Jam-Barrel Politics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-46
Author(s):  
Leonardo Bonilla-Mejía ◽  
Juan S. Morales
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Building Projects ◽  
Road Building ◽  
Excess Costs ◽  
Swing Voters ◽  
Legislative Support ◽  
Using Data

Abstract This paper studies the executive-legislative exchange of centrally-allocated benefits (jam) for legislative support in Colombia using data from road building projects, legislative roll-call votes, and a leaked database which uncovered the assignment of road contracts to individual legislators. We draw hypotheses from a model in which an executive spreads jam to sway legislators. We document that assigned projects had excess costs, legislators targeted were more likely to be swing voters in congress, and legislators increased their support for the executive after their contracts were signed. The results are driven by legislators representing remote regions and constituencies with weaker political institutions.

Institutions and Political Support

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun Bowler
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Institutional Reform ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Political Support ◽  
The Political ◽  
General Expectation ◽  
Using Data

This chapter analyzes to what extent variation in political institutions affects political support. The chapter observes that the existing research is not always clear on which institutions should produce what kind of effect, although a general expectation is that institutional arrangements improve political support when they give citizens an increased sense of connection to the political process. In general then, we should expect institutions that strengthen the quality of representation to strengthen political support. This general expectation is specified in six hypotheses that are tested using data from the ESS 2012. The chapter demonstrates that electoral systems that provide voters with more choice about candidates, multiparty governments, and “responsive” legislatures, correlate positively with political support. However, compared to other macro-level factors and individual characteristics, the effects of political institutions on political support are modest. The chapter concludes that the prospects for institutional reform to strengthen political support are limited.

Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

scholarly journals Exit, Voice and Political Change: Evidence from Swedish Mass Migration to the United States

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mounir Karadja ◽  
Erik Prawitz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Change ◽  
The United States ◽  
Travel Costs ◽  
Mass Migration ◽  
Initial Wave ◽  
Political Effects ◽  
Welfare Expenditures ◽  
Using Data

We study the political effects of mass emigration to the United States in the nineteenth century using data from Sweden. To instrument for total emigration over several decades, we exploit severe local frost shocks that sparked an initial wave of emigration, interacted with within-country travel costs. Our estimates show that emigration substantially increased the local demand for political change, as measured by labor movement membership, strike participation, and voting. Emigration also led to de facto political change, increasing welfare expenditures as well as the likelihood of adopting more inclusive political institutions.

Does Legitimacy Matter?

2012 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 689-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary LaFree ◽  
Nancy A. Morris
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The United States ◽  
Institutional Legitimacy ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Institutional Authority ◽  
Muslim Countries ◽  
The Law ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Compliance With The Law

Legitimacy is conceptualized as subjective individual attitudes and expectations about formal institutional authority and is often thought of as a reservoir of trust or goodwill that formal governing authorities draw on to secure acceptance and compliance with the law. Recent public opinion surveys in predominantly Muslim countries report declining support for U.S. government and policy, as well as increasing support for Muslim-based groups that attack the United States. Based on prior research within the United States showing that perceptions of legitimacy are related to both acceptance and compliance with the law, we examine whether perceptions about the legitimacy of the U.S. government may also be related to support for anti-American transnational terrorist attacks. Using data from more than 3,600 face-to-face interviews with respondents from three Muslim countries, we examine the effects of support for the American government, people, and culture on support for Muslim-based groups that attack Americans. In addition, we examine the effects of perceived domestic institutional legitimacy on support for Muslim-based groups that attack Americans. Our results indicate that individuals who have more favorable attitudes toward American citizens and culture are less likely to support attacks against Americans by Muslim-based groups. We also find that perceived legitimacy in one’s own political institutions, including government, police, and the criminal justice system, is associated with lower levels of support for groups that attack Americans. We discuss the implications of the results for research and policy.

Workers' Councils and Political Stratification: The Yugoslav Experience

1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sidney Verba ◽  
Goldie Shabad
Keyword(s):  
Citizen Participation ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Open Channels ◽  
Professional Status ◽  
The Political ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Political Inequality ◽  
Extensive Survey ◽  
Using Data

Many students of citizen participation claim that one solution to the problem of political inequality in liberal democracies lies in the establishment of direct participatory channels in decentralized socioeconomic and political institutions similar to those found in Yugoslavia. Others argue that the availability of participatory channels in the workplace leads to the domination of these channels by a technocratic elite. Still other students of participation in Yugoslavia claim that participatory channels are dominated by the political elite, the League of Communists.In this paper, we examine this set of conflicting hypotheses by using data which come from an extensive survey of participatory activities in four Yugoslav republics. Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers' councils open channels for a more technocratically oriented participation. When it comes to other kinds of activity, affiliation with the League is more important than socioeconomic or professional status in determining who participates. But because League members come disproportionately from upper-status groups, there is not a marked difference in the extent to which membership in workers' councils and participation in other kinds of activity are biased in favor of the advantaged segments of Yugoslav society. In each case, but for different reasons, it is the upper-status citizen who is likely to be active.

