Debating the Ouroboros of International Law: The Drafting History of Article 31(3)(c)

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Panos Merkouris

AbstractThe Diversification and expansion of International Law has sparked a series of debates on the present status and future of International Law; even more so, since the ILC decided to tackle the issue of fragmentation. One of the areas of research and controversy has been Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which, arguably, enshrines the principle of systemic integration. The aim of this article is to explore the evolution of Article 31(3)(c) from its first inception by the forefathers of international law up to the finalization of the text of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. By mapping the critical arguments in the three main fora of debate (i.e the Institut de Droit International, the International Law Commission and the Vienna Conference on the Law of treaties) what arises is a series of conclusions with respect to certain aspects of Article 31(3)(c) as well as certain recurring themes in the nature and progress of the discussions. All of the above will show that the drafting history of Article 31(3)(c) seems to suggest that the relevant provision was meant to serve a purpose expressed more concisely by the symbol of Ouroboros rather than of a mere "master-key" to the house of International Law.

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malgosia Fitzmaurice

The subject-matter of this article are the issues of treaty law as expounded in the Judgment in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. The following problems are discussed: unilateral suspension and abandonment of obligations deriving from the binding treaty; the principle of fundamental change of circumstances; unilateral termination of a treaty; applicability of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in this case; legal status of so-called ‘provisional solution’; impossibility of performance and material breach of treaty; the application of the principle of ‘approximate application’; and the principle pacta sunt servanda. The issues arc discussed at the background of the Drafts of the International Law Commission.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-200
Author(s):  
Danae Azaria

Abstract This article argues that the International Law Commission (ILC) interprets international law. In recent years, in documents intended to remain non-binding, the Commission has made interpretative pronouncements about a treaty in force, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and customary international law reflected therein. This development is called the ‘codification by interpretation’ paradigm in this article. This article argues that interpretation falls within the ILC’s function, and it analyses the effects of the Commission’s interpretative pronouncements. It explains that the ILC’s interpretative pronouncements are not per se binding or authentic. However, they may trigger an interpretative dialogue with states. The ILC’s interpretative pronouncements may constitute a focal point for coordination among states, a subsidiary means for determining rules of law and a supplementary means of (treaty) interpretation. The aim of the ILC’s ‘codification-by-interpretation’ paradigm in the four topics considered in this article is to introduce clarity and predictability into secondary rules on the law of treaties, thus ensuring the clarity and predictability of primary treaty rules across all fields of international law. The ILC endeavours to convince states to use international law as a medium by which they regulate their affairs.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-76
Author(s):  
Benny TAN Zhi Peng

The International Law Commission recently completed its work on the controversial issue of the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, culminating in the adoption of a set of eighteen draft articles and an annex. The Commission's efforts are nothing short of commendable, but this article argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the role of supervening impossibility of performance and fundamental change of circumstances in determining the effects of armed conflicts on treaties. Although both doctrines may in fact appropriately apply in the context of armed conflicts, the mere referencing of them in the adopted draft articles gives rise to several problems. In particular, the two doctrines were codified by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties without their application to armed conflicts in mind. Some changes to the draft articles are proposed to address these difficulties.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Karol Karski ◽  
Tomasz Kamiński

The submitted paper concerns the treaty-making capacity of components of federal (non-unitary) states. As the division of powers in respect to the conclusion of international treaties between a federal state and its components is based on the provisions of internal federal law, the authors decided to start the consideration of the topic with the presentation of selected appropriate internal law regulations of federal states. Although the study concentrates on an analysis of Swiss and German constitutional rules on the subject, the provisions of i.a. Belgian, US and Canadian law are also commented upon. Therefore it apparently seems to be an important legal question.The treaty-making capacity of components of federal (non-unitary) states was comprehensively discussed during the International Law Commission preparatory works on the regulation on the law of treaties. The provisions dedicated to that issue formed part of the reports prepared by each of the ILC Special Rapporteurs on the subject. The paper presents the draft propositions submitted by them, the views of ILC members, and responses received from states.The final draft of ILC articles on the law of treaties contained a paragraph concerning the issue at stake (than art. 5 § 2 of the draft) stipulating that member states of a federal union may possess such capacity only if such capacity is admitted by the federal constitution and within the scope defined therein. Nevertheless, this issue was omitted in the 1969 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT). Art. 6 of the VCLT on the capacity of States to conclude treaties does not mention the rights of components of federal states. It consists of one paragraph simply stating that every State possesses the capacity to conclude treaties. And the term ‘state’ for the purposes of that regulation possesses the same meaning as i.a. in the Charter of the United Nations, that is a State for the purposes of international law, or a state in the international meaning of that term.This does not mean however that territorial units forming a part of a federal state cannot conclude international agreements. But, this issue depends both on the provisions of internal law of the given state and on the practice of the states recognising the potential rights of the components of the federal (non-unitary) states in respect to conclusion of the treaties.


