International Law & World Order: Weston's & Carlson's Basic Documents V.E.20d Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (with annexes) (10 December 1997)

Author(s):  
Alan Boyle ◽  
Navraj Singh Ghaleigh

This chapter discusses the various shortcomings of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. As a ‘framework convention’, the UNFCCC itself does not regulate climate change but only creates a basis for negotiating multilateral solutions. The Convention’s most evident weakness, as demonstrated during the Marrakesh Accords and the Copenhagen negotiations, is the dependence on the ability of the parties to reach the necessary agreement within a timescale. Complementary to the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol establishes quantitative emission restrictions to advanced industrial states, or Annex I parties. However, the Protocol only focuses on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions rather than on consumption, a reason which led to Canada’s withdrawal. According to international governance scholar Oran Young, these problems emerge as a result of the climate change regime not being based on ‘principles of fairness’ that are broadly acceptable major players.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-81
Author(s):  
Brook M R Dambacher ◽  
Matthew T Stilwell ◽  
Jeffrey S McGee

Abstract Conflicts of interest (COIs) have the capacity to undermine the integrity and legitimacy of decision-making in international legal fora. The issue of COIs has recently become a contentious issue within the international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Despite an emerging debate on COIs, key issues regarding engagement with certain non-state actors, and the reforms that could be implemented in response, remain to be systematically addressed. This article therefore examines best practice for addressing COIs in international fora to see how this might inform management of the issue within the UNFCCC. We find that protecting the integrity and legitimacy of the UNFCCC will likely require its Conference of the Parties to clearly define COIs and to adopt a process for their management. This reform will bring the UNFCCC into line with best practices in global governance and improve prospects for more effective international law on climate change.


Author(s):  
Joana Castro Pereira ◽  
Eduardo Viola

The signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by 154 nations at the Rio “Earth Summit” in 1992 marked the beginning of multilateral climate negotiations. Aiming for the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” the Convention divided parties according to different commitments and established the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC) principle. In 1997, parties to the Convention adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005. The Protocol set internationally binding emission reduction targets based on a rigid interpretation of the CBDRRC principle. Different perceptions on a fair distribution of climate change mitigation costs hindered multilateral efforts to tackle the problem. Climate change proved a “super wicked” challenge (intricately linked to security, development, trade, water, energy, food, land use, transportation, etc.) and this fact led to a lack of consensus on the distribution of rights and responsibilities among countries. Indeed, since 1992, greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere have increased significantly and the Kyoto Protocol did not reverse the trend. In 2009, a new political framework, the Copenhagen Accord, was signed. Although parties recognized the need to limit global warming to < 2°C to prevent dangerous climate change, they did not agree on a clear path toward a legally-binding treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol, whose first commitment period would end in 2012. A consensus would only be reached in 2015, when a new, partially legally-binding treaty—the Paris Climate Agreement—committing all parties to limit global warming to “well below 2°C” was finally signed. It came into force in November 2016. Described in many political, public, and academic contexts as a diplomatic success, the agreement suffers, however, from several limitations to its effectiveness. The nationally determined contributions that parties have presented thus far under the agreement would limit warming to approximately 3°C by 2100, placing the Earth at a potentially catastrophic level of climate change. Forces that resist the profound transformations necessary to stabilize the Earth’s climate dominate climate change governance. Throughout almost three decades of international negotiations, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have increased substantially and at a rapid pace, and climate change has worsened significantly.


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