scholarly journals The Theory and Empirics of the Marriage Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 547-578
Author(s):  
Pierre-André Chiappori
Keyword(s):  
Marriage Market ◽  
Marriage Markets ◽  
Search Models ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Matching Models

This article reviews recent developments in the literature on marriage markets. A particular emphasis is put on frameworks based either on frictionless matching models with transfers or on search models.

Matching under Transferable Utility: Applications

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-André Chiappori
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Birth Control ◽  
Marriage Market ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Female Empowerment ◽  
Control Technology ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Male And Female ◽  
Roe V Wade ◽  
Matching Models

This chapter considers two examples of applications of matching models under transferable utility (TU). The first example deals with the legalization of abortion by virtue of Roe v. Wade and the feminist claim that it empowered all women. The second example deals with the discrepancy between male and female demand for higher education over the last decades. After providing an overview of Roe v. Wade and how it resulted in female empowerment, the chapter describes the model that takes into account preferences and budget constraints, stable matching on the marriage market, and changes in birth control technology. It then examines gender differences in the demand for higher education using the CIW (Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss) model, with a focus on equilibrium, preferences for singlehood, comparative statics, empirical implementation, and the Low model showing that higher education results in a deterministic drop in fertility.

Spousal Alternatives and Marital Relations

2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 787-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Trent ◽  
Scott J. South
Keyword(s):  
Socioeconomic Status ◽  
Racial Differences ◽  
Marital Quality ◽  
Census Data ◽  
Marriage Market ◽  
Marriage Markets ◽  
Sex Composition ◽  
Subjective Measures ◽  
Marital Relations ◽  
The Impact

This analysis merges marital history data for respondents in the National Survey of Families and Households with census data describing the sex composition of their local marriage markets to examine the impact of the availability of spousal alternatives on subjective measures of marital relations. The authors find significant bivariate associations between the sex composition of the local marriage market and husbands' and wives' marital happiness, perceived likelihood of divorce, and anticipated change in happiness if divorced. However, the effects of the sex composition of the local marriage market on these measures of marital quality are not significant after adjusting for racial differences. Racial differences in these subjective measures of marital quality cannot be explained by racial differences in mate availability, socioeconomic status, and other dimensions of sociodemographic background.

scholarly journals Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Britta Augsburg ◽  
Juan Pablo Baquero ◽  
Sanghmitra Gautam ◽  
Paul Rodriguez-Lesmes
Keyword(s):  
Living Arrangement ◽  
Marriage Market ◽  
Household Survey ◽  
Reduced Form ◽  
Marriage Markets ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Program Effects ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Gender Asymmetry ◽  
Marital Behavior

This paper analyses the marriage decisions of men and women, focusing on the added attractiveness of sanitation within the living arrangement, in rural India. We exploit district and time variation from the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) which increased sanitation by 6.6 percent among households with marriage eligible children and generated an exogenous increase in the composition of households with sanitation. Using data from the Indian Human Development household survey (IHDS) and district level census, we show that exposure to TSC increased the probability of marriage for men and women, from poorer households, by 3.8 pp and 6.5 pp respectively. The reduced form estimates incorporate both general equilibrium effects and heterogeneous program effects – two important components of equilibrium marital behavior. To decompose the overall policy impact on marriage market equilibrium we formulate a simple matching model where men and women match on observed and unobserved characteristics. Through model simulations, we show that cohorts within TSC exposed markets experienced a shift in marital gains both across matches but also within a given match. Specifically, the resultant sorting patterns display a marked gender asymmetry with an increase in marital surplus among matches where men are wealthier than their spouse, and a decrease in surplus where the wife is wealthier. Moreover, the increased access to sanitation for TSC exposed women implied a decline in their expected control over resources within the marriage.

The Brides of Boko Haram: Economic Shocks, Marriage Practices, and Insurgency in Nigeria

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonah M Rexer
Keyword(s):  
Marriage Market ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Marriage Markets ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Exogenous Shocks ◽  
Rural Nigeria ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Bride Price ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Strategy I

Abstract Marriage markets in rural Nigeria are characterised by bride price and polygamy. These customs may diminish marriage prospects for young men, causing them to join militant groups. Using an instrumental variables strategy, I find that marriage inequality increases civil conflict in the Boko Haram insurgency. To generate exogenous shocks to the marriage market, I exploit the fact that young women delay marriage in response to favourable pre-marital economic conditions, which increases marriage inequality primarily in polygamous villages. The same shocks that increase marriage inequality and extremist violence also lead women to marry fewer and richer husbands, generate higher average marriage expenditures, and increase insurgent abductions. The results shed light on the marriage market as an important driver of violent extremism.

