boast.”

scholarly journals First person experience of threat modulates cortical network encoding human peripersonal space

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.W. de Borst ◽  
M.V. Sanchez-Vives ◽  
M. Slater ◽  
B. de Gelder
Keyword(s):  
Brain Activity ◽  
Peripersonal Space ◽  
Brain Network ◽  
The Body ◽  
First Person ◽  
Threat Detection ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective

AbstractPeripersonal space is the area directly surrounding the body, which supports object manipulation and social interaction, but is also critical for threat detection. In the monkey, ventral premotor and intraparietal cortex support initiation of defensive behavior. However, the brain network that underlies threat detection in human peripersonal space still awaits investigation. We combined fMRI measurements with a preceding virtual reality training from either first or third person perspective to manipulate whether approaching human threat was perceived as directed to oneself or another. We found that first person perspective increased body ownership and identification with the virtual victim. When threat was perceived as directed towards oneself, synchronization of brain activity in the human peripersonal brain network was enhanced and connectivity increased from premotor and intraparietal cortex towards superior parietal lobe. When this threat was nearby, synchronization also occurred in emotion-processing regions. Priming with third person perspective reduced synchronization of brain activity in the peripersonal space network and increased top-down modulation of visual areas. In conclusion, our results showed that after first person perspective training peripersonal space is remapped to the virtual victim, thereby causing the fronto-parietal network to predict intrusive actions towards the body and emotion-processing regions to signal nearby threat.

scholarly journals Empathy or Ownership? Evidence from Corticospinal Excitability Modulation during Pain Observation

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 1760-1771 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Bucchioni ◽  
Carlotta Fossataro ◽  
Andrea Cavallo ◽  
Harold Mouras ◽  
Marco Neppi-Modona ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
First Person ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Physiological Basis ◽  
Hand Model ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The One

Recent studies show that motor responses similar to those present in one's own pain (freezing effect) occur as a result of observation of pain in others. This finding has been interpreted as the physiological basis of empathy. Alternatively, it can represent the physiological counterpart of an embodiment phenomenon related to the sense of body ownership. We compared the empathy and the ownership hypotheses by manipulating the perspective of the observed hand model receiving pain so that it could be a first-person perspective, the one in which embodiment occurs, or a third-person perspective, the one in which we usually perceive the others. Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) by TMS over M1 were recorded from first dorsal interosseous muscle, whereas participants observed video clips showing (a) a needle penetrating or (b) a Q-tip touching a hand model, presented either in first-person or in third-person perspective. We found that a pain-specific inhibition of MEP amplitude (a significantly greater MEP reduction in the “pain” compared with the “touch” conditions) only pertains to the first-person perspective, and it is related to the strength of the self-reported embodiment. We interpreted this corticospinal modulation according to an “affective” conception of body ownership, suggesting that the body I feel as my own is the body I care more about.

scholarly journals Word use in first-person accounts of schizophrenia

2015 ◽  
Vol 206 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. K. Fineberg ◽  
S. Deutsch-Link ◽  
M. Ichinose ◽  
T. McGuinness ◽  
A. J. Bessette ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mood Disorder ◽  
Language Use ◽  
Test Word ◽  
The Body ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Plural ◽  
Word Use ◽  
Use Patterns ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Causal Language

BackgroundLanguage use is often disrupted in patients with schizophrenia; novel computational approaches may provide new insights.AimsTo test word use patterns as markers of the perceptual, cognitive and social experiences characteristic of schizophrenia.MethodWord counting software was applied to first-person accounts of schizophrenia and mood disorder.ResultsMore third-person plural pronouns (‘they’) and fewer first-person singular pronouns (‘I’) were used in schizophrenia than mood disorder accounts. Schizophrenia accounts included fewer words related to the body and ingestion, and more related to religion. Perceptual and causal language were negatively correlated in schizophrenia accounts but positively correlated in mood disorder accounts.ConclusionsDifferences in pronouns suggest decreased self-focus or perhaps even an understanding of self as other in schizophrenia. Differences in how perceptual and causal words are correlated suggest that long-held delusions represent a decreased coupling of explanations with sensory experience over time.

