Inside Jobs: Salary Setting for Immigrants Crossing Establishment, Organizational, and National Boundaries

ILR Review ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 001979392110413
Author(s):  
Ben A. Rissing ◽  
Kwan Lee

Using novel US Department of Labor administrative records, the authors test theoretical mechanisms to account for variation in immigrant workers’ starting salaries following key career transitions. Specifically, they examine differences in the base starting salaries and discretionary starting salary increases above these base starting salaries for 1) same-establishment hires, relative to 2) US-based establishment transfers, 3) international establishment transfers, 4) US-based external hires, and 5) international external hires. In support of the “insider premium” account, findings show that same-establishment hires tend to work in jobs with greater requirements, and thus higher base starting salaries. In partial support of the “outsider premium” account, findings show that US-based external hires receive larger starting salary increases than do same-establishment hires, conditional on the jobs they enter. This said, international external hires receive smaller starting salary increases than do same-establishment hires. Findings reveal distinct mechanisms, acting separately or in tandem, during salary-setting processes.

2014 ◽  
Vol 79 (6) ◽  
pp. 1226-1255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben A. Rissing ◽  
Emilio J. Castilla

This study contributes to the labor market inequality and organizations literature by investigating the role that government agents play in shaping the employment of immigrants. Using unique data on applications for immigrant permanent labor certification evaluated by U.S. Department of Labor agents, we assess to what extent immigrants of select citizenship groups experience disparities in the labor certification process—one critical stage of the work authorization system leading to the granting of most employment-based green cards. Despite current U.S. laws that forbid discrimination on the basis of nationality, we find that labor certification approvals differ significantly depending on immigrants’ foreign citizenship, even after controlling for key factors. Additionally, because of the U.S. government’s unique process of auditing applications, we are in a rare position to empirically distinguish between statistical and preference-based accounts of labor market discrimination in the labor certification process. In support of the statistical account, we find that certification approvals are equally likely for immigrant workers from the vast majority of citizenship groups when agents review audited applications with detailed employment information. This article concludes by discussing the implications of our results for addressing disparities in the employment of foreign nationals.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Eggerth ◽  
Michael A. Flynn ◽  
Annette Shtivelband ◽  
Donald E. Eggerth

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