The Domestic Politics of the International Dollar Standard: A Statistical Analysis of Support for the Reserve Currency, 2000–2008

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Shih ◽  
David A. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Reserve Currency ◽  
Treasury Securities ◽  
International Dollar ◽  
Political Clout ◽  
Dollar Standard ◽  
Competing Interest ◽  
Using Data

Abstract.Why did most central banks continue to purchase dollar reserves during the 2000s even though they suffered mounting financial losses as a result of this policy? This paper argues that domestic political considerations determine whether policy makers accumulate or dump the reserve currency. We hypothesize that central bank independence decreases support for the dollar because independent central banks reduce the political clout of exporters and increase the salience of financial performance. This argument is tested using data on countries' holdings of US Treasury securities between 2000 and 2008. The statistical results indicate that countries with independent central banks were more likely to sell and less likely to purchase US treasuries. Our findings suggest that a complete understanding of the international dollar standard requires greater attention to domestic politics and how political institutions influence the balance of power between competing interest groups.Résumé.Pourquoi est-ce que la plupart des banques centrales ont continué à acheter des réserves de dollars au cours des années 2000, même quand ils souffraient des pertes financières en raison de cette politique? Cet article soutient que des considérations de politiques nationale déterminent si les responsables des politiques décident d'accumuler ou de vider leurs monnaie de réserve. Nous émettons l'hypothèse que l'indépendance de la banque centrale décourage le soutien pour le dollar, car les banques centrales indépendantes réduise la puissance politique des exportateurs et augmente l'importance de la performance financière. Cet argument est testé en utilisant des données sur la quantité de titres du Trésor américain possédée par pays entre 2000 et 2008. Les résultats statistiques démontrent que les pays avec des banques centrales indépendantes étaient plus susceptibles de vendre et moins susceptibles d'acheter des obligations du Trésor américain. Nos résultats suggèrent qu'une compréhension complète de l'étalon dollar international exige une plus grande attention à la politique nationale, et comment les institutions politiques influencent l'équilibre du pouvoir entre les groupes d'intérêts concurrents.

scholarly journals Policy Pathways to Gender Power: State-Level Effects on the US Division of Housework

2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
LYNN PRINCE COOKE
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Child Support ◽  
Labour Force ◽  
State Level ◽  
Labour Force Participation ◽  
The Us ◽  
Division Of Housework ◽  
Gender Power ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Laws And Policies

Across industrialised countries, men contribute one-third of the household time in domestic tasks despite women's rising labour force participation. Like a Russian doll, however, the private sphere of the household nests within broader socio-political institutions. Proposed here is a relative gender power model incorporating both individual and policy-derived resources to explain differences in the division of household tasks. The sensitivity of the model to state-level policy differences is tested using data from the second wave of the US National Survey of Families and Households. After controlling for women's individual resources, laws and policies enhancing women's economic circumstances in the event of a divorce such as receipt of transfers, child support and property settlement predict that men in couples perform a greater share of domestic tasks. This evidence confirms that the state can ameliorate gender hierarchies and inequality.

scholarly journals Does Paying Politicians More Promote Economic Diversity in Legislatures?

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS CARNES ◽  
ERIC R. HANSEN
Keyword(s):  
Working Class ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
The United States ◽  
Descriptive Representation ◽  
Lower Income ◽  
Economic Diversity ◽  
Political Office ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Using Data

If politicians in the United States were paid better, would more middle- and working-class people become politicians? Reformers often argue that the low salaries paid in state and local governments make holding office economically infeasible for lower-income citizens and contribute to the enduring numerical under-representation of the working class in our political institutions. Of course, raising politicians’ salaries could also make political office more attractive to affluent professionals, increasing competition for office and ultimately discouraging lower-income citizens from running and winning. In this article, we test these hypotheses using data on the salaries and economic backgrounds of state legislators. Contrary to the notion that paying politicians more promotes economic diversity, we find that the descriptive representation of the working class is the same or worse in states that pay legislators higher salaries. These findings have important implications for research on descriptive representation, political compensation, and political inequality.

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