1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 838-852 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne

The purpose of this article is to bring up to date the present writer’s previous article on “The Depositary of International Treaties” published in this Journal, in the light of the deliberations of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties in 1968 and 1969 and the changes there made in the texts. The relevant provisions now appear as Articles 76, 77 and 78 of the so-called Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, corresponding to Articles 71, 72 and 73 of the draft articles on the law of treaties of the International Law Commission.


Author(s):  
Sbolci Luigi

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 established a distinct hierarchy between the general rule of interpretation and supplementary means. Article 32 of the Convention subordinates the use of supplementary means to various assumptions connected with the outcome of the interpretation made on the basis of the general rule contained in Article 31. The list of the supplementary means laid down in Article 32 is not exhaustive and the Vienna Convention says nothing about the concept of preparatory works, of circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty, and about the concept of other supplementary means of interpretation. These and other critical observations can be resolved by reference to indications from the comments of the International Law Commission and from international case law. The rule established in Article 32 can be considered to correspond to the international custom. The use of supplementary means of interpretation is important when the application of the general rule leaves the meaning ambiguous, obscure, or absurd. Recent international case law appears to illustrate the reasons that can lead the interpreter to find, in the supplementary means, a confirmation of the meaning emerging from the application of the general rule expressed in Article 31.


1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (5) ◽  
pp. 705-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert W. Briggs

The fundamental importance of the codification of the law of treaties by the International Law Commission and the Vienna Conference will gain increasing recognition as the rules and principles embodied in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are applied in the practice of states and the jurisprudence of international tribunals. Inevitably the records of this great codification will be searched and researched, by scholars as well as by legal advisers, and for a variety of reasons: What is the function of a particular rule? What r61e was it designed to play in the relations of states and in the international legal community? What does it require in the way of performance or abstention? Is it a residual rule, binding upon states if no other solution is agreed on? Why was the rule given the particular formulation found in the Vienna Convention,and what alternative formulations were rejected? Since the entry into force of the Vienna Convention will be delayed until after thirty-five states have ratified or acceded to it (Article 84), what assessment of the general acceptability of a particular provision can be gained from a study of the drafting record or from the number of affirmative or negative votes or abstentions?


Author(s):  
Kai Bruns

This chapter focuses on the negotiations that preceded the 1961 Vienna Conference (which led to the conclusion of the VCDR). The author challenges the view that the successful codification was an obvious step and refers in this regard to a history of intense negotiation which spanned fifteen years. With particular reference to the International Law Commission (ILC), the chapter explores the difficult task faced by ILC members to strike a balance between the codification of existing practice and progressive development of diplomatic law. It reaches the finding that the ILC negotiations were crucial for the success of the Conference, but notes also that certain States supported a less-binding form of codification. The chapter also underlines the fact that many issues that had caused friction between the Cold War parties were settled during the preparatory meetings and remained largely untouched during the 1961 negotiations.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Graefrath

The history, operation and tasks of the International Law Commission (ILC) have often been described and its success in codifying general international law is well-known and widely acknowledged. The conduct of international relations today is unthinkable without such basic instruments, first drafted by the Commission, as the conventions on diplomatic and consular relations, the law of treaties and the law of the sea. Moreover, other ILC drafts that have not been adopted as treaties have had a long-term effect on the development of international law; for example, the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, and the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure.


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