scholarly journals Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Zhigang Chen ◽  
Qianyue Meng ◽  
Huichuan Wang ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Downstream Region ◽  
Compensation Rate

This paper studies a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation in a river basin and increases the number of pollutants assumed in the model to multiple. Emission and green innovation investment between upstream and downstream regions in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream region provides economic compensation for green innovation investment in the upstream region. The results show that there is an optimal ecological compensation rate, and a Pareto improvement result can be obtained by implementing ecological compensation. Increasing the proportion of ecological compensation can improve the nonvirtuous chain reaction between green innovation investment cost, pollutant transfer rate, and ecological compensation rate. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a joint mechanism composed of the government and the market and formulate a reasonable green innovation subsidy scheme according to the actual situation of the basin, so as to restrict the emergence of this “individual rational” behavior. For river basin areas that can establish a unified management department and organize the implementation of decision-making, the cooperative game is a very effective pollution control decision.

scholarly journals A Differential Game of Transboundary Pollution Control and Ecological Compensation in a River Basin

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Zhongjun Wei ◽  
Chunyan Fu
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Learning By Doing ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Investment Activity ◽  
Downstream Region ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
Compensation Rate

This paper investigates a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation (EC) in a river basin. Among them, the downstream region as the leader chooses its abatement investment level and an ecological compensation rate to encourage upstream investing in water pollution control firstly. After then, the upstream region as the follower determines its abatement investment level to maximize welfare. FFurthermore, we take into consideration the effects of efficiency-improving and cost-reducing learning by doing which are originated from abatement investment activity of both regions simultaneously. The results show the following. (i) There is an optimal ecological compensation rate and under which a Pareto improvement result can be obtained. (ii) Carrying out EC will shift some abatement investment from the downstream region into the upstream region. (iii) The efficiency-improving and cost-reducing learning by doing derived from abatement investment activity of both regions can decrease the optimal ecological compensation rate, increase abatement investment,and improve the social welfare.

scholarly journals A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Zhigang Chen ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Yongxi Yi
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Learning By Doing ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Abatement Measure ◽  
Abatement Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategies

This paper studies a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution abatement between two kinds of ecological compensation and the abatement policy, in which the learning by doing is taken into account. Emission and pollution abatement between upstream and downstream region in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream regions provide economic compensation for pollution abatement in the upstream region. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of proportional compensation and investment compensation, and it is found that an appropriate ecological compensation ratio can improve the investment level of pollution abatement in the two regions by accumulating experience in the process of learning by doing. In the long term, the investment compensation mechanism is an effective transboundary pollution abatement measure that can continuously reduce the water pollution stock in the upstream and downstream.

scholarly journals Transboundary Watershed Pollution Control and Product Market Competition With Ecological Compensation and Emission Tax: A Dynamic Analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
yongxi yi ◽  
Caini Ding ◽  
Chunyan Fu ◽  
Yuqiong Li
Keyword(s):  
Pollution Control ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Product Market Competition ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Emissions Tax ◽  
Product Competition ◽  
First Time ◽  
Compensation Rate

Abstract Product competition and pollution control are closely related to watershed environmental management, but existing literature rarely investigates them in an identical framework. Therefore, this paper develops a multiple differential game model to analyze product market competition and ecological compensation games between watershed regions based on the assumption that a region can choose four strategies to regulate its manufacturers while cooperating with other regions in the basin. Then, solve the model and obtain a simultaneous equilibrium between the governments and manufacturers for the first time. The results show that: the combination of emissions tax and ecological compensation results in the highest social welfare and water ecology for all regions in a basin. Furthermore, the ecological compensation rate independent of emissions tax policy and ecological compensation does not shift investment from downstream to upstream, but it can induce the upstream region to increase investment in management. In addition, if the governments impose an emissions tax, manufacturers' output in both regions decreases, and the upstream region is higher than in the downstream region.

scholarly journals Simulation of Actual Evapotranspiration and Evaluation of Three Complementary Relationships in the Upper Regions of the Mekong River and the Salween River

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongshan Jiang ◽  
Zhaofei Liu ◽  
Rui Wang ◽  
Pingcuo Gele
Keyword(s):  
Wind Speed ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Negative Correlation ◽  
Aridity Index ◽  
Actual Evapotranspiration ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Contribution Rate ◽  
Complementary Relationship ◽  
Annual Series ◽  
Downstream Region

Abstract Based on observed precipitation and runoff data, monthly actual evapotranspiration (ETa) was calculated by the hydrological budget balance method in the Nu River Basin (NRB) and Lancang River Basin (LCRB). The performance of three developed complementary relationship methods, the nonlinear advection-aridity (nonlinear AA) method, generalized complementary relationship method (B2015), and sigmoid generalized complementary function (H2018), on simulating (ETa) were evaluated. The evaluation results showed that three methods were able to accurately simulate monthly (ETa) series. The NSE between the monthly (ETa) simulated by the nonlinear AA, B2015, and H2018 methods and the water-balance-derived (ETa) were 0.89, 0.83, and 0.91, respectively. The R-square were 0.90, 0.84, and 0.93, respectively. Overall, the H2018 method showed the best performance. The parameter α had a negative correlation with regional aridity index. Annual (ETa) and precipitation showed significant increasing trends during 1956–2018 in the basins at all temporal scales (dry and wet seasons and annual series). Runoff also exhibited an increasing trend in each sub-basin, except for the downstream region of the LCRB. The increasing magnitudes of wet reason precipitation and runoff in the mid-stream region was the highest, with the value of 73.7 mm/10a and 44.9 mm/10a, respectively. The (ETa) increased dramatically in the downstream region, the magnitude reached 25.9 mm/10a. Precipitation was the main factor leasing to (ETa) change. The increasing magnitude of (ETa) accounted for 42.4% of the precipitation increment. Research on the influence mechanism between meteorological factors and (ETa) showed that the contribution rate of air temperature to (ETa) was the highest, reaching 23.5%, which showed a significant positive correlation. The second was wind speed, whose contribution rate was − 10.2% on average, and even reached − 14.1% in the upstream region of the NRB. The correlation coefficient between (ETa) and wind speed was highest in mid-stream region of the NRB, which was greater than 0.80. The contribution rates of increasing humidity to (ETa) were − 12.5% and − 9.2% in the NRB and LCRB, respectively. (ETa) was negatively correlated with humidity. The negative correlation was especially strong in the mid-stream region, with coefficients were greater than − 0.65. The sunshine hours had the least effect on (ETa), and the contribution rates were − 6.5% and − 4.1%, respectively.

scholarly journals A Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution between Two Asymmetric Nations

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Sheng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Consistent Solution

Considering the fact that transboundary pollution control calls for the cooperation between interested parties, this paper studies a cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nations in infinite-horizon level. In this paper, we model two ways of transboundary pollution: one is an accumulative global pollutant with an uncertain evolutionary dynamic and the other is a regional nonaccumulative pollutant. In our model, firms and governments are separated entities and they play a Stackelberg game, while the governments of the two nations can cooperate in pollution reduction. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms, and it is found that the governments being cooperative in transboundary pollution control will set a higher pollution tax rate and make more pollution abatement effort than when they are noncooperative. Additionally, a payment distribution mechanism that supports the subgame consistent solution is proposed.

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