scholarly journals The Geographical Reach of International Humanitarian Law in Transnational Armed Conflict

2021 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-311
Author(s):  
Elliot Winter

Abstract Non-international armed conflict between States and organised armed groups is a reality of warfare. Since the emergence of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, this form of conflict has been regulated by international humanitarian law. However, a subset of this category known as ‘transnational armed conflict’ has seen aggressive proliferation over recent decades as groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have taken advantage of the internet and other technologies to expand their reach beyond national frontiers and strike States around the world. This phenomenon has left the geographical extent of international humanitarian law – which has historically relied on State boundaries to determine its ambit – unclear. This article examines the main options for delimiting the geographical reach of the regime in transnational armed conflict. It considers approaches based on international boundaries; ‘hot battlefields’; ‘global application’ and ‘territorial control’ before ultimately concluding that a method based on ‘military presence’ would be the most suitable standard.

2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (895-896) ◽  
pp. 1195-1224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Heffes ◽  
Marcos D. Kotlik

AbstractCommon Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or asui generislegal regime.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-264
Author(s):  
Pouria Askary ◽  
Katayoun Hosseinnejad

The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (Da’esh) has put in place a governance system encompassing judicial structures to justify its grotesque violence. This paper seeks to evaluate the legitimacy of these courts under two complementary perspectives. Whereas establishing courts by an insurgent group during armed conflict should meet the requirements of international humanitarian law (ihl), because Da’esh claims to ground its laws on Islam, these courts should also follow the requirements of Islam as its constituting law. The paper starts with analysing whether international law entitles armed groups to establish their courts. It argues that although such courts are not prohibited at first glance under international law, they should meet the requirements of being regularly constituted while respecting minimum judicial guarantees. Since Da’esh has sought to found its legitimacy on Islam, the paper argues that Da’esh’s interpretation of Islam is not compatible with any major schools of Islamic thought.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-296
Author(s):  
Ilana Rothkopf

Abstract Do fighters associated with non-state armed groups have the combatant’s privilege in armed conflict? Non-state armed groups are commonplace in contemporary armed conflicts. However, international humanitarian law (IHL), particularly the law that pertains to combatant’s privilege and prisoner of war status, was designed with state actors in mind. This article assesses the conditions under which the members of non-state armed groups have combatant’s privilege. Throughout, it uses the case of Kurdish fighters in Syria as an example of the timeliness of this question and its ramifications for conflict actors. This article notes, with support from the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols, and other sources of IHL, that IHL does not foresee a combatant’s privilege for armed groups in a non-international armed conflict. It contends, however, that the international community should agree to a generalisable rule for the treatment of fighters as combatants regardless of conflict type, if these fighters demonstrate the capability and willingness to adhere to IHL. Such a rule would reduce the need to assess both conflict type and the status of individual fighters should they be captured, and more importantly, it would incentivise continued compliance with IHL.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Gal

Humanitarian assistance is essential for the survival of the civilian population and peoplehors de combatin the theatre of war. Its regulation under the laws of armed conflict tries to achieve a balance between humanitarian goals and state sovereignty. This balance, reflected in the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, is not as relevant to contemporary armed conflicts, most of which involve non-state armed groups. Even those provisions relating to humanitarian assistance in conflicts involving non-state armed groups fail to address properly the key features of these groups, and especially their territorial aspect. This article proposes a different approach, which takes into consideration and gives weight to the control exercised by non-state armed groups over a given territory. Accordingly, it is suggested that provisions regulating humanitarian relief operations in occupied territories should apply to territories controlled by armed groups. This approach views international humanitarian law first and foremost as an effective, realistic and practical branch of law. Moreover, it has tremendous humanitarian advantages and reflects the aims and purposes of the law, while considering the factual framework of these conflicts.


Author(s):  
Krystian Mularczyk ◽  
Karolina Saska

The article addresses the applicability of international humanitarian law during the armed conflict in Iraq in 2013-2017 waged against the Islamic State. The paper answers how to classify this conflict against the background of the law of armed conflict. The argumentation for considering it as a non-international conflict with the Islamic State and the Iraqi government as parties is presented. The discussed failure to recognize the Islamic State's status as a state within the meaning of international law does not classify the armed conflict as international. The classification has not been changed by the United States and allied states' intervention, which, as one at the invitation of the Iraqi government, does not mean qualifying the conflict as international. The article also discusses the scope of the norms of international humanitarian law that apply to the conflict in question. It primarily concerns Article 3 that is common to the Geneva Conventions and customary law. Protocol II supplementing the provisions of the Geneva Conventions will not apply as Iraq is not a signatory to it.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayub Torry Satriyo Kusumo ◽  
Kukuh Tejomurti

