Do International Organizations Enjoy Immunity Under Customary International Law?

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wood

The present article considers whether there is “a general practice accepted as law” establishing rules of customary international law on the immunity of international organizations from the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Apart from treaties, there does not appear to be a great deal of practice or opinio juris on the immunity of international organizations. And while there are many treaties dealing with the matter, their significance for the generation of a rule of customary international law seems questionable. This article sketches the historical development of the immunity of international organizations since the nineteenth century, describes various approaches that have been suggested to this question, and sets out such practice as there is and academic consideration of that practice. It then considers whether practice has to date generated any rules of customary international law regarding immunities, and finally suggests some conclusions.

Author(s):  
Denza Eileen

This chapter examines Article 23 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which deals with the exemption of the diplomatic mission premises from taxation. Article 23 states that the sending State and the head of the mission shall be exempt from all dues and taxes in respect of the premises of the mission. This exemption however shall not apply to dues and taxes payable under the law of the receiving State by persons contracting with the sending State or the head of the mission. This practice traces its roots from the nineteenth century when it was not based on diplomatic immunity but on courtesy. Many States concluded bilateral agreements or arrangements providing exemption—a practice which would have been unnecessary if customary international law had required it. During the twentieth century, general practice based on courtesy or on reciprocity began to harden into a customary rule requiring exemption from central and local taxes on mission property.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
SIMON OLLESON

AbstractThe rules of customary international law governing when a state or international organization will be held to have committed an internationally wrongful act, thereby engaging its international responsibility, are relatively well settled in international practice and jurisprudence. A key point of reference in this regard is the work of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility and Responsibility of International Organizations. The present paper examines relevant practice of domestic courts from a variety of jurisdictions which have relied upon the ILC's work, and discusses the extent to which domestic courts may make a contribution to the further development of the rules relating to engagement of responsibility. It concludes that, due to the operation of rules of, inter alia, immunity and non-justiciability, the principal instance in which domestic courts may actually apply the rules of international law is where it is the responsibility of the forum state which is in issue.


Author(s):  
Malgosia Fitzmaurice

This chapter analyses the history of Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute. It also seeks to reflect on the Article’s current status. The main focus of this chapter is to look at sources of international law through the prism of their historical development, including potential ‘new’ sources (acts of international organizations, unilateral acts of States, soft law) which have emerged long after the twelve ‘wise men’ of the Advisory Committee of Jurists had completed their task of drafting Article 38. The chapter also deals with the ‘classical’ sources of international law, such as customary international law and general principles of law. It takes into account how various courts and tribunals approach these sources.


Grotiana ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-251
Author(s):  
Omri Sender ◽  
Sir Michael Wood

Abstract Article 38.1(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which refers to customary international law as ‘a general practice accepted as law’, makes no mention of duration. Yet the ‘time element’, as the Court itself called it, has not infrequently been relevant—if not central—to determining whether a rule of customary international law has come into being. The present article seeks to describe how far the passage of time is necessary for the creation of rules of customary international law, and the possible significance of time to the customary process more generally. While noting that no particular duration is required for the formation of customary international law, it suggests that some time must always elapse, and that assertions of a rapid development in customary international law are to be treated with a degree of caution. Light is thrown on particular ways in which time may indeed be of significance for the formation and identification of a rules of customary international law, and on further ways in which time (and timing) may impact the life cycle of such rules, including their possible change and demise.


1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindsay Moir

That humanitarian rules were applicable in armed conflicts was accepted long before the nineteenth century, but the fact that non-international armed conflicts were regarded as beyond the ambit of international regulation meant that the application of such norms to internal armed conflicts was certainly not a matter of course. Towards the end of the eighteenth century there had been a move towards the application of the laws of warfare to non-international armed conflicts as well as international conflicts, but this was based on the character of the conflicts and the fact that both were often of a similar magnitude, rather than any humanitarian concern to treat the victims of both equally. Not until the nineteenth century did the application of the laws of war to non-international armed conflicts become a widespread issue in international law.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 717-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS POGGE

Various human rights are widely recognized in codified and customary international law. These human rights promise all human beings protection against specific severe harms that might be inflicted on them domestically or by foreigners. Yet international law also establishes and maintains institutional structures that greatly contribute to violations of these human rights: fundamental components of international law systematically obstruct the aspirations of poor populations for democratic self-government, civil rights, and minimal economic sufficiency. And central international organizations, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, are designed so that they systematically contribute to the persistence of severe poverty.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Marie Dupuy ◽  

International custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”, is considered one of the two main sources of international law as it primarily derives from the conduct of sovereign States, but is also closely connected with the role of the international judge when identifying the applicable customary rule, a function it shares with the bodies in charge of its codification (and progressive development), starting with the International Law Commission. Though mainly considered to be general international law, international custom has a complex relationship with many specific fields of law and specific regions of the world. The editor provides comprehensive research published in the last seven decades, invaluable to everyone interested in the field of customary international law.


2012 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Dahlman

This article claims that the requirement of opinio juris in the formation of customary international law means that a general practice must be generally accepted among states to become customary law. The article argues that opinio juris serves an important function. It prevents generally unwanted general practice from becoming customary law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-149
Author(s):  
Cameron Miles

Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute provides that “judicial decisions” may serve as a subsidiary means for the determination of customary international law. The absence of a qualifying adjective to the term “judicial decisions” confirms that, at least ex facie, there is no priority to be given to international over domestic judgments in this respect. And yet – as the International Law Commission’s Draft Conclusions on Formation and Identification of Customary International Law confirms – the reality of international adjudication is one in which domestic judicial decisions are often side-lined. In this paper, I question the ILC’s assertion that this is due to the relative expertise of international versus domestic courts, and instead posit a model based on the shifting architectonics of international adjudication. Two related developments are key: (1) the florescence of international adjudicative bodies in the post-1945 era, and (2) the tendency for international courts and tribunals to see domestic judicial decisions as evidence of state practice and opinio juris under Article 38(1)(b), rather than as subsidiary means for the determination of custom – that is, as factual rather than legal precedents.


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