First-Person Experiments in Thinking

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renatus Ziegler ◽  
Ulrich Weger
Keyword(s):  
Physiological Parameters ◽  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Current Article ◽  
Thinking Process ◽  
Mental Contents

Abstract. In psychology, thinking is typically studied in terms of a range of behavioral or physiological parameters, focusing, for instance, on the mental contents or the neuronal correlates of the thinking process proper. In the current article, by contrast, we seek to complement this approach with an exploration into the experiential or inner dimensions of thinking. These are subtle and elusive and hence easily escape a mode of inquiry that focuses on externally measurable outcomes. We illustrate how a sufficiently trained introspective approach can become a radar for facets of thinking that have found hardly any recognition in the literature so far. We consider this an important complement to third-person research because these introspective observations not only allow for new insights into the nature of thinking proper but also cast other psychological phenomena in a new light, for instance, attention and the self. We outline and discuss our findings and also present a roadmap for the reader interested in studying these phenomena in detail.

Effects of Light-Hearted and Serious Entertainment on Enjoyment of the First and Third Person

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Hofer
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Media Consumption ◽  
First Person ◽  
Online Experiment ◽  
Entertainment Media ◽  
Third Person Effect ◽  
The Third ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Perceived Enjoyment ◽  
The Third Person

Abstract. This was a study on the perceived enjoyment of different movie genres. In an online experiment, 176 students were randomly divided into two groups (n = 88) and asked to estimate how much they, their closest friends, and young people in general enjoyed either serious or light-hearted movies. These self–other differences in perceived enjoyment of serious or light-hearted movies were also assessed as a function of differing individual motivations underlying entertainment media consumption. The results showed a clear third-person effect for light-hearted movies and a first-person effect for serious movies. The third-person effect for light-hearted movies was moderated by level of hedonic motivation, as participants with high hedonic motivations did not perceive their own and others’ enjoyment of light-hearted films differently. However, eudaimonic motivations did not moderate first-person perceptions in the case of serious films.

Praxeology, Imperatives, and Shifts of View

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benj Hellie
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
First Person ◽  
Third Person ◽  
And Shifts ◽  
Practical Metaphysics ◽  
The Way

Recent neo-Anscombean work in praxeology (aka ‘philosophy of practical reason’), salutarily, shifts focus from an alienated ‘third-person’ viewpoint on practical reason to an embedded ‘first-person’ view: for example, the ‘naive rationalizations’ of Michael Thompson, of form ‘I am A-ing because I am B-ing’, take up the agent’s view, in the thick of action. Less salutary, in its premature abandonment of the first-person view, is an interpretation of these naive rationalizations as asserting explanatory links between facts about organically structured agentive processes in progress, followed closely by an inflationary project in ‘practical metaphysics’. If, instead, praxeologists chase first-personalism all the way down, both fact and explanation vanish (and with them, the possibility of metaphysics): what is characteristically practical is endorsement of nonpropositional imperatival content, chained together not explanatorily, but through limits on intelligibility. A connection to agentive behavior must somehow be reestablished—but this can (and can only) be done ‘transcendentally’.

Seeming to Seem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
First Person ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
The Third Person

Dennett’s account of consciousness starts from third-person considerations. I argue this is wise, since beginning with first-person access precludes accommodating the third-person access we have to others’ mental states. But Dennett’s first-person operationalism, which seeks to save the first person in third-person, operationalist terms, denies the occurrence of folk-psychological states that one doesn’t believe oneself to be in, and so the occurrence of folk-psychological states that aren’t conscious. This conflicts with Dennett’s intentional-stance approach to the mental, on which we discern others’ mental states independently of those states’ being conscious. We can avoid this conflict with a higher-order theory of consciousness, which saves the spirit of Dennett’s approach, but enables us to distinguish conscious folk-psychological states from nonconscious ones. The intentional stance by itself can’t do this, since it can’t discern a higher-order awareness of a psychological state. But we can supplement the intentional stance with the higher-order theoretical apparatus.

scholarly journals When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Philipp Klar ◽  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Existential Crisis ◽  
Third Stage ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Pathological Development ◽  
Sense Of Reality ◽  
Intentional Structure

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective’s (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual’s existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

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