<p align="center"><strong><em>Abstract</em></strong></p><p><em>Recently, there is a shift in armed conflict in the world from the conflicts among states or between state and belligerent into the conflict which happened across nations’ border, such as the </em><em>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The ISIS is a non-state actor, which consequently means that the conflicts cannot be properly categorized into international armed conflict. As the consequence, the international humanitarian law cannot be put into practice. The alternative solution is to apply the Martens Clause by paying an ultimate appreciation of fundamental principles of international humanitarian law for the sake of humanity and human rights</em>.</p><p><strong><em>Keywords </em></strong><strong>: <em>ISIS, Martens Clause, Fundamental Principle</em></strong></p><p align="center"> </p><p align="center"><strong>Abstrak</strong></p><p>Dewasa ini telah terjadi pergeseran subyek konflik bersenjata yang semula terjadi antar-negara atau antara negara dengan pemberontak menjadi konflik lintas-batas negara seperti <em>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria </em>(ISIS). Status ISIS dalam hukum internasional bukan sebagai negara melainkan sebagai aktor non negara (<em>non-state actor</em>). Perang melawan ISIS tidak termasuk ke dalam konflik bersenjata internasional karena tidak memenuhi kriteria berdasarkan Konvensi Jenewa Tahun 1949 dan Protokol Tambahan I Tahun 1977. Hal ini sangat mungkin memunculkan kesulitan pemberlakukan HHI. Sebagai alternatifnya, penerapan <em>Martens Clause</em> dapat dilakukan, yaitu dengan menghormati prinsip-prinsip fundamental yang menjadi dasar hukum humaniter internasional demi penghargaan terhadap kemanusiaan dan hak asasi manusia.</p><p><strong>Kata kunci : ISIS, <em>Martens Clause</em>, Prinsip Fundamental</strong><strong></strong></p><strong></strong><strong></strong>


Author(s):  
Yutaka Arai-Takahashi

Abstract The requirement of organization is supposed to be of special importance in international humanitarian law (IHL). In the situation of international armed conflict (IAC), this requirement is implicit as part of the collective conditions to be fulfilled by irregular/independent armed groups to enable their members to claim the prisoners of war status under Article 4 A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. In a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), the eponymous requirement serves, alongside the requirement of intensity of violence, as the threshold condition for ascertaining the onset of a NIAC. While the requirement of organization has not caused much of disputes in IACs, the international criminal tribunals have shown a willingness to examine scrupulously if armed groups in NIACs are sufficiently organized. Still, this article argues that there is need for a nuanced assessment of the organizational level of an armed group in some specific phases of the ongoing armed conflict whose legal character switches (from an NIAC to an IAC, vice-versa, and from a NIAC to a law-enforcement model). It explores what rationales and argumentative model may be adduced to explain such varying standards for organization in different contexts.


1987 ◽  
Vol 27 (258) ◽  
pp. 288-292
Author(s):  
Sumio Adachi

International humanitarian law is, so to speak, a legal measure for moral enforcement which in turn bridges the gap between law and politics. It prescribes minimum duties of contending parties in case of an international or non-international armed conflict.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 234-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artem Sergeev

Following the widespread participation of United Nations (UN) forces in hostile environments, this article aims to expand the obligations of the UN under International Humanitarian Law. The article argues that Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the Geneva Conventions can bind UN forces, even though the UN is not formally a party thereto. The argument is built on three distinct legal issues: the first issue is whether the UN’s involvement in a conflict internationalizes a non-international armed conflict; the second issue is the legal nature of the UN’s obligations under AP II, which will be explained through two legal theories of indirect consent; and the third issue is the conformity of UN forces to the criteria of an armed group outlined in AP II. The article concludes that if UN forces meet certain conditions, as will be outlined herein, they should be bound by the provisions contained in AP II.


2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-26
Author(s):  
Oleksandra Severinova ◽  

The article analyzes the theoretical and methodological aspects of the formation and development of doctrinal ideas about the meaning of the concept of «armed conflict» in the history of world political and legal thought. The question of the name of the branch of law that regulates armed conflict, by analyzing its historical names such as «law of war», «laws and customs of war», «law of armed conflict», «international humanitarian law» and «international humanitarian law, used in armed conflicts». As a result of this analysis, it can be concluded that it would be most appropriate to use the terms «international humanitarian law» only in a narrow sense or «international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts», which is more cumbersome but most accurately describes the field. It is emphasized that due to the availability of new powerful weapons (economic, political, informational, cultural and weapons of mass destruction), which are dangerous both for the aggressor and for the whole world; the aggressor's desire to downplay its role in resolving conflicts in order to avoid sanctions from other countries and international organizations, as well as to prevent the loss of its authority and position on the world stage; the attempts of the aggressor countries to establish their control over the objects of aggression (including integrating them into their political, economic and security systems) without excessive damage to them is the transformation of methods and means of warfare. It is determined that the long history of the formation of the law of armed conflict has led to the adoption at the level of international law of the provision prohibiting any armed aggression in the world, which is reflected in such a principle as non-use of force or threat of force. At the same time, the UN Charter became the first international act in the history of mankind, which completely prohibited armed aggression and enshrined this principle at the international level, which is binding on all states of the modern world.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document