What Makes People Support Public Responsibility for Welfare Provision: Self-interest or Political Ideology?

2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Meier Jæger
2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-151
Author(s):  
Patrick Sachweh

What motivates welfare attitudes during economic crises? While existing research highlights self-interest, this conclusion rests on a predominant conceptualization of citizens’ crisis experiences as personal job loss. However, during economic downturns, people are likely to also witness colleagues or distant others being laid off, which might affect welfare attitudes for reasons beyond self-interest. This article analyses how personal job loss as well as that of colleagues and acquaintances during the Great Recession is related to welfare attitudes in the UK, Germany and Sweden, where welfare regimes and crisis policies differ systematically. Based on Eurobarometer data from 2010, the findings reveal that the importance of personal job loss as well as that of colleagues and acquaintances varies cross-nationally. In the liberal UK – with its modest crisis response – demand for greater public welfare provision is associated with personal job loss. In social-democratic Sweden – with its active crisis management – demand for greater welfare provision is associated with acquaintances’ job loss. In conservative Germany – with its labour market insider-focused crisis response – no clear picture emerges. These findings support a sociological perspective emphasizing the importance of other-regarding concerns for welfare attitudes and the role of institutions in structuring people’s self-interest and normative orientations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-446
Author(s):  
Jolien Galle ◽  
Koen Abts ◽  
Marc Swyngedouw ◽  
Bart Meuleman

This article contributes to the debate about migration’s impact on welfare state support by investigating the welfare opinions of migrants and their descendants. It examines whether experiences of group and individual discrimination explain the welfare attitudes of this group over and beyond classical predictors of self-interest and political ideology. Using survey data from Belgian citizens of Turkish and Moroccan descent, we show that stronger support for redistribution is associated with higher levels of perceived group discrimination, religious involvement, and belonging to the second generation. Preferences of government responsibility, however, are strongly determined by labor market position and left-right ideology.


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (7) ◽  
pp. 824-835 ◽  
Author(s):  
Branden B. Johnson ◽  
Nathan F. Dieckmann

A survey experiment assessed response to five explanations of scientific disputes: problem complexity, self-interest, values, competence, and process choices (e.g. theories and methods). A US lay sample ( n = 453) did not distinguish interests from values, nor competence from process, as explanations of disputes. Process/competence was rated most likely and interests/values least; all, on average, were deemed likely to explain scientific disputes. Latent class analysis revealed distinct subgroups varying in their explanation preferences, with a more complex latent class structure for participants who had heard of scientific disputes in the past. Scientific positivism and judgments of science’s credibility were the strongest predictors of latent class membership, controlling for scientific reasoning, political ideology, confidence in choice, scenario, education, gender, age, and ethnicity. The lack of distinction observed overall between different explanations, as well as within classes, raises challenges for further research on explanations of scientific disputes people find credible and why.


1970 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boban Petrović ◽  
Janko Međedović

Previous research has shown that since the beginning of the 1990s, differentiation in the ideological orientations of political parties in Serbia has been increased. Comparing three samples, we explored the temporal stability of relations between evaluations of Serbian political parties (DSS, DS, SRS, SPS, SNS, and LDP) and lexically derived ideological dimensions: Traditional and Religious Sources of Authority, Unmitigated Self-Interest, Communal Rationalism, and Subjective Spirituality. We hypothesize that: 1) political parties should be divided into conservative and socio-liberal parties, and this structure should become stable over time; 2) the evaluation of political parties should consistently reflect their political ideology orientation : conservative parties should be related to an indicator of conservative ideology, Traditional Religiosity, while socio-liberal parties should be related to a humanistic ideological orientation, Communal Rationalism. Data was collected in three time-points: 2010 (N = 102), 2014/15 (N = 358) and 2016 (N = 117) from university students in Serbia. In all three studies principal component analyses of evaluations of political parties showed that two components were extracted and interpreted as evaluations of the National-Conservative Parties and Socio-Liberal Parties (in 2010 and 2014), i.e. Democratic parties (in 2016). However, while the structure of evaluations of the National-Conservative Parties remained stable, the congruence of evaluations of the Socio-Liberal Parties decreased over time. Additionally, the results of regression analyses showed that evaluations of the National-Conservative Parties were rooted in Traditional and Religious Sources of Authority and Unmitigated Self-interest, but the percentage of explained variance decreased over time. The evaluations of the Socio-Liberal Parties had much weaker relations with ideological orientations throughout all three time-points. The findings suggested that there was some kind of ‘’ideological crisis’’ in Serbia, primarily regarding the Socio-Liberal Parties and their supporters.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-198
Author(s):  
JoEllen Pederson ◽  
K Russell Shekha

