Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union

2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Ballmann ◽  
David Epstein ◽  
Sharyn O'Halloran

Although relatively unknown outside of Europe, comitology committees are an object of considerable controversy in the European Union (EU). Controversy stems from their pivotal role in overseeing policy implementation authority delegated from the Council of Ministers (Council) to the European Commission (Commission). In this article, we employ a game-theoretic model to analyze the influence of these, committees on policy outcomes. Our analysis provides three important insights. First, we show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, comitology committees move outcomes toward the Commission's preferred policies rather than the Council's. Second, we demonstrate that the possibility of a Council veto may also move outcomes away from Council members' policy preferences and toward the Commission's. Third, the 1999 changes to the comitology procedures, designed to enhance the Commission's autonomy in policymaking, may have had the exact opposite effect. Paradoxically, we conclude that comitology serves to enhance the Commission's role in policy implementation and thereby strengthens the separation of powers within the EU.

2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.


2021 ◽  
pp. 73-112
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter examines the internal composition, internal powers, and internal procedures of the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council of Ministers. It begins by looking at the role of the separation-of-powers principle in the European Union. Unlike the US Constitution, the EU Treaties do not discuss each institution within the context of one governmental function. Instead, each institution has ‘its’ article in the Treaty on European Union, whose first section then describes the combination of governmental functions in which it partakes. The European Treaties have thus ‘set up a system for distributing powers among different [Union] institutions’. And it is this conception of the separation-of-powers principle that informs Article 13(2) TEU. The provision is thus known as the principle of interinstitutional balance.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

The aims of this chapter are threefold. It first briefly considers the events that have led to the creation of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, it introduces the reader to the principal institutions of the Union: the European Council; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of each of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates, where appropriate, the nature of the institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the member states.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 556-568
Author(s):  
Heidi Maurer ◽  
Nicholas Wright

Summary Can diplomacy work without physical presence? International relations scholars consider the European Union (EU) the most institutionalised case of international co-operation amongst sovereign states, with the highest density of repeated diplomatic exchange. In a year, the Council of Ministers hosts on average 143 ministerial and 200 ambassadorial meetings, along with hundreds of working group meetings. These intense diplomatic interactions came to an abrupt halt in mid-March 2020, when the spread of COVID-19 forced the Council to approve — in a manner unprecedented in European integration history — the temporary derogation from its rules of procedures to allow votes in written form, preceded by informal videoconferences between ministers or ambassadors. This argumentative essay reflects on how we can use these extraordinary months of intra-European diplomacy to assess the viability of virtual diplomacy in the EU context and what lessons it provides as we seek more sustainable means of international engagement.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter has three aims. It first briefly considers the origins of the what is now the European Union (EU). Secondly, it discusses the institutions of the Union, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates the nature of institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.


2020 ◽  
pp. 75-100
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter addresses the question of whether the EU has a constitution. It explores the formal constitutionalist credentials of the Union legal order and shows that the Union has claimed that the EU Treaties constitute the highest law in Europe. It then examines the constitutional nature of the Union from a ‘democratic’ perspective. Finally, it evaluates the Union legal order through the lens of liberal constitutionalism. This ‘classic’ constitutionalism assesses the legal nature of a document by insisting on a separation of powers and the existence of fundamental rights.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (10) ◽  
pp. 1151-1183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gallya Lahav

The literature on immigration has been divided with regard to the constraints, particularly of public opinion, on EU policy cooperation. Analysts have suggested that there is a disjuncture between public opinion and policy developments and that liberal immigration policies have emerged because negative public opinion is not factored into elite decision making or institutional developments. Comparing public opinion data derived from Eurobarometer surveys with demographic trends and EU initiatives, this article questions the “disjuncture” premises by evaluating the nature of mass attitudes and its impact on policy harmonization in the EU. In bridging the attitudinal-policy gap, the article assesses (a) the extent to which publics are ignorant or informed and (b) the distinct effects of personal versus general societal conditions as they motivate immigration attitudes and policy preferences. The conclusions have implications for immigration cooperation in the European Union, with policy outcomes that are more compatible with public attitudes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert

Suggested citation:  Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert, 'An Old Procedure with new Solutions for the Rule of Law Crisis' (2019) 2(2) NJEL 1. While commentators for the past years, have highlighted that there is no effective enforcement mechanism after accession for the values of the European Union which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the Juncker Commission has announced in 2017 that it will be ‘bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on small things’ thus applying a more strategic approach to enforcement in terms of handling infringements. This Article thus analyses two cases brought by the Juncker Commission after 2017 and on their bases seeks to show that the infringement procedure, when applied strategically, is and remains an effective enforcement mechanism even for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU in the ‘rule of law crisis’. Thus, by way of analysis of the case C-619/18 Commission v Poland and its comparison with similar cases which have not been as effective, it is shown how the infringement procedure can prevent the enforcement of the most controversial provisions regarding the judiciary in Hungary and Poland and ensure the separation of powers, which is essential for the rule of law. Moreover, by comparison of the Commission’s request and the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in C-235/17 Commission v Hungary it is shown how the Charter could become a significant legal instrument in the Commissions infringement policy towards Member States that are undermining fundamental rights and the rule of law. This Article thereby aims to contribute to the discussion on how to effectively enforce the values of the EU enshrined in Article 2 TEU through an existing enforcement mechanism.


Author(s):  
N. Kaveshnikov

Most of existing researches on the methods of governance in the European Union (EU) are rather narrow in scope. Many of them investigate particular policies of the EU for the purpose of identifying and describing the details of the governance mode in use. Other researches provide a comparative analysis of the application of a particular method of governance in several EU policies. However, there is a clear lacuna in the field of systematization of all methods of governance usable in the EU. This article reveals a comprehensive system of EU methods of governance. They are based on six key principles: 1) EU methods of governance are not reducible to combinations of communitarian and intergovernmental approaches. 2) Methods of governance are linked with the level of decision-making (super-system, system and subsystem decisions). 3) There are seven basic methods of governance in the EU. Classic intergovernmental method is used to make “historic” decisions at the super-system level. Communitarian approach and intensive trans-governmentalism are the most common methods at the system level. One can distinguish four methods of governance at the subsystem level: regulation, distribution, policy coordination and executive method. 4) There is no univocal correspondence between methods of policy setting (system level) and policy implementation (subsystem level). 5) Identified methods of governance are the ideal types. In practice, implementation of particular policy in the EU is usually a combination of various governance methods. 6) Methods of governance used at the level of policy implementation could change in the course of time. The concept proposed reflects the inter-coupling between the level of decision-making and a method of governance in the EU. It offers a consistent systematization of EU methods of governance, and discloses the correspondence between methods of governance and EU policies. Developed theoretical concept can be used as a methodological basis for the research of EU activities in particular policy areas, of decision-making process in the EU, of the evolution of governance in particular policy areas.


2021 ◽  
pp. 73-112
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter examines the internal composition, internal powers, and internal procedures of the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council of Ministers. It begins by looking at the role of the separation-of-powers principle in the European Union. Unlike the US Constitution, the EU Treaties do not discuss each institution within the context of one governmental function. Instead, each institution has ‘its’ article in the Treaty on European Union, whose first section then describes the combination of governmental functions in which it partakes. The European Treaties have thus ‘set up a system for distributing powers among different [Union] institutions’. And it is this conception of the separation-of-powers principle that informs Article 13(2) TEU. The provision is thus known as the principle of interinstitutional balance.


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