scholarly journals Where did it go wrong? Marriage and divorce in Malawi

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 505-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurens Cherchye ◽  
Bram De Rock ◽  
Frederic Vermeulen ◽  
Selma Walther
Keyword(s):  
Structural Model ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Marriage Market ◽  
Revealed Preference ◽  
Marital Instability ◽  
Stable Marriage ◽  
Marriage Markets ◽  
Out Of Sample ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Rich Data

Do individuals marry and divorce for economic reasons? Can we measure the economic attractiveness of a person's marriage market? We answer these questions using a structural model of consumer‐producer households that is applied to rich data from Malawi. Using revealed preference conditions for a stable marriage market, we define the economic attractiveness of a potential match as the difference between the potential value of consumption and leisure with the new partner and the value of consumption and leisure in the current marriage. We estimate this marital instability measure for every possible pair in geographically defined marriage markets in 2010. We find that the marital instability measure is predictive of future divorces, particularly for women. We further show that this estimated effect on divorce is mitigated by the woman's age, and by a lack of men, relative to women, in the marriage market, showing that these factors interact with the economic attractiveness of the remarriage market. These findings provide out‐of‐sample validation of our model and evidence that the economic value of the marriage market matters for divorce decisions.

Book Reviews

2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1031-1033
Keyword(s):  
Labor Supply ◽  
Marriage Market ◽  
Household Production ◽  
Marriage Markets ◽  
Price Theory ◽  
Multiple Markets ◽  
Graphic Analysis ◽  
Wage Effects ◽  
Allocation Of Time ◽  
Consumption Theory

Patricia Apps of University of Sydney reviews “The Marriage Motive: A Price Theory of Marriage: How Marriage Markets Affect Employment, Consumption, and Savings”, by Shoshana Grossbard. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Uses price theory to analyze how economic outcomes (such as employment, other time uses, consumption, and savings) are related to marriage markets. Discusses a theory of allocation of time in markets for labor and marriage—macromodel; a theory of allocation of time in markets for labor and marriage—multiple markets for work-in-household; how marriage markets affect allocation and valuation of time implications from a macro model; compensating differentials in marriage markets and more new implications for labor supply based on a Marshallian marriage market analysis; revisiting labor supply effects of sex ratio, income, and wage—effects of marriage-related laws; labor supply, household production, and common law marriage legislation; labor supply and marriage markets—a simple graphic analysis with household public goods; household production and racial intermarriage; a consumption theory with competitive markets for work-in-household; and savings, marriage, and work-in-household. Grossbard doesn't have a current affiliation.”

scholarly journals The Econometrics of Matching Models

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 832-861 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-André Chiappori ◽  
Bernard Salanié
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Work ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Review Reports ◽  
Matching Models ◽  
Two Sided Markets

Many questions in economics can be fruitfully analyzed in the framework of matching models. Until recently, empirical work has lagged far behind theory in this area. This review reports on recent developments that have considerably expanded the range of matching models that can be taken to the data. A leading theme is that in such two-sided markets, knowing the observable characteristics of partners alone is not enough to credibly identify the relevant parameters. A combination of richer data and robust, theory-driven restrictions is required. We illustrate this on leading applications. (JEL C57, C78)

In Plain Sight: The Neglected Linkage between Brideprice and Violent Conflict

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie M. Hudson ◽  
Hilary Matfess
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Marriage Market ◽  
Violent Conflict ◽  
Marriage Markets ◽  
Asset Accumulation ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
New Members ◽  
Organized Violence ◽  
Asset Exchange

Approximately seventy-five percent of the world's population lives in countries where asset exchange upon marriage is obligatory. Rising brideprice—money or gifts provided to a woman's family by the groom and his family as part of marriage arrangements—is a common if overlooked catalyst of violent conflict. In patrilineal (and some matrilineal) societies where brideprice is practiced, a man's social status is directly connected to his marital status. Brideprice acts as a flat tax that is prone to sudden and swift increases. As a result, rising brideprice can create serious marriage market distortions that prevent young men, especially those who are poor or otherwise marginalized, from marrying. This phenomenon is especially evident in polygamous societies, where wealthy men can afford more than one bride. These distortions incentivize extra-legal asset accumulation, whether through ad hoc raiding or organized violence. In such situations, rebel and terror groups may offer to pay brideprice—or even provide brides—to recruit new members. Descriptive case studies of Boko Haram in Nigeria and various armed groups in South Sudan demonstrate these linkages, while an examination of Saudi Arabia's cap on brideprice and its efforts to arrange low-cost mass weddings illustrates the ways in which governments can intervene in marriage markets to help prevent brideprice-related instability. The trajectory of brideprice is an important but neglected early indicator of societal instability and violent conflict, underscoring that the situation and security of women tangibly affect national security.

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