The historical strength of Latin American public pension systems and the changes many countries are making in the contemporary period warrant understanding attitudes about public pensions in Latin America. Data were examined for three countries: Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, to see whether commonly tested welfare state theories explain individual differences in attitudes in these countries. Using basic multilevel modeling techniques, we find both individual- and country-level differences in attitudes toward government responsibility for and spending on public pensions. Understanding what predicts these attitudes in Latin America will help improve approaches to social welfare in this region.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Pearson

In the aftermath of World War II, Christian leaders in Germany embraced the political ideology of Christian Democracy. Viewing Nazism as a form of materialism and atheism, which they blamed on the ongoing secularization and moral decay of German society, both Protestant and Catholic leaders argued that only the society-wide renewal of Christian faith and Christian values could provide a solid foundation for the future. Enjoying a privileged position in the eyes of the western Allies (particularly the Americans), the churches took on a leading role in the reconstruction of German society. And, working to overcome the postwar disillusionment of many of their members, church leaders urged their followers to take active, personal responsibility for political life in the new German states.


2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
ACHIM GOERRES ◽  
MARKUS TEPE

AbstractIn order to explain why people differ in their attitudes towards public childcare, we present a theoretical framework that integrates four causal mechanisms: regime socialisation, political ideology, family involvement and material self-interest. Estimation results obtained from multivariate regressions on the 2002 German General Social Survey and replications on the 2008/9 European Social Survey can be condensed into three statements: (1) Regime socialisation is the single most important determinant of attitudes toward public childcare, followed by young age as an indicator of self-interest and political ideology. Family involvement does not have any sizeable impact. (2) Regime socialisation conditions the impact of some indicators of political ideology and family involvement on attitudes toward public childcare. (3) Despite a paradigmatic shift in policy, the dynamics of 2008 mirror those of 2002, highlighting the stability of inter-individual differences in support. The results suggest that the ‘shadow of communism’ still stretches over what people in the East expect from the welfare state and that individual difference in the demand for public childcare appears to be highly path-dependent.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 552-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad B. Newswander ◽  
Aaron Matson ◽  
Lynita K. Newswander

Understood in economic terms, interest elevates baser human impulses and degrades higher human potential as it motivates individuals to value material gains over moral ones. Because of this influence, it is difficult to consider interest as a regime value. But just because it is beleaguered does not mean it ought to be abandoned, especially because interest is placed front and center in the constitutional order. Providing a perspective of the merits of interest, Alexis de Tocqueville offers a conceptualization that allows this regime value to be relevant even for contemporary administrators operating in spaces of diffused public responsibility.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172199365
Author(s):  
Klaus Armingeon ◽  
David Weisstanner

How can we explain variation in demand for redistribution among cross-pressured voters? We argue that redistributive preferences reflect an interaction between material self-interest and political ideology. The self-interest argument predicts growing opposition to redistribution as income increases, while the argument of ideologically driven preferences suggests that left-leaning citizens are more supportive of redistribution than right-leaning citizens. Focusing on cross-pressured voters, we expect that the difference in redistribution preferences between left- and right-leaning citizens is smaller at the bottom of the income hierarchy than at the top. Among the group of left-leaning citizens, the role of material self-interest is expected to be smaller than among right-leaning citizens. We provide evidence in line with our argument analysing data from the European Social Survey in 25 European democracies between 2008 and 2018.


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